Al Maliki’s Defeat in 2010 Parliamentary Elections Will Be a Setback for President Obama in Iraq

Al Maliki’s Defeat in 2010 Parliamentary Elections Will Be a Setback for President Obama in Iraq

BFPR ANALYSIS

 

By Webster Brooks      

Washington, D.C. — The Iraqi legislature’s November 8 approval of a new election law and agreement to hold parliamentary elections before January 31, 2010 are bringing all the major problems in Baghdad to a head. Although President Obama praised Iraq’s parliament saying its action will keep U.S. troop withdrawals on track for completion by August 2011, the outcome of the election is fraught with danger for his administration. Iraq’s Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s re-election bid is in deep trouble. Renewed sectarian violence hangs over Iraq as two deadly al Queda bombings on October 25 of government ministry buildings in Baghdad has unsettled the country. Pro-Iranian Shiia forces have re-organized their election campaigns and are gaining momentum. Tension between Kurdish, Sunni Arab and Turkmen forces over the status of oil-rich Kirkuk are also intensifying as the Parliament’s new election law backed Kurdish demands that voter eligibility in Kirkuk (Tamim Province) will be based on the 2009 voting list. With the stakes and the political temperature rising, U.S. armed forces in Iraq are prepared to redeploy to Kirkuk as Iraq braces for outbreaks of violence in the run up to the election.

 

At the center of the electoral firestorm is Iraqi Prime Minister al-Maliki. In August al-Maliki announced his Dawa Party’s break with the major Shiia groups (Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) and Sadrist forces led by Muqtada al Sadr) to form a secular “State of the Law List” with his “Sunni allies.” After directing the Iraqi Army’s offensive to smash the Sadrists in Basrah in 2008, al-Maliki distanced himself from the ruling Shiia coalition in Iraq’s January 2009 provincial elections. Al-Maliki’s list won a plurality of 31% of the vote carrying most of the Shiia majority provinces by campaigning on a platform of nationalism, political secularism, restoring law and order, building a strong central government and supporting a Status of Forces Agreement to expel U.S. troops by 2011. After his strong 2009 campaign al-Maliki negotiated with Shiia groups for months, demanding 50% of the parliamentary seats for the DAWA Party to join the new Shiia-led “United Iraqi Alliance List.” Fearful that al-Maliki is attempting to consolidate power for himself and DAWA, the Shiia groups balked at his demand but left the door open for al-Maliki’s possible return. On November 4, Iranian Parliamentary leader Ali Larijani arrived in Baghdad for talks with Iraq’s Shiia parties, urging them to settle their differences and bring al-Maliki into the fold to maximize Shiia control over Iraq’s government in the upcoming elections. But rapprochement between al-Maliki and the new United Iraqi Alliance is not likely. Over the past year al-Maliki’s missteps have alienated key forces and developments have conspired to further undermine his power base.

 

In August, former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari led a press conference announcing the creation of a new Shiia majority electoral list; the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA). After losing the 2009 provincial elections, the Sadrists, the Fadhila Party and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) patched up their differences and formed the UIA. Shiia forces hold 128 of the 275 seats in parliament, but in the 2009 provincial elections the ISCI won only 12% of the vote, the Sadrist 9% and former Prime Minister Ibrahim Jaffari won 5%. Forced to adjust its platform, the dominant ISCI dropped its call to create a Shiia controlled autonomous region (Shiiastan) in southern Iraq to appease Muqtada al Sadr’s forces in Baghdad and central Iraq who opposed Shiia regional autonomy. To appeal to more mainstream voters and secularists, the Sadrist and ISCI jettisoned their rhetoric to establish Iraq as a theocratic (read Shiia) Islamic state, choosing instead to run as a secular list. To broaden their base, the UIA invited Sunni groups, independents and influential Shiia secularist politicians like Ahmed al Chalabi and former DAWA Prime Minister al-Jaafari to join their list. When powerful Shiia cleric Ayatollah Sistani endorsed an open ballot process allowing Iraqis to vote for individuals, parties or lists, instead of just coalitions, UIA backers supported the measure in parliament although it will narrow their advantage at the ballot box.

 

While the UIA is expanding its base, al-Maliki’s “State of Law List” efforts to widen its influence beyond its DAWA base have met with little success. Prominent Sunni and secularist leaders publicly courted by al-Maliki are refusing to support his bloc. Former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, Sunni leader Saleh Mutlak and Vice-President Tarik al Hashemi formed the anti-Iranian “Iraqi National Movement List,” advocating re-integration of former Baathist leaders. Sheikh Ahmad Abu Risha, a force in Anbar and Interior Minister Jawad Bolani of the Constitution Party decided to create their own “Unity Alliance.” Similarly, al-Maliki’s efforts to recruit Ninewa Province’s ruling al-Hadbaa Party and Sunni tribal leaders from Anbar, Tamim and Salahaddin met with failure.

 

The Sunni lack of support for al-Maliki is not surprising. Al-Maliki promised to pay salaries for former Sunni Awakening forces and integrate them into Iraq’s national army, but half of the Awakening soldiers were never paid. Recently, al-Maliki announced the armed forces payroll would be cut as government salaries and expenditures were absorbing 74% of the nation’s $58 billion budget, thus the Iraqi National Army will likely remain a predominantly Shiia military. Moreover, reconciliation efforts to reintegrate Baathist forces into the wellsprings of Iraq’s government still has not occurred and no agreement has been reached on distribution of oil revenues. Despite his break with the Sadrists and the Iraqi Supreme Islamic Council, the Sunni still view al-Maliki as an agent of Iranian ambition. Sunni dissatisfaction with al-Maliki was underscored by the twin al Queda bombings in October of government complexes in the middle of Baghdad. The blasts that killed hundreds seriously undermined al-Maliki’s claim that he has restored security to Iraq. As the attacks were directed against major government buildings it appears the bombings were a direct warning to al-Maliki that the Sunni can visit chaos on Iraq if their demands are not addressed.

 

With the passage of the new 2010 election law allowing the 2009 voter list to be used in Kirkuk’s elections the Kurds are poised to gain control of oil-rich Tamim Province and exercise virtual independence from Iraq. Sunni Arab and Turkmen groups argued for using the 2004 voting list to eliminate voter eligibility for thousands of Kurds that returned to Kirkuk after Saddam Hussein was toppled in 2003. How the new election law would be applied to Kirkuk was the most contentious issue delaying the passage of the new bill and it remains the most volatile flashpoint that could lead to mass sectarian violence between the Kurds, the Sunni and Turkmen. The Kurds are now positioned to increase its 53 seat voting bloc in Iraq’s Parliament and strike a deal with the Shiia UAI List to incorporate oil rich Kirkuk into Kurdistan’s autonomous region. The two major Kurdish groups (PUK and KDP) will not enter into an alliance with Nouri al-Maliki, who opposed Kurdish enlargement and dispatched Iraqi Army forces to attack the Kurdish peshmerga in 2008. Instead, the Kurds will support UIA control of parliament and have a major voice in naming a new Prime Minister to replace al-Maliki if the “State of Law List falters.”

 

While Prime Minister al-Maliki’s chances of being re-elected are growing dimmer, shifting alliances and unforeseen events could tip the scales back in his direction the next sixty days. Iraq is a very unpredictable place. Prime Minister al-Maliki’s emphasis on secularism, law and order and building a unitary Iraq rather than ceding more autonomy to the Kurds and Shiia has been viewed with great favor by the Obama administration. And while his outreach to the Sunni may fall short of winning allies for the election, it has altered the political dynamic in Iraq. For the moment, the revamped Shiia led United Iraq Alliance has the momentum to win a working Parliamentary majority and name a new Prime Minister.  Among al-Maliki’s potential successors are Adel Abdul Mehdi, the Vice-President and a senior leader of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, and Ibrahim al-Jaafari, Iraq’s first elected prime minister. A pro-Iran leaning UIA victory will mean Tehran will strengthen its position in Iraq as the United States prepares to accelerate troop withdrawals at the end of March. The referendum on the Status of Forces Agreement scheduled for approval during the 2010 parliamentary has been withdrawn and will proceed on schedule for all U.S. forces to be withdrawn by August 31, 2011. If American forces can avoid being drawn into the maelstrom of Iraqi politics and sectarian violence President Obama may have the good fortune to exit U.S. troops without significant losses and augment his forces in Afghanistan. While an orderly U.S. withdrawal from Iraq will be viewed by many in the United States as a victory, in the larger strategic sense Iran’s ability to gain the upper hand in Iraq and solidify its control over the Persian Gulf would mark a major strategic setback for the U.S. Iraq’s 2010 elections and the fate of Prime Minister al-Maliki will significantly impact the future of American power in Gulf region as democratic elections continue to cast a large footprint across the Middle East.              

 

WHY OBAMA WILL ADOPT “McCRYSTAL LIGHT” STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN

 

BROOKS FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW

www.foreignpolicyreview.org

Analysis:  November 3, 2009    

by Webster Brooks 

 

 

With Hamid Karzai’s re-election as President of Afghanistan guaranteed by Abdullah Abdullah’s withdrawal from the race, President Obama is  moving U.S. policy towards the end-game of America’s occupation in Afghanistan. To reverse the Taliban’s momentum, protect Afghanistan’s major population centers and allow more time for President Karzai’s embattled government to be stabilized, President Obama will deploy up to 20,000 additional U.S. troops. By steering a “middle course” with a scaled down version of General McCrystal’s counterinsurgency plan, the President hopes to tilt the battlefield in favor of U.S./NATO forces without launching a forward-based offensive in the Pashtun Belt that will result in heavy U.S. troop losses.  The “McCrystal Light” strategy will place more emphasis on containing the Taliban, rather than the U.S. taking aggressive actions to significantly degrade Taliban forces. President Obama’s overarching strategic consideration will be re-setting the battlefield to give Afghanistan’s indigenous anti-Taliban oppostion forces the leverage to militarily engage and nuetralize the Taliban over time as the U.S. starts drawing down forces in 2011.   

President Obama’s decision to surge more U.S. troops to Afghanistan was never in question for several reasons. The Taliban’s growing momentum and influence cannot be allowed to expand without a challenge. Troop increases will also forestall a revolt by the U.S. military establishment and the Republican Party that have solidly backing the McCrystal plan. At the same time, a more robust presence of U.S. troops on the ground will send a message to America’s allies (NATO, India and Pakistan) and regional adversaries (Russia, Iran and China) that Afghanistan will not be abandoned. 

President Obama’s adoption of the “McCrystal Light” counterinsurgency plan is clearly a gamble to play for more time–more time for fresh U.S. forces to get postioned during the winter lull in fighting; more time to coordinate a new strategic orientation with NATO, and more time for new power sharing arrangements to be forged between Karzai, Abdullah Abdullah and the warlord powers. Afghanistan’s fraudulent elections have further undermined President Karzai’s despised government, increased ethnic tension and could still lead to violence between competing warlords if a post-election power sharing arrangement is not reached. 

By maintaining control of Afghanistan’s major population centers and key highways between Kandahar, Jalalabad, Mazar e Sharif, Herat and Kabul, U.S. /NATO forces may be able to bludgeon the Taliban’s advance while containing its presence in Eastern and Southeastern Afghanistan. To disrupt the Taliban and al Queda operations, the U.S. will certainly continue its Drone attacks and Special Forces missions along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.

In the meanwhile, the Obama administration will be forced to rapidly buildup the criminal warlord forces and their militias along with Afghanistan’s National Army as a bulwark against a Taliban takeover. As the warlord forces outside the Pashtun Belt represent Afghanistan’s Tajik, Uzbek, Hazara and Turkmen ethnic groups (60% of the total population), it’s possible that America’s eventual withdrawal could lead to a civil war between Afghanistan’s ethnic groups and the Pashtun dominated Taliban. These non-Pashtun communities that  coalesced under the banner of the Northern Alliance to help topple the Taliban in 2001 have no desire to live under Taliban rule again. Thus, to the extent that these forces could re-unite to form an effective anti-Taliban united front, preventing a Taliban takeover of all Afghanistan can be averted even if the Taliban is not completely dislodged from its Pashtun Belt strongholds.

President Obama is also gambling that as U.S. forces begin to draw down troop levels, Iran, Russia and India–three countries that supported the Northern Alliance and have a significant stake in preventing the Taliban’s return to power –may increase support for their various proxy forces within Afghanistan. Thus far Russia and Iran have benefitted strategically from America being pre-occupied and weakened by the conflict in Afghanistan. However, a Taliban takeover would spell trouble for Moscow and Tehran. Indeed, there are realistic scenarios in which the United States can withdraw the majority of its armed forces from Afghanistan and still prevent a Taliban takeover while denying al Queda a safe haven.

Under any of these scenarios, the real tragedy will be the horrible violence and deprevation the majority of Afghan people will continue to endure. The hardship they have suffered since the Taliban was deposed in 2001 has not significantly changed under the corrupt Karzai government. Moreover, the criminal warlords who have privatized the nation’s resources, stolen its mineral wealth, established their own tax collections system, profited from Afghanistan’s booming narcotics industry and crushed the Afghan peoples’ democratic rights have rivaled the Taliban in the art of brutal repression. The much discussed need for a counterinsurgency strategy and increasing U.S. troops to defeat the Taliban while doing nothing to curb the warlords power will leave millions of Afghans defenseless against these henchmen, many of which hold top level positions in the Karzai government today.

President Obama has come under heavy criticism for being indecisive and taking too much time to respond to General McCrystal’s assessment and recommendations on Afghanistan. What may be closer to the truth is that President Obama did not particularly like the options he was presented with. Vice-President Biden’s counterterrorism stategy emphasizing Drone attacks and Special Forces operations to subdue the Taliban was nothing more than a quick and dirty withdrawal strategy by another name. Obama will conclude that the situation on the ground does not yet warrant committing 40,000 additional troops. Given the current strain on U.S. armed forces Obama is also clearly concerned about getting bogged down in a long war in Afghanistan when America has other challenges it must prepare for. The situation in Iraq where 130,000 U.S. troops are still deployed remains a fluid and dangerous thearte of war. In steering the “middle course” President Obama will seek to balance all the competing internal forces on the ground in Afghanistan to achieve an outcome that prevents the Taliban from returning to power. This strategy calls for reshaping alliances and weakening forces in some cases, while strengthening forces and even provoking rivalries in others instances. With public support in America waning for the war in Afghanistan, President Obama’s “McCrystal Light” strategy to achieve the same objective of pushing back the Taliban and al Queda with minimal U.S. troop fatalities may also strike an acceptable balance.

Subduing insurgencies in foreign countries is sometimes the burden policing  empire. These unpopular conflicts can be lost by the lack of polictical support at home, just as easily as by being defeated by adversaries on the battlefield abroad. President Obama didn’t create American empire or start the war in Afghanistan, but he is now fully immersed in the search for an elegant solution to a very thorny crises in the Central Asian Great Game.

Obama Can Win Afghanistan With Soft Partition & the “Reverse McCrystal Strategy”

Obama Can Win Afghanistan With Soft Partition & the “Reverse McCrystal Strategy”

by Webster Brooks

Today, the Center for New Politics and Policy (CNPP) released its recommendations to abate the Taliban insurgency and stabilize Afghanistan with a new strategy paper called “Obama Can Win Afghanistan with Soft Partition & the Reverse McCrystal Strategy” (RMS). The RMS report highlights recommendations to halt the Taliban’s momentum, reconfigure US/NATO force structure on the ground with 20,000 additional troops, stabilize Afghanistan’s post-election government and maximize vital reconstruction efforts to unleash Afghanistan’s state building efforts. The Reverse McCrystal Strategy provides a framework for President Obama’s efforts over the next 18 months to achieve his central goal of preventing a Taliban takeover and denying al Queda a platform in Afghanistan to launch attacks against the United States. The report was drafted by Senior Fellow Webster Brooks, Director of Brooks Foreign Policy Review; the international affairs arm of the Center for New Politics and Policy. The following summary of the Reverse McCrystal Strategy was released on October 19, 2009 in Washington, D.C.

 Summary           

The critical moment for President Obama to announce a decision on America’s strategy to win the war in Afghanistan is fast approaching. In the ongoing series of White House war councils, debate continues on General Stanley McCrystal’s August report that stated “Failure to gain the initiative and reverse insurgent momentum in the near-term (next 12-18 months)….risks an outcome where defeating the insurgency is no longer possible.”  Over the next 18 months President Obama faces four critical questions: 1) Developing a response to stem the Taliban’s growing influence and putting the insurgency on the defensive, 2) Redeploying U.S./NATO/ANA forces to tilt the battlefield in their favor, 3) Brokering an agreement to form a power-sharing post-election government and 4) Reorganizing state building and reconstruction efforts to create the foundation needed to sustain Afghanistan. The Reverse McCrystal Strategy (RMS) represents the best and most realistic strategy to achieve these objectives in the next 18 months and prepare for the gradual withdrawal of U.S. troops over the long run (3-4 years). 

The centerpiece of the Reverse McCrystal Strategy calls for redeploying U.S./NATO military and economic power to consolidate Northern, Central and Western Afghanistan into a “maximum safety zone.” Securing these three regions now where 65% of all Afghans live, and linking them to vital reconstruction efforts is the most effective way to diminish the Taliban’s momentum and solidify critical mass around the central government. Supported by 20,000 additional American troops, U.S./NATO operations would shift from conducting “clear, hold and build missions” inside the Taliban dominated Pashtun belt to providing maximum security to Kabul and the 23 identified “median and low-risk” provinces where the Taliban’s presence is minimal but spreading (see map). Recent Taliban advances outside the Pashtun belt suggest that U.S. forces engaging their adversaries from Kunduz in Northeastern Afghanistan to the southern province of Helmand are overstretched and under resourced. General McCrystal’s request for 40,000 to 80,000 troops to pursue the elusive Taliban plays directly into the Taliban’s hit and run strategy. Meanwhile, the Taliban continues to maneuver and expand the battlefield, launching surprise offensives in new areas. What is most important now for President Obama and the faltering Afghan government is reversing the Taliban’s momentum by consolidating order, safety and stability over a significant section of Afghanistan. Demonstrating real progress and a model of a viable state is of the utmost urgency. Securing Northern, Central and Western Afghanistan would not only demonstrate tangible success, it would decisively impact the balance of power on the ground.         

The Reverse McCrystal Strategy also calls on U.S./NATO forces to scale back forward operations for one year in the Pashtun belt where the Taliban enjoys real support, superior battlefield knowledge and strategic depth with supporting rear-guard bases in Pakistan. The tactical pullback in the Pashtun belt would be done in conjunction with the mass redeployment to Northern, Central and Western Afghanistan. A “demilitarized zone” and safe transit corridors to-and-from the Pushtun-belt provinces would be established for commercial purposes and safe passage. In addition, US/NATO forces would continue the “limited use” of Drone attacks and Special Forces operations on the Pakistan/Afghanistan border to interdict arms shipments and infiltrating al Queda elements. Redoubled efforts in cooperation with Pakistan’s government to destroy critical Taliban support networks in Baluchistan and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas is of critical importance. Concurrent with these changes, Afghanistan’s government would open discussions with Pashtun tribal leaders, parliamentary officials and “willing” Taliban elements over a potential framework for regional autonomy and other national reforms.

While the RMS embraces General McCrystal’s call for a shift from defeating the Taliban by force of arms to creating safe havens, it reverses the battlefield deployment and political focus by winning the hearts and minds of two-thirds of Afghanistan’s provinces first. It optimizes opportunities to contain and undermine the Taliban by negating the most compelling factor powering its surge; the prevailing state of chaos across Afghanistan led by an incompetent and corrupt Karzai government and criminal warlords.

By increasing troop levels, resetting US/NATO/ forces and tactically pulling back in the Pashtun Belt, President Obama will gain valuable breathing room to bring America’s allies on side, settle the post-election political governmental crisis and train additional Afghan National Army troops. Whether there is a run-off election or not between Hamid Karzai and Abdullah Abdullah, it is critical that both men participate in a new coalition government. The effort to stabilize Northern, Central and Western Afghanistan will require significant compromise between Uzbeks, Tajiks, Hazaras and Turkmen who were the core of the Northern Alliance that helped topple the Taliban in 2001. Many of these forces also supported Abdullah Abdullah in the first round of the presidential elections. For better or worse, as a Pashtun, Hamid Karzai can still be a valuable asset in talks with provincial leaders on instituting various forms of autonomy in Pashtun communities. While the character of the Taliban’s insurgency is Islamic-based, the Taliban has remained a predominately ethnic-Pashtun movement. Increased autonomy may create new vehicles and greater choice to incorporate Pashtun cultural, religious and traditional practices into provincial governance structures, thereby dispelling notions that only the Taliban can fulfill these aspirations. The essential point of autonomy in the Pashtun belt is that increased empowerment at the provincial level will afford Pashtun more choices and resources to exert independence from the Taliban. 

Critics of the Reverse McCrystal Strategy will undoubtedly claim that any pullback-temporary or otherwise- from taking the fight to the Taliban is tantamount to capitulation or surrender. But there is no purely military solution to end the war in Afghanistan. The consensus view is that sufficient damage must be inflicted on extremists Taliban elements to create conditions that will compel moderate and wavering Taliban elements to align themselves with the central government. By creating a safe and viable Afghanistan state in Northern, Central and Western Afghanistan supported by a majority of the Afghan people, the Taliban’s rationale that they are the only force that can restore order will be severely undermined. Containing the Taliban’s advances by a soft partition of the Pashtun belt will halt their expansion and reverse their momentum. Increased efforts with Pakistan to neutralize their rear-guard support bases will bottle the Taliban up in a confined space. Offers of greater autonomy and redefining their relationship to the Afghan government will stimulate more debate among the Pashtun people about where their future interests lie and further undercut support for the Taliban. The Reverse McCrystal Strategy in its initial phase will significantly weaken the Taliban militarily and drain its political support among the Pashtun people. Moreover, RMS can accomplish all these achievements with the lowest possible U.S./NATO casualty rates. With public opinion weakening in America and Europe for the war, tangible success in stabilizing 65% of Afghanistan today combined with minimum casualties is the formula to sustain support for the cause in Afghanistan. If and when US/NATO forces have to move decisively to fully re-engage militarily in the Pashtun belt they would confront a far less formidable adversary.

Prosecuting unpopular wars against insurgencies that cannot be won militarily is sometimes the burden of policing empire. There are no easy options for President Obama in Afghanistan. What is required now is an imaginative approach that breaks with conventional thinking. The Reverse McCrystal Strategy offers both. ******

Obama’s Critics on Missille Defense Shield Cancellation Are Wrong

BROOKS FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW ANALYSIS

September 27, 2009

“President Bush was right that Iran’s ballistic missile program poses a significant threat. That’s why I’m committed to deploying strong missile defense systems which are adaptable to the threats of the 21st century. This approach is also consistent with NATO’s missile defense efforts and provides opportunities for enhanced international collaboration going forward and we are bound by the solemn commitment of NATO’s Article V that an attack on one is an attack on all.”                                                                                 

Critics charging that President Obama’s cancellation of the missile defense shield system in Poland and the Czech Republic marked capitulation to Russia and weakened Europe’s defense against Iranian and Russian missile attacks are dead wrong. Quite the opposite, the President’s new plan deploys a more potent, high tech, land, sea and space-based system to defend all of Europe and the Caucuses. Obama’s revised “Star Wars” plan is more mobile, less detectable and will be deployed faster than the original plan for ten ground-based interceptor missiles in Poland and forward-based X-band missile radar in the Czech Republic. Arguably, the Obama-Gates universal interceptor missile system will put the United States on the cusp of uncontested global military superiority by making itself and its allies highly impenetrable to Russian, Chinese, North Korean and Iranian missile attacks.

Appearing with President Obama at the September 17 announcement, Defense Secretary Gates stated that “We have now the opportunity to deploy new sensors and interceptors in northern and southern Europe that in the near term provide missile defense coverage against more immediate threats from Iran or others.” Given that Iran is nowhere close to fielding long-range missiles, Gates reference to “others” was obviously directed at Russia. Gates outlined the new plan that will deploy Aegis class warships equipped with SM-3 mobile missile interceptors that can be moved from one region to another. The U.S. has fifteen destroyers and three cruisers equipped with the Aegis combat system which is being developed into a worldwide, sea based, rapid deployable missile shield structure. These new capabilities are being coordinated with Norway, Spain, Australia, Japan and South Korea. Indeed, in February 2008, the USS Lake Erie, an Aegis class guided-missile cruiser, shot down an American satellite in space in its testing phase.  Further, Gates said Phase 2 of the universal interceptor missile system will include “upgraded land-based SM-3s” by 2015.

In addition to deploying the universal interceptor missile system, the Obama Administration and NATO are upgrading the integrated European Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) with current Patriot and Nike Hercules components.  MEADS will include forward-based X-band radar, 360 degree surveillance radar, missile launchers and next-generation Patriot interceptor missiles. MEADS will be interoperable with other defense systems, including the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system and the Aegis sea-based missile defense systems. Obama has requested and will receive $600 million in funding from Congress for MEADS in the next fiscal year. Doubters concerned about President Obama’s commitment to missile defense should also take comfort in the August announcement of the Pentagon’s Missile Defense Agency that its modified Boeing 747-400F airplane was successfully deployed with a laser weapon that “found, tracked, engaged and simulated an intercept with a missile seconds after liftoff.’ This fall the first live attempt to bring down a ballistic missile will be tested. As for the “defenseless” Czech Republic and Poland, the Pentagon has already opened talks with both countries about hosting a land-based version of the SM-3 missile interceptors and other components of the system. American plans call for 96 Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missiles in Poland, capable of selecting targeting and homing in on the warhead portion of an inbound ballistic missile. 

Obama’s detractors that claim Poland and the Czech Republic were betrayed in exchange for Russian support for sanctions against Iran’s nuclear program should think again. It’s true that Russian President Medvedev applauded President Obama’s decision to “cancel” the missile defense shield system. After all, he’d look foolish criticizing what Russia had so publicly demanded. On September 22, Medvedev also suggested Russia would consider supporter tougher sanctions against Iran. But behind the walls of the Kremlin there are growing concerns about Russia’s encirclement by the U.S./NATO buildup of a global missile interceptor system. Moscow has seen this movie before. President Reagan’s original Star Wars plan set off a run of defense spending in the USSR that contributed significantly to the economic hollowing out of the Soviet state. When Russia responded to the Poland-Czech Republic missile defense shield by threatening to place Iskander ballistic missiles in Kaliningrad on Poland’s border, it evoked a sense of an escalating Cold War buildup. If Russia ultimately supports damaging sanctions against Iran it won’t be because they feared ten fixed-site land based missile interceptors and a radar installation outside of Prague; Putin and company have a larger strategic problem to counterbalance.  

It must also be said that after all the rhetoric about the Polish and Czech people being abandoned to the Russians, surveys consistently demonstrate that a majority of Poles opposed the stationing of American missiles inside their borders. In the Czech Republic, over two-thirds of the public opposed the basing of the interceptor missile radar. For those who are still not clear about President Obama’s capacity for flexing American military might, he defended his vision of the Star Wars 2 universal missile interceptor system by saying, “President Bush was right that Iran’s ballistic missile program poses a significant threat. And that’s why I’m committed to deploying strong missile defense systems which are adaptable to the threats of the 21st century. This approach is also consistent with NATO’s missile defense efforts and provides opportunities for enhanced international collaboration going forward and we are bound by the solemn commitment of NATO’s Article V that an attack on one is an attack on all.”  Commenting on the new missile defense system the conservative Wall Street Journal recently stated that “Never has Ronald Reagan’s dream of layered missile defenses – Star Wars, for short – been as close, at least technologically, to becoming realized.”

America’s military buildup of ground forces and the largest CIA station in Afghanistan and its aggressive push to place military installations across Central Asia are exerting enormous pressure on Russia, China and Iran. In the final analysis, President Obama will not be able to stop Iran’s drive to master the uranium enrichment cycle or develop a nuclear weapons program. What we witnessing now with the deployment of Obama’s Star Wars 2 missile defense system is a rapid buildup to contain the emerging Eastern Axis in Tehran, Beijing and Moscow.

Pakistani Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud Killed in CIA Missile Strike

Brooks Foreign Policy Review

August 7, 2009

Today Pakistani officials announced that Pakistani Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud was killed by a U.S. drone missile attack. Mehsud was the most feared leader of Pakistan’s resurgent Tehrik-i-Taliban. He has been accused of masterminding terrorists attacks from Spain to complicity in the murder of former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in 2007. Mehsud always denied he had any involvement in Bhutto’s assassination. He was also accused of working directly with al Queda in Pakistan, supplying them with support to establish operating and training bases in the Federally Administered Tribal Territories.

While definitive proof of Mehsud’s death has yet to be established it is believed he was killed in Drone attack on his father-in-laws home on Friday morning, where he was visiting his second wife. Reports have also indicated that local Taliban leaders in South Waziristan have already convened a shura (council) to determine who will succeed Mehsud as leader. Robert Gibbs, Obama adminstration spokesman said they are aware of the reports but cannot confirm their accuracy. Meanwhile the Pakistani government announced they will be dispatching a team to the site of the attack to confirm Baitallah Mehsud’s death.

Obama’s Unfolding Strategy for Victory in Afghanistan

August 4, 2009

by Webster Brooks ,

Editor Brooks Foreign Policy Review 

With July marking the deadliest month of combat for U.S. and NATO forces since the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, America’s fortitude and patience with an intensifying military conflict will be severely tested in 2009. So too will President Obama’s leadership as a wartime president. England and Canada’s flagging support for the war, rising casualty rates and abducted American soldiers pleading for their lives on cable news channels are already generating concern at the White House and the Pentagon. Because wars can be lost just as easily by the lack of domestic support, more so than military defeats on foreign battlefields, President Obama must continue to forcefully articulate what vital American interests are at stake in Afghanistan. He should answer his critics who question his rationale for escalating a war most experts agree cannot be won militarily against an enemy that poses no existential threat to America. Afghanistan is now Barak Obama’s war. His credibility as Commander-in-Chief and his presidency may well depend on it. 

President Obama came to office with a clear and well conceived strategy to prosecute the “Forgotten War” in Afghanistan; one he has relentlessly pursued in his first six months in office. Having inherited George Bush’s war, he immediately redefined the goal in Afghanistan as defeating al Queda and its extremists Taliban allies, and denying them a sanctuary to launch attacks against America. Obama’s critical first step called for a larger American military footprint on the ground. Not surprisingly, his attempts to persuade our NATO allies to make a similar commitment were not very successful. Although some of his detractors questioned his decision to expand America’s commitment in Afghanistan out of fear that the U.S. would get bogged down in a military quagmire, President Obama had no choice. When he assumed office in January, the Taliban had advanced to the outskirts of Kabul, and were gaining control of more provinces within the country. Not to act quickly and decisively to increase America’s presence on the ground risked the downfall of President Hamid Kharzai’s weak and unpopular government. The possibility of Afghanistan collapsing into a failed state would have dramatically destabilized the region and vastly complicated an already dangerous situation in neighboring Pakistan and Iran.  Since the arrival of additional troops in Afghanistan and Obama’s installation of General Stanley McChrystal to lead the war effort, the Taliban’s offensive has been blunted and President Kharzai’s government has been shored up. The troop surge has also been critical to restoring order across the country in the lead up to the September presidential elections.  

In July, Obama’s troop surge unfolded as the locus of his long-term strategy of unleashing a military offensive to break the back of extremist Taliban forces entrenched in Eastern Afghanistan. President Obama’s goal is not to totally destroy extremist Taliban elements, but to significantly reduce their military capability and influence; thereby creating new conditions to draw “moderate” Taliban elements into Kharzai’s ruling coalition government. July’s ground offensive targeted the Taliban’s most significant stronghold in southeastern Afghanistan’s Helmund Province.  Helmund Province is not only one of the Taliban’s military and cultural centers of gravity, but the most profitable poppy growing region in the nation that finances much of the Taliban’s operations. The Taliban cannot be defeated until its economic lifeline to narcotics trafficking is degraded and U.S./Afghan National Army forces can exert more control over the areas along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border to stem the flow of jihadists, arms and drugs to-and-from Pakistan.  

The costs of taking the fight to the Taliban thus far have been heavy. The spike in U.S. and NATO casualties will undoubtedly continue throughout 2009 as the missions to subdue the Taliban in Eastern Afghanistan continue. In July, NATO and American forces suffered 75 fatalities; 42 two U.S. troops were killed and six more died the first two days in August. Despite the uptick in combat deaths, the U.S. and NATO must continue to press forward on the battlefield. Their failure to do so would send a negative message to the Afghan people who already question America’s commitment and resolve to the future wellbeing of Afghanistan.

Similar to Iraq, the U.S. military is attempting to drive the Taliban out of its areas of refuge and support, and then remain in the “liberated” areas to secure the safety of local inhabitants. This close combat and exposure to enemy fire associated with the “capture, hold and build” strategy is more challenging in Afghanistan which is not only larger but more ethnically and tribally diverse than Iraq. The Afghan Taliban forces are extremely capable and well trained, particularly in using suicide and roadside bombs to kill American soldiers. Thus higher casualty rates must be expected.

By pressing its ground and air offensive early and hard against Taliban strongholds in Helmund Province, President Obama is hoping to score a decisive victory that will create the momentum to confront the Taliban in Afghanistan’s other eastern provinces like Kandahar, while at the same time demoralizing wavering Taliban elements. Key to the success of the Obama’s strategy of winning moderate and wavering Taliban elements over to the Kharzai government is convincing them that the Taliban hardliners cannot win the war or offer its citizens a better life.

As an integral part of this strategy the U.S. is moving to implement a similar tactic that it used with success in Iraq in the Anbar Awakening; putting Taliban insurgents on its payroll to stop fighting the Kharzai government. In Iraq the U.S. coughed up $30 million a month to pay 100,000 Sunni insurgents $300 each. In Afghanistan it has been estimated that its 250,000 insurgents could be paid $120 a month, or the national average of the salary of the lowest ranking members of the Afghan army. In the weeks ahead the Obama administration can be expected to roll out this program after the presidential elections that Kharzai is expected to win.  

A second strategy the Obama administration is reviewing to bring more moderate Taliban elements into Kharzai’s coalition government is “flipping” various Taliban leaders and groups. In Afghanistan’s past twenty years of internal warfare, various warlords, tribal and clan leaders have often “switch sides” in the middle of a conflict based on who they think will win. Warlords and tribal leaders joining the same forces they once fought against has been a constant and peculiar feature of Afghanistan devastating patchwork of civil wars. In short, many Taliban leaders have placed insuring the survival of their own tribes and klans above their loyalty to national Taliban leaders like Mullah Omar or major figures from other provinces. The Obama administration has made it clear to Hamid Kharzai, that if he wins the presidential election, he will have to reach out to various Taliban forces that have opposed him and even fought against him in the past. He will also have to end the rampant corruption that has marked his presidency. Kharzai has already begun making his peace with some of these Taliban leaders by offering them offices in his government in exchange for their support for his candidacy. While “flipping” certain Taliban leaders is an intricate and complex process intrinsic to Afghan culture, the prospects of its success will be dramatically improved the more U.S. and NATO forces are able to rock extremists Taliban elements back on the heels militarily.

Beyond the military component of the Afghanistan War, financial support, NGO involvement, reconstruction teams, education, infrastructure and economic development assistance are needed to stand up a viable functioning state. If the U.S. is going to eradicate poppy fields and production that constitutes 60 percent of Afghanistan’s economy they must also have replacement crops and programs available to poor Afghan farmers to maintain their support. Coordinating and bringing these resources to bear on Afghanistan is far beyond the means of the United States alone. It will require the cooperation and assistance of NATO countries and others like India, Iran and Russia that already have substantial investments and national security interest in a stable Afghanistan. But these massive investments and improvements in the daily lives of the Afghan people can only become tangible in an environment where there is a reasonable hope of long-term security and stability in government. Right now the Afghan people have neither.

President Obama is well aware of the dangers of getting bogged down in a long-drawn out war in Afghanistan; one the United States cannot afford militarily or financially. Afghanistan storied history as being the graveyard of empires from Genghis Khan to the Soviet Union’s disastrous occupation has informed his military strategy. President Obama’s troop surge and military offensive to “capture, hold and build” territory while changing facts on the ground in the short run is the only realistic strategy that can create the conditions for a negotiated settlement with moderate and wavering Taliban forces. It is a realistic approach for getting American troops out of Afghanistan sooner rather than later. Whether the American people will demonstrate the resolve to support America’s difficult and painful mission in Afghanistan remains to be seen. As for the Obama Administration, there can be no turning back now.  ******

Guantanamo and the Uighurs: The Story of China’s Other Minority – Part II

by Collin Spears – Visiting Fellow, Center for New Politics and Policy

The first installment of this two part series explored the situation of Uighur detainees in Guantanamo Bay and China’s response to the U.S. decision to release the Uighurs to third-countries as political refugees.  This installment will look at the current situation in Xinjiang.  Then, the history of the Han Chinese – Uighur relationship will be surveyed to deduce what motivated the Guantanamo Uighurs to journey to Afghanistan and Pakistan as political and economic refugees, some of whom trained in the hope of returning to Xinjiang to commit terrorist acts against the Chinese government.  Further, the implications to U.S. foreign policy, as it relate to the situation in Xinjiang, will be examined.

Guantanamo and the Uighurs: The Story of China’s Other Minority – Part I.

by Collin Spears – Visiting Fellow, Center for New Politics and Policy

Officially, the People’s Republic of China has 55 distinct ethnic minority groups, which total to about 100 million in number or 8.5 percent of the country’s population.  Most of these minorities live on the margins of China-proper, and do not have greater issues with the national government than the Han majority who live in similar situations.  Some groups, such as the ethnic Koreans (Chaoxian) and Manchu (Mǎnzú), are highly integrated into the Chinese mainstream.  However, the best known Chinese minority internationally, especially in the West, are the Tibetans (XīZàng).  They are widely understood to be an oppressed culturally distinct minority who wants independent or, at the very least, greater autonomy from Beijing.

This level of international awareness is astonishing; considering, the Tibet Autonomous Region (Xīzàng Zìzhìqū) is roughly 12% of China’s total land area, but Tibetans make up less than half of one percent of China’s population.  This makes them only the ninth largest minority group.  The Tibetan Issue is well known, primarily due to a superior global marketing campaign, which includes the venerable Dalai Lama and a host of celebrity Western activists, such as Richard Gere and Sting.  However, the Uighurs (also Uyghurs, Wéiwú’ěr) are a more numerous minority who have struggled just as long against the Han Chinese, whose homeland also makes up a larger territory, have never enjoyed the same international regard.  Perhaps, Turkic Muslims are not as appealing to the hearts and minds of the West as monks in flowing robes, despite the latter’s harsh feudalistic history.  Besides cultural bias, the Uighurs have likely failed at marketing, because unlike the Tibetans, they have no central leadership that is universally recognized by all the disparate factions.

Brooks Sunday Global Review – Rajan Menon Interview: Obama’s NATO Challenge and the Afghanistan War

Rajan Menon

BROOKS SUNDAY GLOBAL REVIEW – TALK
Rajan Menon, Bernard Schwartz Fellow -The New America Foundation
Discusses: Obama’s First EU/NATO Visit, the War in Afghanistan and his book
“The End of Alliances” with Webster Brooks.

Obama’s Afghanistan War Now Hinges on Russian Supply Lines

Richard Holbrooke, President Obama and George Mitchell

“Afghanistan and Pakistan are the central front in America’s war against terrorism. The deteriorating situation in the region poses a grave threat to  global security. It’s an international challenge of the highest order. That’s why we are pursuing a careful review of our policy.”

 President Barak Obama

 

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The success of President Obama’s planned surge of 30,000 additional U.S. troops to Afghanistan will likely depend on support from an unlikely ally; Russia. On January 20, the same day Barak Obama was sworn in as President, CENTCOM Commander General David Petreus concluded his Central Asian tour and announced from Pakistan that agreements to transit commercial goods and services to U.S. forces in Afghanistan will ”include several of the countries in the Central Asia states and also Russia.” How the ugly war of words between the U.S. and Russia over Moscow’s Georgian invasion five months ago was shelved to forge a critical alliance around Afghanistan reveals much about America’s diminished capacity to project power in Central Asia. It’s also an ominous sign that  Pakistan’s growing insurgency is wrecking havoc on U.S. supply routes to Afghanistan and the extremists potential to induce crisis in Pakistan.  

     

Three-fourths of NATO supplies are transited to Afghanistan through Pakistan’s Khyber Pass, located west of the NWFP capital of Peshawar. The Taliban has destroyed hundreds of NATO provision trucks, unleashed  deadly attacks against NATO convoys and raided key supply depots.  Emboldened by its success, the Taliban is now attempting to choke off the vital port city of Karachi, where the NATA logistics hub begins. The Pakistani military’s inability to drive the Taliban from the Northwest Territory combined with ISI support for the Taliban has made maintaining Pakistani supply routes too risky a proposition to sustain NATO growing operations in Afghanistan. The new Obama administration has continued its devastating Drone aerial attacks against Taliban strongholds on the Afghan-Pakistani border. But civilian deaths associated with the Drone attacks are fueling anger and anti-American sentiment on both sides of the border, while weakening the legitimacy of President Kharzai and President Zardari’s governments. For all these reasons opening a second supply front for U.S. and NATO operations emerged as “mission critical” to push forward  President Obama’s Afghanistan surge campaign.

     

Pakistan’s deepening turmoil and  U.S. reliance on a revanchist Russia to ensure its supply lines in Afghanistan are unsettling realities. But dragging the unstable nations of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan into the equation represents a dangerous expansion of the “Long War” in Central Asia. U.S. negotiations with these countries over transit routes, access to air bases and foreign aid packages started before the 2001 Afghanistan invasion. The regional maneuvering has ebbed and flowed with the intensifying U.S.- Russian rivalry over Central Asian oil exploration, pipeline rights and the volatile internal politics of each country. Given the contention between the U.S. and Russia in Central Asia’s renewed “Great Game” a valid question arises; why has Russia come to the aid of its nemesis, the United States? 

 

Moscow has a strategic interest in preventing the Taliban from toppling the government in Kabul, either directly or by leading a coalition of forces.  The Taliban’s return to power would virtually eliminate Russian influence inside Afghanistan, whereas today Moscow has significant ties with  Northern Alliance forces, President Kharzai and pro-Iranian forces inside Afghanistan. Furthermore, America’s aggressive efforts in Central Asia have led to the establishment of U.S. military installations in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Moscow and China are deeply troubled by America’s expanded military profile in Central Asia. President Putin moved to  facilitate the transit agreements, rather than risking the U.S. cutting deals with Central Asia regimes without Russian input. For his services to the United States, the Obama administration reciprocated by hitting the mute button regarding Putin’s shut down of natural gas flows to European countries in mid-winter; a manufactured crisis that allowed Russia to blame the Ukraine for the shortages while extorting higher gas  transit prices from Kiev.  

 

Beyond blocking U.S. encroachment in its security perimeter, Russia has a long-term security imperative of preventing the spread of radical Islam  to its neighboring former Soviet Republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,  Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. These countries on Russia’s southern border have large Muslim populations and indigenous radical Islamists organizations that threaten Moscow’s national security and hinder its efforts to keep the former Soviet republics within its sphere of influence. Inside Russia, the transformation of Chechnya’s nationalist movement into a  jihadist juggernaut supported by its majority Muslim population led to a  bloody 12-year succession struggle bordering on ethnic cleansing. There are 20 million self-identified Muslims in Russia, a number that has risen by 40% in the last 15 years. Russian sensitivity to its potential Islamic threat is real, and the destabilization of any of its Central Asian neighbors could be a lightning rod that ignites the fuse. 

 

Obama’s new Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke will undoubtedly tout the benefits of  U.S. anti-narcotics initiatives in Afghanistan to curtail the flow of heroin that is devastating Central Asia and Russia. Construction projects, infrastructure development, U.S. dollars and other accoutrements showered on the Central Asian republics will ease the regional economic crisis and revive the failed “Silk Road” strategy of applying American soft power in Central Asia. Of particular concern to Obama’s foreign policy team will be buttressing Tajikistan; the poorest Central Asian country, rife with weapons and narcotics smuggling, and tense ethnic divisions with its Uzbek neighbors that could collapse the nation into a failed state. Such a development would increase the difficulties of stabilizing Afghanistan and heighten US-Russian regional geo-political rivalry. 

 

For the  United States and Russia, expanding the War in Afghanistan to the Central Asian steppes, even with a benign act of securing transit routes is a risk they are willing to take to prevent the Taliban from taking power in Kabul. What becomes problematic is the possibility that Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Omar is not to contending for state power, but destabilizing the Kharzai government to the point where the Taliban can maintain control of a limited number of provinces while expanding its sphere of influence. Indeed, what seems more likely is that the Afghan Taliban is working in concert with the newly emerging Pakistan Taliban and al Queda in an effort to establish a rump confederation that consolidates their joint control of Southeastern Afghanistan, Pakistan ’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas, Baluchistan and the Northwest Frontier Provinces. In short, these forces are carving out a failed state of Pushtanistan in the ungoverned territories along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region.  

 

On January 22, President Obama called Pakistan and Afghanistan “the central front of terrorism,” and spoke of the necessity of eliminating this global threat starting in Afghanistan. By securing Russia’s aid to open new supply lines for NATO and U.S. forces, he just might be falling deeper into al Queda’s deadly trap of extending U.S. forces across Afghanistan, expanding unpopular bombing missions, increasing cross border excursions into Pakistan’s Northwest Territories and exposing more American forces to attack on the Central Asian steppes. The battlefield in Central Asia is being stretched. No one is sure where it will end.