Obama’s Unfolding Strategy for Victory in Afghanistan

August 4, 2009

by Webster Brooks ,

Editor Brooks Foreign Policy Review 

With July marking the deadliest month of combat for U.S. and NATO forces since the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, America’s fortitude and patience with an intensifying military conflict will be severely tested in 2009. So too will President Obama’s leadership as a wartime president. England and Canada’s flagging support for the war, rising casualty rates and abducted American soldiers pleading for their lives on cable news channels are already generating concern at the White House and the Pentagon. Because wars can be lost just as easily by the lack of domestic support, more so than military defeats on foreign battlefields, President Obama must continue to forcefully articulate what vital American interests are at stake in Afghanistan. He should answer his critics who question his rationale for escalating a war most experts agree cannot be won militarily against an enemy that poses no existential threat to America. Afghanistan is now Barak Obama’s war. His credibility as Commander-in-Chief and his presidency may well depend on it. 

President Obama came to office with a clear and well conceived strategy to prosecute the “Forgotten War” in Afghanistan; one he has relentlessly pursued in his first six months in office. Having inherited George Bush’s war, he immediately redefined the goal in Afghanistan as defeating al Queda and its extremists Taliban allies, and denying them a sanctuary to launch attacks against America. Obama’s critical first step called for a larger American military footprint on the ground. Not surprisingly, his attempts to persuade our NATO allies to make a similar commitment were not very successful. Although some of his detractors questioned his decision to expand America’s commitment in Afghanistan out of fear that the U.S. would get bogged down in a military quagmire, President Obama had no choice. When he assumed office in January, the Taliban had advanced to the outskirts of Kabul, and were gaining control of more provinces within the country. Not to act quickly and decisively to increase America’s presence on the ground risked the downfall of President Hamid Kharzai’s weak and unpopular government. The possibility of Afghanistan collapsing into a failed state would have dramatically destabilized the region and vastly complicated an already dangerous situation in neighboring Pakistan and Iran.  Since the arrival of additional troops in Afghanistan and Obama’s installation of General Stanley McChrystal to lead the war effort, the Taliban’s offensive has been blunted and President Kharzai’s government has been shored up. The troop surge has also been critical to restoring order across the country in the lead up to the September presidential elections.  

In July, Obama’s troop surge unfolded as the locus of his long-term strategy of unleashing a military offensive to break the back of extremist Taliban forces entrenched in Eastern Afghanistan. President Obama’s goal is not to totally destroy extremist Taliban elements, but to significantly reduce their military capability and influence; thereby creating new conditions to draw “moderate” Taliban elements into Kharzai’s ruling coalition government. July’s ground offensive targeted the Taliban’s most significant stronghold in southeastern Afghanistan’s Helmund Province.  Helmund Province is not only one of the Taliban’s military and cultural centers of gravity, but the most profitable poppy growing region in the nation that finances much of the Taliban’s operations. The Taliban cannot be defeated until its economic lifeline to narcotics trafficking is degraded and U.S./Afghan National Army forces can exert more control over the areas along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border to stem the flow of jihadists, arms and drugs to-and-from Pakistan.  

The costs of taking the fight to the Taliban thus far have been heavy. The spike in U.S. and NATO casualties will undoubtedly continue throughout 2009 as the missions to subdue the Taliban in Eastern Afghanistan continue. In July, NATO and American forces suffered 75 fatalities; 42 two U.S. troops were killed and six more died the first two days in August. Despite the uptick in combat deaths, the U.S. and NATO must continue to press forward on the battlefield. Their failure to do so would send a negative message to the Afghan people who already question America’s commitment and resolve to the future wellbeing of Afghanistan.

Similar to Iraq, the U.S. military is attempting to drive the Taliban out of its areas of refuge and support, and then remain in the “liberated” areas to secure the safety of local inhabitants. This close combat and exposure to enemy fire associated with the “capture, hold and build” strategy is more challenging in Afghanistan which is not only larger but more ethnically and tribally diverse than Iraq. The Afghan Taliban forces are extremely capable and well trained, particularly in using suicide and roadside bombs to kill American soldiers. Thus higher casualty rates must be expected.

By pressing its ground and air offensive early and hard against Taliban strongholds in Helmund Province, President Obama is hoping to score a decisive victory that will create the momentum to confront the Taliban in Afghanistan’s other eastern provinces like Kandahar, while at the same time demoralizing wavering Taliban elements. Key to the success of the Obama’s strategy of winning moderate and wavering Taliban elements over to the Kharzai government is convincing them that the Taliban hardliners cannot win the war or offer its citizens a better life.

As an integral part of this strategy the U.S. is moving to implement a similar tactic that it used with success in Iraq in the Anbar Awakening; putting Taliban insurgents on its payroll to stop fighting the Kharzai government. In Iraq the U.S. coughed up $30 million a month to pay 100,000 Sunni insurgents $300 each. In Afghanistan it has been estimated that its 250,000 insurgents could be paid $120 a month, or the national average of the salary of the lowest ranking members of the Afghan army. In the weeks ahead the Obama administration can be expected to roll out this program after the presidential elections that Kharzai is expected to win.  

A second strategy the Obama administration is reviewing to bring more moderate Taliban elements into Kharzai’s coalition government is “flipping” various Taliban leaders and groups. In Afghanistan’s past twenty years of internal warfare, various warlords, tribal and clan leaders have often “switch sides” in the middle of a conflict based on who they think will win. Warlords and tribal leaders joining the same forces they once fought against has been a constant and peculiar feature of Afghanistan devastating patchwork of civil wars. In short, many Taliban leaders have placed insuring the survival of their own tribes and klans above their loyalty to national Taliban leaders like Mullah Omar or major figures from other provinces. The Obama administration has made it clear to Hamid Kharzai, that if he wins the presidential election, he will have to reach out to various Taliban forces that have opposed him and even fought against him in the past. He will also have to end the rampant corruption that has marked his presidency. Kharzai has already begun making his peace with some of these Taliban leaders by offering them offices in his government in exchange for their support for his candidacy. While “flipping” certain Taliban leaders is an intricate and complex process intrinsic to Afghan culture, the prospects of its success will be dramatically improved the more U.S. and NATO forces are able to rock extremists Taliban elements back on the heels militarily.

Beyond the military component of the Afghanistan War, financial support, NGO involvement, reconstruction teams, education, infrastructure and economic development assistance are needed to stand up a viable functioning state. If the U.S. is going to eradicate poppy fields and production that constitutes 60 percent of Afghanistan’s economy they must also have replacement crops and programs available to poor Afghan farmers to maintain their support. Coordinating and bringing these resources to bear on Afghanistan is far beyond the means of the United States alone. It will require the cooperation and assistance of NATO countries and others like India, Iran and Russia that already have substantial investments and national security interest in a stable Afghanistan. But these massive investments and improvements in the daily lives of the Afghan people can only become tangible in an environment where there is a reasonable hope of long-term security and stability in government. Right now the Afghan people have neither.

President Obama is well aware of the dangers of getting bogged down in a long-drawn out war in Afghanistan; one the United States cannot afford militarily or financially. Afghanistan storied history as being the graveyard of empires from Genghis Khan to the Soviet Union’s disastrous occupation has informed his military strategy. President Obama’s troop surge and military offensive to “capture, hold and build” territory while changing facts on the ground in the short run is the only realistic strategy that can create the conditions for a negotiated settlement with moderate and wavering Taliban forces. It is a realistic approach for getting American troops out of Afghanistan sooner rather than later. Whether the American people will demonstrate the resolve to support America’s difficult and painful mission in Afghanistan remains to be seen. As for the Obama Administration, there can be no turning back now.  ******

Obama’s India Policy and the China Factor

 

Prime Minister Singh and President Khazi Meeting in Kabul January 2009

As the world’s largest democracy, economic behemoth and nuclear power, India’s continued emergence as a bulwark of stability in Southeast Asia is pivotal to Barak Obama’s foreign policy portfolio. Since George Bush brokered the U.S.-India nuclear agreement in 2006, the U.S has decisively tilted toward an expanded strategic relationship with New Delhi over Pakistan. Vital to America’s containment strategy of China and serving as an integrating force for Asia’s bulging regional economies, India’s stability is paramount to the U.S. and the west. When Barak Obama takes the Oval Office, ratcheting down the long arc of tension between India and Pakistan and preventing any destabilizing chaos caused by insurgencies, civil war and terrorism emanating from Afghanistan, Nepal and Bengladesh will be core to his strategy of maintaining India’s viability as a major power.  

India’s challenges as an emerging global power are formidable and complex. With one billion people speaking 22 official languages in 1,656 dialects, India’s democracy is rent with tension between its Hindu majority and numerous ethnic groups. India’s 130 million Muslims constitutes the second largest Muslim population of any country in the world and makes India an inviting target for Muslim extremists and Salafists. In 2007, over 1000 deaths were attributed to terrorists attacks as India has the 4^th highest terrorist related death rate internationally.

 The siege of Mumbai by extremists with Pakistani ties nearly provoked an Indo-Pakistani confrontation and caused outrage among the Indian people at its government’s failure to prevent the attack. The attacks underscored how India’s combustible domestic and regional issues can lead to dangerous confrontations with its volatile neighbors. Add to the equation an internal Naxalbite insurgency in 13 provinces, a civil war in neighboring Sri Lanka that has inflamed its own Tamil population for three decades and sporadic Sikh breakaway movements  that have prompted deadly violence in Northwest India and Afghanistan, and you have a recipe for domestic turmoil.   

As a reliable U.S. ally in a region where America has few friends, Obama’s relationship with India will begin with a strong foundation. India voted for U.N. sanctions against Iran’s nuclear program at the risk of jeopardizing its pending 25 year multi-billon dollar proposal to secure oil from Tehran. India also launched an Israeli over-watch satellite to monitor Iranian nuclear development activities. New Delhi has contributed more peacekeeping troops to international hotspots than any other nation, and grants American access to its naval ports that are critical to patrolling strategic waterways in the Indian Ocean. In 2005, India and the U.S. signed a 10-year defense agreement  that ex­panded joint military exercises, increased defense-related trade and established a defense procurement group. The U.S. and India have conducted more than 50 military exer­cises since 2002, demonstrating how far the mili­tary partnership has progressed in a relatively short period.

 

Ironically, if not tragically India’s 911 moment in Mumbai could be the most important development since the 2006 nuclear agreement that will cement U.S.-Indian relations. When pressed on India’s right to strike Pakistan after Mumbai, Obama said “every sovereign nation has a right to defend itself.” Fortunately, India’s decision not to seek retribution against Pakistan after the Mumbai attacks marked a major step forward in its ascendency as a responsible power. An attack on Pakistan may have satisfied domestic calls for revenge but almost certainly would have led to armed clashes with Islamabad and possibly dragged other nations and non-state actors like al Queda into a regional conflagration.

 

However, India is stepping up its profile in Afghanistan and its virtual proxy war with Pakistan. Increasingly both countries view Afghanistan as part of its own security perimeter and India is determined to prevent a full blown Taliban resurgence. Indian embassies are up and running in Afghanistan. India is also creating stronger alliances with Kharzi and Northern Alliance forces and stirring the waters of Baluchistan resistance against Islamabad. On January 13, Khazi and Prime Minister Singh signed a joint letter urging Pakistan to stop its support of terrorist groups. India must tread carefully in Afghanistan, as many in Pakistan already subscribe to the notion that the U.S. and India are conspiring to encircle Pakistan and carve it up into small principalities.  

 

Obama has expressed his clear support for strengthening America’s relationship with India. He has stated without reservation that Pakistan’s main threat is not India; but the growing Taliban/al Queda axis spreading in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and Kashmiri terrorists. In his September 23 letter to Indian Prime Minister Singh, then Presidential candidate Obama voiced strong support for the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal and called for redoubling U.S.-Indian military, intelligence and law enforcement cooperation. But Obama has also made some initial missteps with India. 

Although India shares strategic interests with the United States, the Obama administration must recognize that India has its own universe of national security considerations. Kashmir is a case in point. Obama’s suggestion that he would appoint a special envoy to help resolve the Kashmir border dispute with Pakistan was well intentioned, but not well received in New Delhi. India’s government balked at the notion of an special envoy, saying Kashmir is a bilateral issue between India and Pakistan. On November 15, Obama dispatched the new Senate Foreign Relations Chairman John Kerry to New Delhi to acknowledge that Obama had no intention of interfering in the Kashmir issue. India is open to a political settlement but is not ready to give up territory in Kashmir or surrender its independence of action. India was also alarmed at statements Obama made during his campaign that America outsourced too many jobs to India. After the terrorist attacks in Mumbai, Obama and Prime Singh’s telephone conversation seems to have eased some of New Delhi’s  apprehension. 

 

Similarly, although India voted for sanctions against Iran’s nuclear program, the Bush administration attempted to bully New Delhi to revoke its oil deal with Tehran. But strongarming India didn’t prevent the Chinese from underbidding India for global oil contracts, and the U.S. isn’t providing oil to heat homes in Bangalore and New Delhi. Obama will have to be prepared to accept similar tradeoffs with India, especially concerning its relationship with China. 

 

Despite its four wars and nuclear standoffs with Pakistan since the 1947 partition, it is India’s contentious relationship with China that has enormous global implications. China is Pakistan’s most  powerful ally and sponsored its drive to go nuclear. The two countries with world’s largest populations are engaged in a heated rivalry for energy resources, economic markets in Southeast Asia, and military advantage across continental Asia. India and America are both peacefully engaged with China, but both countries are troubled by China growing military strength. Neither India nor America wants Asia to be dominated by a single country. Indeed it’s hard to imagine a peaceful Asia in which there is not cooperation between India, the United States and China.

 

India’s $40 billion trade package with China is a promising sign of cooperation between the two economic titans, but the list of explosive issues between Beijing and New Delhi is long. Movement toward a settlement of its 1,300 mile border dispute with China has slowed to a crawl. In the meantime China’s military has breeched the border of the Indian states of Sikkim and Arunchal Pradesh on several occasions. China has also been busy developing strategic naval and trade port facilities in Sittwe, Burma; Chittatong, Bangladesh; Hambantota, Sri Lanka and its new port in Gwadar, Pakistan. Connect the dots and China’s aggressive agenda has the look and feel of a military encirclement campaign, rather than protecting sea lanes and ensuring the delivery of energy supplies as China contends.  

 

For Barak Obama, monitoring developments between India and China will be important. The U.S. must avoid putting New Delhi in any awkward situation in which it appears that India is being pitted against China for the benefit of the United States strategic interest. The U.S. must find creative ways to support India, not intervene on its behalf. India will balk at such moves and China will react with hostility. The more India and China broaden their ongoing diplomatic talks and the U.S. engages Beijing, the greater the chances that flashpoints of conflict can be peacefully resolved.   

By continuing to help India integrate its economy with Australia, Japan, South Korea, and the smaller Southeast Asian nations, the United States can greatly assist in promoting stability in the Pacific Rim. With the development of India’s civil nuclear power program and working jointly on environmental issues, America and India can build a very special relationship between the largest democracies in the Western and Eastern hemispheres. India’s road ahead will be filled with twist and turns, and the avoidance of open conflict between Pakistan or China is indispensible to India’s ascent. The fact that India has come so far in building democracy in the world’s most diverse society is part of the new story of the 21^st Century. A smart, nimble and patient American foreign policy toward India under the Obama Administration can truly help change the face of the Asian continent.