Obama and the U.S.-Turkey Foreign Policy Standoff
BROOKS FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW
December 24, 2009
U.S.-Turkey relations have reached their nadir. At the December White House meeting called to repair the breach in U.S.-Turkish relations Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan refused to support sanctions against Iran’s nuclear program and rebuffed Obama’s request for Turkey’s 1,730 troops to undertake combat missions in Afghanistan. Erdogan’s split with Obama over Iranian sanctions, his support of HAMAS and Ankara’s growing ties with Syria and Iraq has fueled concerns in Washington that Turkey is drifting into Tehran and Moscow’s orbit. Whether Turkey is leaving the West to become an outpost of Iranian and Russian influence is debatable. What is clear is that Turkey is coming into its own. Prime Minister Erdogan is leading the predominantly Muslim Turkey down the path of a secular democracy and advancing its “Strategic Depth” foreign policy to secure Ankara’s national interests in a dangerous corner of the world. The new calculus informing Turkey’s foreign policy has unsettled U.S. policymakers accustomed to dictating the parameters of Ankara’s diplomatic horizons. Washington is also concerned that Erdogan’s “Islamic” leaning Justice and Development Party (AKP) is losing contact with the West and returning to its Middle Eastern Muslim roots. But unwarranted public criticism and reflexive short-term thinking by Washington could permanently damage U.S.-Turkish relations while strengthening Turkey’s military and ultra-nationalist forces seeking to derail Erdogan’s government. The Obama administration should hit the pause button and rethink its Turkey policy. Patience and thoughtful engagement could prevent a disastrous break between Washington and Ankara—one that could risk further destabilization of a region where American power is already on the decline.
Under Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu’s leadership, Turkey’s three dimensional “Strategic Depth” foreign policy doctrine has emerged as the blueprint to reposition Turkey as a regional power. Sharing borders with Syria, Iraq, Armenia, Georgia and Iran the locus of the “Strategic Depth” policy has been realigning Ankara’s relationships with its neighbors to strengthen Turkey’s economy while enhancing its national security posture. “Strategic Depth” anticipated two global trends that are guiding Turkey’s grand strategy; America’s diminished capacity to shape regional events and Iran and Russia’s ambition to exploit the growing power vacuum. It has also provided a framework for Turkish rapprochement with Cypress and Armenia, and reconciliation to end the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) domestic insurgency; all critical components of Ankara’s drive to gain ascension to the European Union. The central dilemma confronting the Obama Administration is whether Turkey’s growing relations with Iran and Russia is “realpolitik” in action or if Turkey is inexorably moving towards a new strategic alliance with Moscow and Tehran.
Turkey has the 17th largest economy in the world. To continue its economic and democratic revolution Prime Minister Erdogan must insure Turkey’s national security, end the Kurdish PKK insurgency that is dividing the nation and dramatically expand trade. Therein lays the heart of the dispute with Washington. As one of the most energy dependent countries in the region, Turkey imports an astounding 90 percent of its energy needs. Ankara’s relationship with Iran and Russia is critical to secure its strategic long-term energy imperatives and leverage Turkey’s position as a regional energy transit hub. Russia is Turkey’s second largest trading partner and has opportunistically supported Turkey’s drive for E.U. membership and Turkey’s position in defense of Northern Cypress. In addition to Turkey’s extensive oil and gas ties to Iran, trade between the two countries now exceeds $10 billion a year and is growing.
While the Obama administration has been highly critical of Turkey’s relationship with Iran and Russia, the United States is in no position to guarantee Ankara’s critical energy needs or replace its critical trade relationships with Tehran and Moscow. In 2007 Erdogan rejected a U.S. proposal to supply Ankara with oil from Iraq’s Anbar Province, pointing out that the pipelines would ultimately have to transit oil through Syria or Iraqi Kurdistan, both heavily influenced by Iran. Instead, Erdogan’s direct dealings with Iran yielded lucrative long-term energy agreements and assurances from Tehran and Russia that the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline running from the Caspian Sea to Turkey’s southeastern port of Ceyhan will not be disrupted. Turkey signed a 25-year 10-billion-cubic meter natural gas deal with Iran and a parallel agreement with Turkmenistan that transits gas through Iran. In addition, Ankara inked a $3.5 billion deal to invest in Iran’s South Pars mega field. A realist, Erdogan recognizes the stubborn facts of life in the Middle East, the Caucuses and Central Asia; that Iran and Russia’s converging interest in controlling the region’s energy corridors is formidable. As the mecurial Prime Minister stated “U.S. and Israeli opposition to importing gas from Iran is not important because they cannot meet Turkey’s need for energy, and Turkey must fulfill its needs from Russia and Iran.”
Against this backdrop, the calculations underlying Erdogan’s refusal to support sanctions against Iran’s nuclear program can be more clearly understood. Erdogan’s statement that sanctions have failed the past 30 years because Western states have shamelessly exploited legal loopholes, raised a valid question; why should Turkey jeopardize its strategic economic relationship with Tehran to support a failed and largely symbolic United Nations sanctions resolution? More importantly, the pragmatic Erdogan, like many other Middle Eastern leaders is convinced that Iran is “going nuclear,” despite U.S.–Israeli efforts to halt Tehran’s uranium enrichment program. Prime Minister Erdogan and Turkey’s “Anatolian Elite” are well aware that a nuclear Iran will dramatically alter power relationships in the Middle East. Thus Turkey is recalibrating its policies across the region. Ankara’s use of “soft power” engagement in Armenia, Syria, Iraq and the Levant has lead to substantive changes in its foreign policy portfolio.
In October 2009, Turkey signed an agreement to establish diplomatic ties and re-open its border with its longtime foe Armenia, a country that still charges Turkey with committing genocide against 1.5 million Armenians after World War 1. Erdogan signed the agreement after President Obama withdrew his commitment to recognize the events of 1915 as a genocidal act. By signing the accord Erdogan avoided a confrontation with the United States which wants to secure oil pipeline routes running from the Caspian Sea basin through Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia and Turkey without having to transit oil through Iran. The Armenian agreement was a bitter pill for Erdogan to digest. He had promised not to reopen the border until Armenia withdraws its forces from the disputed enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan. The accord also angered Turkey’s nationalist forces who took to the streets to denounce the agreement, calling Erdogan a traitor.
In April Turkey ruffled more feathers in Washington by carrying out joint military exercises with Syria along the two countries’ border. The military exercises were the first ever between a NATO country and an Arab army. Turkey’s motivations in pursuing the highly symbolic maneuvers were fairly obvious. Ankara wants to expand bi-lateral trade with Damascus, put Tel Aviv on notice that it is building alliances with Israel’s adversaries and boost its credibility as a Middle East power broker. More importantly, Turkey needs to measure President Bashir Assad’s reliability in denying Kurdish PKK separatists a safe haven in neighboring Syria which has its own restive Kurdish minority.
One of Turkey’s biggest short-term challenges has been recasting its relations with Iraq. Over the past year Turkey has opened consulates in Basra and Erbil the capital of Iraqi Kurdistan whose autonomous region functions as a virtual national sovereign. Erdogan has backtracked on its threats to militarily intervene in Iraqi Kurdistan if the oil rich Kirkuk province passes to Kurdistan Regional Government control–a likely development as the KRG is poised to win a majority in Kirkuk’s (Tamim) province in Iraq’s upcoming parliamentary elections. Turkey is the largest investor in Kurdistan today and has reached an agreement to participate in a free trade zone in Kurdistan. By establishing closer ties with the KRG, Turkey’s business mavens have become the beneficiary of millions in commercial contracts and are actively seeking negotiations on potential oil agreements. Ankara’s opening of a consulate in Basra, Iraq’s second largest city and the crown jewel of its oil exporting platform is highly significant. It signals Turkey’s acceptance of Iraq’s Shiia’s leaders as the dominant force in the country and the realization that if Turkey wants to participate in the development of Iraq’s energy resources they will need to repair their once strained relations with Iraq’s Shiaa leaders.
Turkey’s strong condemnation of Israel’s 2008 Gaza invasion and support for HAMAS angered Washington but played well on the Arab street. Israel’s Gaza invasion in the middle of Turkey’s mediation efforts between the Palestinian Authority and Israel was an embarrassment that left Erdogan little choice but to withdraw from the talks. As for Erdogan’s support for bringing HAMAS into the peace negotiations, his position is shared by many countries across the Middle East and privately in European capitals. Having mediated Israeli-Palestinian talks Erdogan knows peace cannot be secured with by Obama’s short-sighted “One and One-Half State Solution” that seeks to isolates HAMAS and the Gaza Strip. The collapse of the Obama administration’s efforts to restart peace talks between Israel and the Palestinian Authority may well have killed any prospect of an agreement being reached in President Obama’s first term in office.
In pursuing its “Strategic Depth” doctrine Turkey is clearly emerging as a rising political and economic force in the Middle East. Through “soft power” diplomacy, expanded trade and Turkey’s unique role mediating conflicts in the Balkans, the Caucuses and the Middle East, Ankara has emerged as an invaluable intermediary that could help the U.S. solve some of its trickier diplomatic missions. But it is Turkey’s ties with Tehran and Damascus that foreshadow the trace lines of a Syria-Turkey-Iran-Russia energy and military axis that represents a formidable threat to American supremacy in the Middle East.
If Washington wants to balance Turkey’s “Eastern angle” President Obama should use his considerable powers of persuasion to convince German Chancellor Angela Merkel and France’s Nicholas Sarkozy to support Turkey’s application to the European Union. Europe’s dismissive attitude towards Turkey while approving Cypress’s membership to the E.U. has done more to turn Turkey to the East than the AKP’s “Islamic” inclinations; it has created a feeling in Ankara that Europe has a double standard. The Obama administration can also signal its strong support to Ankara and Kurdistan for Erdogan’s efforts to end the PKK’s insurgency including offers of economic incentives for development projects in Southeastern Turkey. Most of all Washington needs to understand that Turkey is passing through its most profound domestic and foreign policy transformation since the “Young Turk” revolution 100 years ago. In building a vibrant Muslim secular democracy that moves Turkey’s Kurdish minority from the margins to the mainstream Prime Minister Erdogan risk the possible loss of his office and AKP control of the machinery of governance. Likewise, Erdogan’s decision to embark on a new forward-leaning foreign policy informed by the doctrine of “Strategic Depth” is challenging the assumptions of Turkey’s tradtional relationships with the East and the West. Ankara has a rendevous with destiny. With or without Washington’s support there will be no turning back in Ankara.*****
Failed Israeli-Palestinian Peace Talks May Sink Obama’s Middle East Strategy
President Obama’s failure to restart Israeli-Palestinian peace talks has severely diminished his administration’s hopes of achieving a Two-State Solution. Persuading Israel and the Palestinians to reach an accord lay at the center of President Obama’s strategy to renew American power in the Middle East. By removing the Israel-Palestinian conflict as the destabilizing accelerant fueling anti-American sentiment, radical sympathies with salafi causes and potential wars between Israel, Lebanon and Syria, President Obama sought to usher in a political re-alignment in the region. Obama’s “New Middle East” envisaged in his Cairo speech embodied the majority of Sunni Arab governments accepting a Two-State Solution, recognizing Israel’s right to exist and working in partnership with the U.S. to curb Iranian influence.
President Obama’s plan hinged on securing two critical concessions; first Israel would be convinced to freeze settlements in the “occupied territories;” then Saudi King Abdullah would be persuaded to support the talks and win approval from the Arab world to bring the Palestinian Authority to the negotiating table. But President Obama miscalculated badly. When Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu refused to freeze settlement activity King Abdullah was forced to reject Obama’s request to support the talks and “normalize” relations with Israel. Left out in the cold, Mahmoud Abbas announced his resignation as Palestinian Authority President. A mere ten months after taking office, President Obama’s Middle East initiative had crashed and burned.
Since early November the Obama administration has scrambled to revive the peace process with little success. Secretary of State Clinton announced that talks between Israel and the Palestinians could resume as soon as possible without preconditions. But the Palestinian Authority’s immediate rejection of Secretary Clinton’s offer underscores how wide the chasm has grown in the search for peace. Israeli support for Prime Minister Netanyahu’s position to expand settlements in the West Bank has increased. Israeli jets continue to bomb targets in Gaza suspected of being transit points for weapons smuggling and his center-right coalition with Avigdor Lieberman has grown stronger.
On the other side of the divide, the Palestinian Authority is in disarray. Having demanded a total ban on Israel settlements as a condition to resume talks, Mahmoud Abbas is in no position to offer more concessions. Many speculate that Abbas’s threat to resign as Palestinian Authority President is a bluff to force the U.S. to adopt a firmer position with Israel on the settlement issue. But Secretary Clinton’s November endorsement of Netanyahu’s offer to restrict settlement activities with exemptions for Jerusalem and the 3,000 settlement projects already under construction could hardly be considered getting tough with Israel.
Increasingly, Mahmoud Abbas is viewed throughout the Palestinian Diaspora as a spent force. Abbas and the Fatah’s corruption, inability to deliver vital social services to its constituents and the failure to win anything meaningful after five years of negotiations with Israel and the U.S. has led to the P. A.’s disintegration on the West Bank. Notwithstanding his threats to resign, Mahmoud Abbas will likely cancel the January elections and remain the PA President by default. Calls by Egyptian President Mubarak, Jordan’s King Hussien II, Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak, and President Shimon Peres for Abbas to remain as President reflect growing concerns that the absence of a credible “moderate” PA President will result in the West Bank falling under HAMAS’s control. Nor can the prospects of another destructive civil war between Fatah and HAMAS be ruled out.
Irrespective of whatever short-term maneuvers Mahmoud Abbas makes, momentum in the West Bank is passing over to HAMAS and more radical Palestinian forces. Similarly, Iran’s influence in the West Bank is likely to grow, even if Abbas maintains some semblance of power with the Palestinian Authority. With Israel moving further to the right and tension mounting in Gaza and the West Bank the prospects for renewed violence may be greater than the prospects of restarting peace talks.
Many will question why President Obama demanded that Israel halt settlement activities as a condition to open talks with the Palestinian Authority when it wasn’t necessary. That the President made such a demand without thoroughly discussing the issue with the Israelis first is even more baffling, as was his expectation that Saudi King Abdullah would support renewed peace talks with no commitment from Israel to stop settlement construction. Whether President Obama was misled by Tel Aviv, underestimated the Israelis and the Saudis or overestimated his ability to transfer his substantial popularity into a foreign policy breakthrough remains unclear. What we do know is that President Obama’s Israeli-Palestinian gambit failed miserably, and failure has consequences. President Obama is not the first, nor is he likely to be the last American president to be seduced by the dream of forging an Israeli-Palestinian peace. In the end, peace can only be made when the warring parties are ready for peace. Unfortunately, that day is still a long way off.
China Walks the Middle Path Around Obama
American President Obama and Chinese President Hu Jintao
by Collin A. Spears
In the aftermath of Barack Obama’s first presidential trip to Asia, many of his more ardent critics and fervent supporters are left to ponder the same question – what did he accomplish? This is especially the case in regard to his much anticipated visit to China. Maybe it is more appropriate to ask why Obama’s foreign policy objectives were met with a lukewarm response from Beijing. Further, were there any other possible outcomes considering the divergent interests of America and China? So, what were the issues that Obama felt were most important to address on his tour?
Southeast Asia
One of Obama’s stops was at the APEC Summit in Singapore; the main purpose was which was to shore up relations with the Association of Southeast Asia (ASEAN) member states. After a decade of neglect by the Bush Administration, China’s power in the region has grown immensely to the point where it has gained control of large sectors of the Laotian, Cambodian, and Myanmar economies. It has also made significant political and economic gains with traditional U.S. allies, such as the Philippines and Thailand. On the other hand, it has also engendered some level of fear and suspicion with many in the region, especially Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia. This fear is not just due to China’s growing economic might, but also its military strength and territorial claims in the South China Sea.
Al Maliki’s Defeat in 2010 Parliamentary Elections Will Be a Setback for President Obama in Iraq
Al Maliki’s Defeat in 2010 Parliamentary Elections Will Be a Setback for President Obama in Iraq
BFPR ANALYSIS
By Webster Brooks
Washington, D.C. — The Iraqi legislature’s November 8 approval of a new election law and agreement to hold parliamentary elections before January 31, 2010 are bringing all the major problems in Baghdad to a head. Although President Obama praised Iraq’s parliament saying its action will keep U.S. troop withdrawals on track for completion by August 2011, the outcome of the election is fraught with danger for his administration. Iraq’s Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s re-election bid is in deep trouble. Renewed sectarian violence hangs over Iraq as two deadly al Queda bombings on October 25 of government ministry buildings in Baghdad has unsettled the country. Pro-Iranian Shiia forces have re-organized their election campaigns and are gaining momentum. Tension between Kurdish, Sunni Arab and Turkmen forces over the status of oil-rich Kirkuk are also intensifying as the Parliament’s new election law backed Kurdish demands that voter eligibility in Kirkuk (Tamim Province) will be based on the 2009 voting list. With the stakes and the political temperature rising, U.S. armed forces in Iraq are prepared to redeploy to Kirkuk as Iraq braces for outbreaks of violence in the run up to the election.
WHY OBAMA WILL ADOPT “McCRYSTAL LIGHT” STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN
BROOKS FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW
Analysis: November 3, 2009
by Webster Brooks
With Hamid Karzai’s re-election as President of Afghanistan guaranteed by Abdullah Abdullah’s withdrawal from the race, President Obama is moving U.S. policy towards the end-game of America’s occupation in Afghanistan. To reverse the Taliban’s momentum, protect Afghanistan’s major population centers and allow more time for President Karzai’s embattled government to be stabilized, President Obama will deploy up to 20,000 additional U.S. troops. By steering a “middle course” with a scaled down version of General McCrystal’s counterinsurgency plan, the President hopes to tilt the battlefield in favor of U.S./NATO forces without launching a forward-based offensive in the Pashtun Belt that will result in heavy U.S. troop losses. The “McCrystal Light” strategy will place more emphasis on containing the Taliban, rather than the U.S. taking aggressive actions to significantly degrade Taliban forces. President Obama’s overarching strategic consideration will be re-setting the battlefield to give Afghanistan’s indigenous anti-Taliban oppostion forces the leverage to militarily engage and nuetralize the Taliban over time as the U.S. starts drawing down forces in 2011.
President Obama’s decision to surge more U.S. troops to Afghanistan was never in question for several reasons. The Taliban’s growing momentum and influence cannot be allowed to expand without a challenge. Troop increases will also forestall a revolt by the U.S. military establishment and the Republican Party that have solidly backing the McCrystal plan. At the same time, a more robust presence of U.S. troops on the ground will send a message to America’s allies (NATO, India and Pakistan) and regional adversaries (Russia, Iran and China) that Afghanistan will not be abandoned.
President Obama’s adoption of the “McCrystal Light” counterinsurgency plan is clearly a gamble to play for more time–more time for fresh U.S. forces to get postioned during the winter lull in fighting; more time to coordinate a new strategic orientation with NATO, and more time for new power sharing arrangements to be forged between Karzai, Abdullah Abdullah and the warlord powers. Afghanistan’s fraudulent elections have further undermined President Karzai’s despised government, increased ethnic tension and could still lead to violence between competing warlords if a post-election power sharing arrangement is not reached.
By maintaining control of Afghanistan’s major population centers and key highways between Kandahar, Jalalabad, Mazar e Sharif, Herat and Kabul, U.S. /NATO forces may be able to bludgeon the Taliban’s advance while containing its presence in Eastern and Southeastern Afghanistan. To disrupt the Taliban and al Queda operations, the U.S. will certainly continue its Drone attacks and Special Forces missions along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.
In the meanwhile, the Obama administration will be forced to rapidly buildup the criminal warlord forces and their militias along with Afghanistan’s National Army as a bulwark against a Taliban takeover. As the warlord forces outside the Pashtun Belt represent Afghanistan’s Tajik, Uzbek, Hazara and Turkmen ethnic groups (60% of the total population), it’s possible that America’s eventual withdrawal could lead to a civil war between Afghanistan’s ethnic groups and the Pashtun dominated Taliban. These non-Pashtun communities that coalesced under the banner of the Northern Alliance to help topple the Taliban in 2001 have no desire to live under Taliban rule again. Thus, to the extent that these forces could re-unite to form an effective anti-Taliban united front, preventing a Taliban takeover of all Afghanistan can be averted even if the Taliban is not completely dislodged from its Pashtun Belt strongholds.
President Obama is also gambling that as U.S. forces begin to draw down troop levels, Iran, Russia and India–three countries that supported the Northern Alliance and have a significant stake in preventing the Taliban’s return to power –may increase support for their various proxy forces within Afghanistan. Thus far Russia and Iran have benefitted strategically from America being pre-occupied and weakened by the conflict in Afghanistan. However, a Taliban takeover would spell trouble for Moscow and Tehran. Indeed, there are realistic scenarios in which the United States can withdraw the majority of its armed forces from Afghanistan and still prevent a Taliban takeover while denying al Queda a safe haven.
Under any of these scenarios, the real tragedy will be the horrible violence and deprevation the majority of Afghan people will continue to endure. The hardship they have suffered since the Taliban was deposed in 2001 has not significantly changed under the corrupt Karzai government. Moreover, the criminal warlords who have privatized the nation’s resources, stolen its mineral wealth, established their own tax collections system, profited from Afghanistan’s booming narcotics industry and crushed the Afghan peoples’ democratic rights have rivaled the Taliban in the art of brutal repression. The much discussed need for a counterinsurgency strategy and increasing U.S. troops to defeat the Taliban while doing nothing to curb the warlords power will leave millions of Afghans defenseless against these henchmen, many of which hold top level positions in the Karzai government today.
President Obama has come under heavy criticism for being indecisive and taking too much time to respond to General McCrystal’s assessment and recommendations on Afghanistan. What may be closer to the truth is that President Obama did not particularly like the options he was presented with. Vice-President Biden’s counterterrorism stategy emphasizing Drone attacks and Special Forces operations to subdue the Taliban was nothing more than a quick and dirty withdrawal strategy by another name. Obama will conclude that the situation on the ground does not yet warrant committing 40,000 additional troops. Given the current strain on U.S. armed forces Obama is also clearly concerned about getting bogged down in a long war in Afghanistan when America has other challenges it must prepare for. The situation in Iraq where 130,000 U.S. troops are still deployed remains a fluid and dangerous thearte of war. In steering the “middle course” President Obama will seek to balance all the competing internal forces on the ground in Afghanistan to achieve an outcome that prevents the Taliban from returning to power. This strategy calls for reshaping alliances and weakening forces in some cases, while strengthening forces and even provoking rivalries in others instances. With public support in America waning for the war in Afghanistan, President Obama’s “McCrystal Light” strategy to achieve the same objective of pushing back the Taliban and al Queda with minimal U.S. troop fatalities may also strike an acceptable balance.
Subduing insurgencies in foreign countries is sometimes the burden policing empire. These unpopular conflicts can be lost by the lack of polictical support at home, just as easily as by being defeated by adversaries on the battlefield abroad. President Obama didn’t create American empire or start the war in Afghanistan, but he is now fully immersed in the search for an elegant solution to a very thorny crises in the Central Asian Great Game.
Russia’s Strategy to Block Obama’s Bid for Nuke Free Iran
BROOKS FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW: ANALYSIS
October 7, 2009
by Webster Brooks, Editor BFPR
Since assuming office, the nexus of President Obama’s diplomacy to halt Iran’s development of a nuclear weapon has focused on convincing Russia to endorse tougher sanctions against Tehran and scaling back its support of their nuclear program. Instead, Moscow has attempted to leverage the threat of a nuclear-armed Iran to improve its own geo-strategic position by undermining American power in the Persian Gulf and Central Asia. The chances that President Obama will secure meaningful Russian support to halt Iran’s nuclear program are remote for two reasons. First, as Defense Secretary Gates recently stated, Iran’s uranium enrichment program has advanced too far to be stopped, even if the U.S. or Israel launches air strikes against its nuclear sites. Second, Moscow regards Iran as a strategic ally. Russia’s national security interests will not be threatened, but enhanced by a nuclear armed Iran. President Obama cannot be faulted for negotiating with Russia to contain Iran’s nuclear ambitions. However, the political assumptions underlying President Obama’s overtures to Moscow are troubling. It remains to be seen if President Obama’s desire to “reset” relations with Moscow means that he regards Russia as a potential ally, strategic competitor or strategic adversary. Clearly, the nature of Russia’s involvement with Iran’s nuclear program and its actions strongly conflict with America’s national security interests. Thus a valid question arises; what does the President Obama want from Russia and what is he prepared to concede to Moscow?
Moscow’s position in Iran is formidable and multi-faceted. Over the past two years, Russia has actively strengthened its position in Iran and the Persian Gulf. In February 2009 Russian scientists completed Iran’s Bushehr nuclear reactor that can produce enough nuclear material for thirty atomic bombs a year (off the books). Russia and Iran signed a ten-year nuclear fuel contract to operate Bushehr after Moscow provided the technical expertise, nuclear fuel, equipment, parts, and other components for the reactor. Russia is also receiving spent fuel from Iran to reprocess into low-grade enriched uranium material. In March 2009, Moscow also began executing its contract to deliver advanced long-range S-300 air-defense systems to Iran. Combined with its purchase of the Russian made TOR-M1 surface-to-air system, Iran is racing to deploy its own missile defense shield in an effort to discourage if not complicate possible airstrikes against their nuclear sites. If Iran is able to field a credible defense missile shield system around its nuclear sites and platforms for medium and short range missiles, Tehran’s capacity to project power in the Persian Gulf will be greatly enhanced.
Iran’s missile and nuclear program are exerting tremendous pressure on the U.S., NATO and its regional allies. When President Obama cancelled the missile defense shield plans for Poland and the Czech Republic on September 17, it was widely suggested that he caved in to Russia to win Putin’s support for stronger sanctions against Iran. Arguably, President Obama and NATO’s revised plan to more quickly deploy a comprehensive mobile land, sea and space- based missile interceptor system across Europe and the Caucuses could hardly be considered capitulation. Nevertheless, Russia is clearly angling for opportunities to sow confusion and discord in the U.S.-led NATO Alliance, which it regards as an adversarial block.
In addition to Russia’s support for Iran’s nuclear and missile programs, Moscow is also preparing to come to Tehran’s aid should the U.S. impose sanctions targeting gasoline imports to Iran. Currently, imported gasoline products make up one-third of the country’s consumption, most of which are shipped to Iran through the Persian Gulf. Sanctions on Iranian gas imports could devastate the Iranian regime and economy, thereby forcing Tehran to make real concessions on its nuclear program. Iran is importing more than 400,000 barrels per day (bpd) and has already started stockpiling gasoline in preparation for possible sanctions. Russia and other former Soviet states would be able to fill Iran’s basic import needs by ship and rail transport from the north and the Caspian Sea basin. Russia is one of the largest refiners of oil products in the world and could increase its capacity to supply Iran with refined gasoline for a considerable period of time. Moscow would also reap massive profits from a spike in energy prices if sanctions are imposed. Tehran’s dependency on Russia would also increase if sanctions on gas imports are enacted; something the U.S. wishes to avoid. Along with gas imports from Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Malaysia, Iran could survive sanctions on imported gasoline which is considered the strongest weapon in President Obama’s arsenal to nudge Iran off the nuclear weapons path. Russia’s strategic relationship with Iran on its nuclear program, weapons sales and energy issues is vital to Russian national security interests. Moscow is not only seeking a beachhead in the energy rich Persian Gulf that challenges U.S. supremacy, but Russia desperately wants to secure its southern perimeter in the Caucuses. Fearful of militant Muslim movements like Chechnya spreading among the 20 million Muslims within its borders, Moscow has reached an understanding with Iran not to fan the flames of Shiia Muslim extremism in Russia, the Southern Caucuses or bordering Central Asia states. At the same time that Russia is buttressing Iran as a strategic ally in the Persian Gulf, Moscow has started building a counterweight to Iran by initiating arms sales to its chief regional rival; Saudi Arabia. In 2008, King Abdullah agreed to a $4 billion deal to purchase 150 Russian T-9 tanks, 100 MI-17 and MI-35 tanks hundreds of BMP Armored Infantry Combat Vehicles and 20 BVIC air defense systems. Putin also offered the Saudi’s nuclear reactors and cooperation on a space program to invest in launching Saudi satellites. Abdullah’s shift to allow the Russians arms sales shocked the United States and Western Europe who fear Moscow’s growing role in the Persian Gulf.
For all these reasons, President Obama’s attempts to cut a deal with Russia to shut down Iran’s nuclear weapons program are fraught with danger. The price Moscow is demanding to halt its support of Iran’s nuclear program is American acknowledgement that Central Asia is within Russia’s exclusive sphere of influence. It is not a price President Obama can afford to pay. Nor can Russia guarantee that Iran’s nuclear ambitions will be thwarted.
In the aftermath of the October 1 meetings in Geneva between the P-5+1 and Iran, President Obama said “Talk is no substitute for action. Our patience is not unlimited. If Iran fails to live up to its promises of cooperation, then the United States will not continue to negotiate indefinitely and we are prepared to move toward increased pressure.” Obama gave Iran two weeks to allow the newly disclosed uranium enrichment facility near the city of Qom to be inspected by the I.A.E.A . Obama also urged Iranian to ship low-enriched uranium to a third country to further process the material for use in a research reactor in Tehran. Obama said “Taking the step of transferring its low-enriched uranium to a third country would be a step toward building confidence that Iran’s program is in fact peaceful.” According to reports Russia agreed to perform the further processing of low-enriched uranium from Iran. France would fabricate it into fuel assemblies for use at the Tehran research reactor, which is under international inspection. All the parties to the talks agreed to return to the negotiating table in late October to continue discussions. Iran will likely concede to inspections of the Qom facility, as they were caught red-handed trying to conceal the existence of the facility. It is also possible that Iran may agree to ship “some” of its spent fuel to outside countries (principally Russia). But under no circumstances will Tehran agree to suspend their uranium enrichment activities. Thus the stage is set for yet another showdown in late October. As part of the P-5+1 group Russia will play a critical role in the outcome of the talks. That should give President Obama pause for concern. ***
Webster Brooks is a Senior at the Center for New Politics and Policy (CNPP) and Editor of Brooks Foreign Policy Review, the international affairs arm of CNPP. His articles on foreign policy have appeared in numerous newspapers and websites in the Middle East, Eurasia and in the United States. He may be contacted at editor@foreignpolicyreview.org The Center for New Politics and Policy is based in Washington, D.C.
Obama’s Critics on Missille Defense Shield Cancellation Are Wrong
BROOKS FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW ANALYSIS
September 27, 2009
“President Bush was right that Iran’s ballistic missile program poses a significant threat. That’s why I’m committed to deploying strong missile defense systems which are adaptable to the threats of the 21st century. This approach is also consistent with NATO’s missile defense efforts and provides opportunities for enhanced international collaboration going forward and we are bound by the solemn commitment of NATO’s Article V that an attack on one is an attack on all.”
Critics charging that President Obama’s cancellation of the missile defense shield system in Poland and the Czech Republic marked capitulation to Russia and weakened Europe’s defense against Iranian and Russian missile attacks are dead wrong. Quite the opposite, the President’s new plan deploys a more potent, high tech, land, sea and space-based system to defend all of Europe and the Caucuses. Obama’s revised “Star Wars” plan is more mobile, less detectable and will be deployed faster than the original plan for ten ground-based interceptor missiles in Poland and forward-based X-band missile radar in the Czech Republic. Arguably, the Obama-Gates universal interceptor missile system will put the United States on the cusp of uncontested global military superiority by making itself and its allies highly impenetrable to Russian, Chinese, North Korean and Iranian missile attacks.
Appearing with President Obama at the September 17 announcement, Defense Secretary Gates stated that “We have now the opportunity to deploy new sensors and interceptors in northern and southern Europe that in the near term provide missile defense coverage against more immediate threats from Iran or others.” Given that Iran is nowhere close to fielding long-range missiles, Gates reference to “others” was obviously directed at Russia. Gates outlined the new plan that will deploy Aegis class warships equipped with SM-3 mobile missile interceptors that can be moved from one region to another. The U.S. has fifteen destroyers and three cruisers equipped with the Aegis combat system which is being developed into a worldwide, sea based, rapid deployable missile shield structure. These new capabilities are being coordinated with Norway, Spain, Australia, Japan and South Korea. Indeed, in February 2008, the USS Lake Erie, an Aegis class guided-missile cruiser, shot down an American satellite in space in its testing phase. Further, Gates said Phase 2 of the universal interceptor missile system will include “upgraded land-based SM-3s” by 2015.
In addition to deploying the universal interceptor missile system, the Obama Administration and NATO are upgrading the integrated European Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) with current Patriot and Nike Hercules components. MEADS will include forward-based X-band radar, 360 degree surveillance radar, missile launchers and next-generation Patriot interceptor missiles. MEADS will be interoperable with other defense systems, including the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system and the Aegis sea-based missile defense systems. Obama has requested and will receive $600 million in funding from Congress for MEADS in the next fiscal year. Doubters concerned about President Obama’s commitment to missile defense should also take comfort in the August announcement of the Pentagon’s Missile Defense Agency that its modified Boeing 747-400F airplane was successfully deployed with a laser weapon that “found, tracked, engaged and simulated an intercept with a missile seconds after liftoff.’ This fall the first live attempt to bring down a ballistic missile will be tested. As for the “defenseless” Czech Republic and Poland, the Pentagon has already opened talks with both countries about hosting a land-based version of the SM-3 missile interceptors and other components of the system. American plans call for 96 Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missiles in Poland, capable of selecting targeting and homing in on the warhead portion of an inbound ballistic missile.
Obama’s detractors that claim Poland and the Czech Republic were betrayed in exchange for Russian support for sanctions against Iran’s nuclear program should think again. It’s true that Russian President Medvedev applauded President Obama’s decision to “cancel” the missile defense shield system. After all, he’d look foolish criticizing what Russia had so publicly demanded. On September 22, Medvedev also suggested Russia would consider supporter tougher sanctions against Iran. But behind the walls of the Kremlin there are growing concerns about Russia’s encirclement by the U.S./NATO buildup of a global missile interceptor system. Moscow has seen this movie before. President Reagan’s original Star Wars plan set off a run of defense spending in the USSR that contributed significantly to the economic hollowing out of the Soviet state. When Russia responded to the Poland-Czech Republic missile defense shield by threatening to place Iskander ballistic missiles in Kaliningrad on Poland’s border, it evoked a sense of an escalating Cold War buildup. If Russia ultimately supports damaging sanctions against Iran it won’t be because they feared ten fixed-site land based missile interceptors and a radar installation outside of Prague; Putin and company have a larger strategic problem to counterbalance.
It must also be said that after all the rhetoric about the Polish and Czech people being abandoned to the Russians, surveys consistently demonstrate that a majority of Poles opposed the stationing of American missiles inside their borders. In the Czech Republic, over two-thirds of the public opposed the basing of the interceptor missile radar. For those who are still not clear about President Obama’s capacity for flexing American military might, he defended his vision of the Star Wars 2 universal missile interceptor system by saying, “President Bush was right that Iran’s ballistic missile program poses a significant threat. And that’s why I’m committed to deploying strong missile defense systems which are adaptable to the threats of the 21st century. This approach is also consistent with NATO’s missile defense efforts and provides opportunities for enhanced international collaboration going forward and we are bound by the solemn commitment of NATO’s Article V that an attack on one is an attack on all.” Commenting on the new missile defense system the conservative Wall Street Journal recently stated that “Never has Ronald Reagan’s dream of layered missile defenses – Star Wars, for short – been as close, at least technologically, to becoming realized.”
America’s military buildup of ground forces and the largest CIA station in Afghanistan and its aggressive push to place military installations across Central Asia are exerting enormous pressure on Russia, China and Iran. In the final analysis, President Obama will not be able to stop Iran’s drive to master the uranium enrichment cycle or develop a nuclear weapons program. What we witnessing now with the deployment of Obama’s Star Wars 2 missile defense system is a rapid buildup to contain the emerging Eastern Axis in Tehran, Beijing and Moscow.
Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Policy Gamble and the Iranian Nuclear Problem
Saudi Arabia's King Abdullah in Germany
BROOKS FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW: ANALYSIS
By Webster Brooks
While there are many unanswered questions about Saudi Arabia’s evolving foreign policy, Riyadh’s response to Iranian enlargement in the Middle East already suggests that great change is at hand. The Saudi’s are engaged in active diplomacy with Iran while simultaneously fighting proxy wars against them, pursuing a massive military buildup, inviting the Soviets into the Persian Gulf and debating nuclear deterrence to push back the “Persian threat.”
Containing Iran’s drive for dominance in the Middle East has risen to the top of Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy agenda. Tehran’s enlarged footprint in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Afghanistan, the Palestinian territories and Gulf States has diminished Saudi Arabia’s political power across the Middle East. The threat to Riyadh’s national security interests are being felt with immediacy. Iranian backed Shiite militias control southern Iraq and threaten Saudi Arabia’s northern border. In Yemen, Iran is supporting the al Houthi Shiia insurgency against President Saleh’s government on the Kingdom’s southern border. With the specter of Iran’s nuclear program looming over the House of Saud, Riyadh is recalibrating its foreign policy to counter the possibility of a new existential threat. To combat Iran’s imperial reach King Abdullah has transformed Saudi Arabia’s once secretive cloak and dagger diplomacy into a fully engaged foreign policy agenda aimed at establishing Saudi Arabia as maximum leader of the Arab World. But King Abdulla’s multifaceted efforts to staunch the Iranian juggernaut have met with limited success. Thus, Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy continues to undergo profound change that will require more accommodations to Tehran, greater independence from the United States, closer ties to Russia and an unprecedented military buildup that could include a Saudi nuclear program. For decades, maintaining stability in the Persian Gulf and insuring the safe passage of oil through its critical shipping lanes defined Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy universe; a policy based on Riyadh’s reliance on American military power. The nexus of U.S.-Saudi relations was containment of Iran and Iraq whose highly militarized states constituted a direct threat to Riyadh. But the 1979 Iranian revolution that bought a radical Shiite theocracy to power, and President Bush’s ill-advised Iraq invasion that led to an Iranian backed Shiia government in Baghdad has changed the balance of power in the Persian Gulf. With Saddam Hussein’s buffer state deposed and nothing standing between Saudi Arabia and Iran’s hegemonic designs, King Abdulla initiated a decisive shift in the Kingdom’s policies toward Tehran. Riyadh no longer treats Iran as a permanent adversary but a strategic competitor. Rather than leading a Sunni Arab united front to isolate Tehran, King Abdulla opened a permanent dialogue with Iran on a full range of diplomatic issues. Since Iranian President Ahmadinijad’s surprise invitation to address the religious pilgrimage in Mecca in 2007, Saudi and Iranian leaders have negotiated understandings over Lebanon, Iraq and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Both countries have sought to “manage” conflict between their competing religious and political factions to minimize sectarian bloodshed. In each instance Iranian backed Hezbollah forces in Lebanon, the Mahdi and Badr Forces in Iraq and HAMAS in Palestine have held the upper hand militarily. Thus, the Saudi’s have funneled arms and money to defend their Sunni allies, while negotiating compromises with Iran to preserve political options for their Sunni compatriots. Although King Abdullah slowed Iran’s momentum in Lebanon where the Cedar forces won the spring elections and HAMAS and al Fatah are at an impasse, Iran is clearly emerging as the Gulf’s dominant force. Indeed, the Iraqi Shiia ascendency to power under Nouri al Maliki constituted an enormous strategic setback for Riyadh. Expanded Iranian access to Iraqi oil, its waterways and its strategic energy platform in Basra has greatly strengthened Iran’s economic, military and political position across the Middle East. With a weak national army, vulnerable borders and having dismissed American forces from its soil in 2003, King Abdullah has embarked on a military buildup that consumes 11% of the nation’s GDP. To counter Iran’s growing threat he turned to an unlikely ally; Russia. In 2007, following discussions with President Vladimir Putin, King Abdullah agreed to a $4 billion deal to purchase 150 Russian T-9 tanks, 100 MI-17 and MI-35 tanks, hundreds of BMP Armored Infantry Combat Vehicles and 20 BVIC air defense systems. Putin also offered the Saudi’s nuclear reactors and cooperation on a space program to invest in launching Saudi satellites. Speculation that the Saudi arms deal with Moscow included a proviso that Russia would oppose Iran’s nuclear arms program has not materialized. Abdullah’s shift to allow the Russians arms sales shocked the United States and Western Europe. As a major arms and nuclear materials supplier to Iran, Russian arms sales to Saudi Arabia afford Moscow powerful leverage in the Persian Gulf at a time when American and Western European influence is declining.
Notwithstanding the Russian arms deal Saudi Arabia will remain in the U.S. sponsored Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) defense pact. The Saudi’s will install an $8 billion border security system, procure coast guard vessels, surveillance aircraft, helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicles and a telecommunications network as part of the GCC agreement. But the Moscow agreement was a serious warning that Riyadh is no longer marching in lockstep with the U.S., especially when its national security interests are at state. Similarly, the debate within the House of Saud about President Obama’s response to the Iranian nuclear threat has raised the issue of Riyadh pursuing a nuclear path.
The Saudi’s are skeptical about President Obama’s imprimatur to convene talks with Iran over its nuclear program. Irrespective of the fact that no proof exist that Iran has a nuclear weapons program, the Saudi’s are convinced Iran won’t suspend its enrichment activities or permit more intrusive inspections. Should the U.S. or Israel attack Iran’s nuclear facilities Tehran would likely respond with attacks on Saudi oil tankers, close Gulf shipping lanes, sabotage Saudi oil facilities and foment Shiia unrest within the Kingdom. While the Saudi’s are split on the issue of an attack against Iran, at the end of the day the decision is not theirs to make. It is this sense of frustration at the lack of a credible conventional and nuclear deterrent that has prompted the Saudi’s to consider a nuclear program.
The prospects of Saudi Arabia attempting to develop a nuclear weapons program are remote. The Kingdom has no nuclear power facilities. Its scientists have no experience in enriching uranium for reactor fuel or operating nuclear reactors. Further, no evidence exists that Riyadh has tried to procure nuclear weapons from foreign suppliers. Saudi Arabia has joined the Gulf Cooperation Council initiative to develop a joint nuclear energy program. In May 2008, they also signed a memorandum of understanding with the U.S. on nuclear energy cooperation. Were the Saudi’s to move in the direction of a nuclear weapons program, they would undoubtedly face heavy international criticism, risk isolation and stiff economic sanctions. Nevertheless, the possibility of Riyadh going nuclear cannot be ruled out. If Iran brings a nuclear weapons program on-line, or Saudi confidence in America’s ability to protect the Kingdom collapses, or a new leader succeeds King Abdullah with a pro-nuclear weapons agenda, Riyadh could reverse course.
While there are many unanswered questions about Saudi Arabia’s evolving foreign policy, Riyadh’s response to Iranian enlargement in the Middle East already suggests that great change is at hand. The Saudi’s are engaged in active diplomacy with Iran while simultaneously fighting proxy wars against them, pursuing a massive military buildup, inviting the Soviets into the Persian Gulf and debating nuclear deterrence to push back the “Persian threat.”
Beyond Riyadh’s preoccupation with Iran, the broader currents of change sweeping over the Middle East are challenging the Saudi foreign policies as well. The Saudi’s are already softening their position towards Shiia Muslim communities in Arab countries in response to the “Shiia awakening.” The clamor for democracy that is bringing new forces to power through elections is forcing the Saudi’s to enter new alliances with a more diverse set of players. The growing role of non-state actors, militias and ethnic breakaway movements has exposed the limitations of Riyadh’s reliance on petro-dollars to simply buy off whole governments. The Saudi’s attempt to pay the Kurds $1 billion dollars to postpone the referendum on Kirkuk for ten years is a classic if not embarrassing case in point. Even the Saudi’s role as the grand mediator’s of Sunni Arab conflicts is being challenged by tiny Qutar that recently brokered peace arrangements in Lebanon and Yemen. There is a “New Middle East” coming into being. How Saudi Arabia adjust its foreign policy to meet the Iranian challenge and embrace the winds of change engulfing the region will determine if Riyadh is prepared to meet the test of leadership in a new age. ******
Defusing Yemen’s Ticking Time Bomb & the Iran-Saudi Proxy War
Yemen's Embattled President Ali Abdullah Saleh
Defusing Yemen’s Ticking Time Bomb & the Iran-Saudi Proxy War
Yemen is a ticking time bomb with a dangerously short fuse. President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s government is under siege; battling an al Houthi insurgency, attacks by Sunn extremists rebranded as “al Queda of the Peninsula” (AQP) and fending off a growing secessionist struggle led by the Southern Movement.” Absent urgent American intervention, Yemen is on a course leading to the collapse of President Saleh’s government or the partitioning of Yemen into autonomous zones run by non-state actors. Concerns in the United States and Saudi Arabia are mounting as Iran has entered the fray backing the al Houthi Shiia (Zaida sect) insurgency. Like Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq, Yemen is emerging as a battlefield in a proxy war between Iran and the Saudi/American axis. Tehran is threatening to secure a beachhead in the strategic Southwest Arabian Peninsula, where Yemen’s oil, proximity to Saudi oilfields and control over critical Red Sea shipping lanes are up for grabs.
As the poorest Gulf oil state Yemen is the regional nerve center for trafficking arms, narcotics and harvested body parts, transiting jihadists and sponsoring Somali pirating operations. With President Saleh’s 30 year rule faltering, Saudi Arabia has intervened to contain the threat Yemen’s instability poses to its national security and to short circuit Iran’s growing influence. Saudi Arabia is actively supporting President Saleh’s war to eliminate the Zaida Shiite sect (called al Houthi’s) in the mountains of northwestern Yemen along the Saudi border. The al Houthi are fighting to restore Shiite rule over Northern Yemen they lost to the Sunni in 1962. Shiite Muslims make up 40 percent of Yemen’s population. Saudi Arabia’s Sunni royalists are mortified at the prospects of the al Houthi Shiia revolt spreading across its border with Yemen to inflame the passions of its own repressed Shiia minority concentrated around its Eastern oilfields. Reports are also surfacing that Egypt is providing arms and ammunition to President Saleh’s government with American approval.
While admitting they are “consulting” with Saleh’s regime, Saudi leaders have disavowed claims by the al Houthi that Saudi planes have bombed rebel positions in Sa’adah province where the heaviest fighting is occurring. President Saleh has promised to crush the al Houthi resistance, or force them to accept a six-point peace plan that includes surrendering their weapons and control over key highways on the Saudi border. Pressing the offensive against the al Houthi with his most elite units, tanks and artillery divisions, Saleh has been forced to recruit local tribes to fight the insurgency. Hundreds have been injured or killed and thousands displaced as the both sides battle with resolve.
The tenacity of the al Houthi insurgency has taken the Yemeni government by surprise. President Saleh has accused Iran of arming the northern rebels, and claims his government has uncovered caches of Iranian made short-range missiles and machine guns. Like the Saudi’s, Iran has denied the claims, which means the likelihood that both countries are arming proxy forces is true. In the spring Iranian Parliamentary Speaker Ali Larijani visited Yemen and affirmed Iran’s support for a unified Yemen. Yemen has entered into discussions with Tehran over Iranian investments in its energy platform, roads, dams and housing industry. Yemen reciprocated by announcing its support for Iran’s development of a civil nuclear program, much to the chagrin of the U.S. and Saudi Arabia.
Iran’s capacity to leverage Yemen’s huge Shiite community, the al Houthi insurgency and President Saleh’s weak position is substantial and can be projected over time. Indeed, Iran’s genius in cultivating ties with Hezbollah and Hamas are the result of decades of support. In addition to Iran’s support for the al Houthi insurgency, Tehran could also begin supporting the socialist-led Southern Movement coalition. Notwithstanding its Shiia roots, Iran could also funnel backdoor support to the resurgent elements of “Al Queda of the Peninsula,” (AQP) if the Sunni extremist target President Saleh’s regime or more importantly use Yemen as a base to continue their battle against neighboring Saudi Arabia’s royal family.
Al Queda resurfaced in Yemen last year after its forces were routed by the House of Saud in the 2004-2007 jihadist war. Given Saudi concerns about AQP reigniting its insurgency inside the kingdom from neighboring Yemen, the Obama Administration’s plans to transfer 110 Yemeni detainees from Guantanamo Bay when the base closes has surfaced as a complicated issue. The Yemeni government wants to accept the detainees, insisting they will prosecute those who have committed acts of terrorism and rehabilitate the rest. However, after the mysterious prison break of 2006 when 23 al Queda members escaped from Yemen’s jails, the U.S. is reluctant to hand over the detainees to President Saleh. The Obama administration prefers to return the detainees to Saudi Arabia, who they believe has a better record of rehabilitating extremists. The Saudi’s don’t share the U.S.’s enthusiasm on the detainee issue. Ironically, last week in Jeddah, royal family member and Saudi counter terrorist head Prince Mohammed Bin Nayef narrowly escaped death after a Yemeni jihadist turning himself in for rehabilitation set off a suicide bomb in his presence.
With Yemen on the brink of a renewed civil war between Saleh’s regime and the secessionist “Southern Movement” in South Yemen, the Obama administration has stepped up its call for a negotiated settlement. After two years of peaceful protests led by civil service workers and soldiers whose pensions were never paid, the situation is escalating to violence. In the last few months three opposition leaders have been murdered by northern security forces and seven newspapers have been shut down. The movement has been joined by socialist forces and sympathizers of the former South Yemen government who are fed up with the Saleh government’s rampant corruption and mismanagement of the economy. Ali Salem al-Bidh, the former Marxist leader who negotiated the first reunification agreement between North and South Yemen in 1990, has been named the new leader of the Southern Movement. Because the Southern Movement has no faith in negotiating with Saleh, they have called for the United Nations to lead reconciliation talks or allow the Gulf Cooperation Council to form a new caretaker government in lieu of new negotiations.
Once again, the United States finds itself caught in a diplomatic tangle. The Obama administration wants negotiations to unify Yemen. The Southern Movement and the al Houthi Shiia have no intention of entering direct negotiations with a corrupt regime that has criminalized the machinery of national governance and used authoritarian measures to suppress their just struggles.
In the final analysis, the al Houthi Shiia sect and the Southern Movement insurgencies can be resolved through negotiations and diplomacy, but not as long as President Saleh remains in office. The U.S. must insist on his replacement, a new negotiations process and the willingness to make compromises with the insurgents to preserve Yemen’s unity. If not, Yemen’s descent in chaos will continue, marked by sectarian violence, balkanization, and foreign proxy wars. It is time for the Obama administration to defuse the powder keg in Yemen before it explodes. ***
Obama’s Unfolding Strategy for Victory in Afghanistan
August 4, 2009
by Webster Brooks ,
Editor Brooks Foreign Policy Review
With July marking the deadliest month of combat for U.S. and NATO forces since the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, America’s fortitude and patience with an intensifying military conflict will be severely tested in 2009. So too will President Obama’s leadership as a wartime president. England and Canada’s flagging support for the war, rising casualty rates and abducted American soldiers pleading for their lives on cable news channels are already generating concern at the White House and the Pentagon. Because wars can be lost just as easily by the lack of domestic support, more so than military defeats on foreign battlefields, President Obama must continue to forcefully articulate what vital American interests are at stake in Afghanistan. He should answer his critics who question his rationale for escalating a war most experts agree cannot be won militarily against an enemy that poses no existential threat to America. Afghanistan is now Barak Obama’s war. His credibility as Commander-in-Chief and his presidency may well depend on it.
President Obama came to office with a clear and well conceived strategy to prosecute the “Forgotten War” in Afghanistan; one he has relentlessly pursued in his first six months in office. Having inherited George Bush’s war, he immediately redefined the goal in Afghanistan as defeating al Queda and its extremists Taliban allies, and denying them a sanctuary to launch attacks against America. Obama’s critical first step called for a larger American military footprint on the ground. Not surprisingly, his attempts to persuade our NATO allies to make a similar commitment were not very successful. Although some of his detractors questioned his decision to expand America’s commitment in Afghanistan out of fear that the U.S. would get bogged down in a military quagmire, President Obama had no choice. When he assumed office in January, the Taliban had advanced to the outskirts of Kabul, and were gaining control of more provinces within the country. Not to act quickly and decisively to increase America’s presence on the ground risked the downfall of President Hamid Kharzai’s weak and unpopular government. The possibility of Afghanistan collapsing into a failed state would have dramatically destabilized the region and vastly complicated an already dangerous situation in neighboring Pakistan and Iran. Since the arrival of additional troops in Afghanistan and Obama’s installation of General Stanley McChrystal to lead the war effort, the Taliban’s offensive has been blunted and President Kharzai’s government has been shored up. The troop surge has also been critical to restoring order across the country in the lead up to the September presidential elections.
In July, Obama’s troop surge unfolded as the locus of his long-term strategy of unleashing a military offensive to break the back of extremist Taliban forces entrenched in Eastern Afghanistan. President Obama’s goal is not to totally destroy extremist Taliban elements, but to significantly reduce their military capability and influence; thereby creating new conditions to draw “moderate” Taliban elements into Kharzai’s ruling coalition government. July’s ground offensive targeted the Taliban’s most significant stronghold in southeastern Afghanistan’s Helmund Province. Helmund Province is not only one of the Taliban’s military and cultural centers of gravity, but the most profitable poppy growing region in the nation that finances much of the Taliban’s operations. The Taliban cannot be defeated until its economic lifeline to narcotics trafficking is degraded and U.S./Afghan National Army forces can exert more control over the areas along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border to stem the flow of jihadists, arms and drugs to-and-from Pakistan.
The costs of taking the fight to the Taliban thus far have been heavy. The spike in U.S. and NATO casualties will undoubtedly continue throughout 2009 as the missions to subdue the Taliban in Eastern Afghanistan continue. In July, NATO and American forces suffered 75 fatalities; 42 two U.S. troops were killed and six more died the first two days in August. Despite the uptick in combat deaths, the U.S. and NATO must continue to press forward on the battlefield. Their failure to do so would send a negative message to the Afghan people who already question America’s commitment and resolve to the future wellbeing of Afghanistan.
Similar to Iraq, the U.S. military is attempting to drive the Taliban out of its areas of refuge and support, and then remain in the “liberated” areas to secure the safety of local inhabitants. This close combat and exposure to enemy fire associated with the “capture, hold and build” strategy is more challenging in Afghanistan which is not only larger but more ethnically and tribally diverse than Iraq. The Afghan Taliban forces are extremely capable and well trained, particularly in using suicide and roadside bombs to kill American soldiers. Thus higher casualty rates must be expected.
By pressing its ground and air offensive early and hard against Taliban strongholds in Helmund Province, President Obama is hoping to score a decisive victory that will create the momentum to confront the Taliban in Afghanistan’s other eastern provinces like Kandahar, while at the same time demoralizing wavering Taliban elements. Key to the success of the Obama’s strategy of winning moderate and wavering Taliban elements over to the Kharzai government is convincing them that the Taliban hardliners cannot win the war or offer its citizens a better life.
As an integral part of this strategy the U.S. is moving to implement a similar tactic that it used with success in Iraq in the Anbar Awakening; putting Taliban insurgents on its payroll to stop fighting the Kharzai government. In Iraq the U.S. coughed up $30 million a month to pay 100,000 Sunni insurgents $300 each. In Afghanistan it has been estimated that its 250,000 insurgents could be paid $120 a month, or the national average of the salary of the lowest ranking members of the Afghan army. In the weeks ahead the Obama administration can be expected to roll out this program after the presidential elections that Kharzai is expected to win.
A second strategy the Obama administration is reviewing to bring more moderate Taliban elements into Kharzai’s coalition government is “flipping” various Taliban leaders and groups. In Afghanistan’s past twenty years of internal warfare, various warlords, tribal and clan leaders have often “switch sides” in the middle of a conflict based on who they think will win. Warlords and tribal leaders joining the same forces they once fought against has been a constant and peculiar feature of Afghanistan devastating patchwork of civil wars. In short, many Taliban leaders have placed insuring the survival of their own tribes and klans above their loyalty to national Taliban leaders like Mullah Omar or major figures from other provinces. The Obama administration has made it clear to Hamid Kharzai, that if he wins the presidential election, he will have to reach out to various Taliban forces that have opposed him and even fought against him in the past. He will also have to end the rampant corruption that has marked his presidency. Kharzai has already begun making his peace with some of these Taliban leaders by offering them offices in his government in exchange for their support for his candidacy. While “flipping” certain Taliban leaders is an intricate and complex process intrinsic to Afghan culture, the prospects of its success will be dramatically improved the more U.S. and NATO forces are able to rock extremists Taliban elements back on the heels militarily.
Beyond the military component of the Afghanistan War, financial support, NGO involvement, reconstruction teams, education, infrastructure and economic development assistance are needed to stand up a viable functioning state. If the U.S. is going to eradicate poppy fields and production that constitutes 60 percent of Afghanistan’s economy they must also have replacement crops and programs available to poor Afghan farmers to maintain their support. Coordinating and bringing these resources to bear on Afghanistan is far beyond the means of the United States alone. It will require the cooperation and assistance of NATO countries and others like India, Iran and Russia that already have substantial investments and national security interest in a stable Afghanistan. But these massive investments and improvements in the daily lives of the Afghan people can only become tangible in an environment where there is a reasonable hope of long-term security and stability in government. Right now the Afghan people have neither.
President Obama is well aware of the dangers of getting bogged down in a long-drawn out war in Afghanistan; one the United States cannot afford militarily or financially. Afghanistan storied history as being the graveyard of empires from Genghis Khan to the Soviet Union’s disastrous occupation has informed his military strategy. President Obama’s troop surge and military offensive to “capture, hold and build” territory while changing facts on the ground in the short run is the only realistic strategy that can create the conditions for a negotiated settlement with moderate and wavering Taliban forces. It is a realistic approach for getting American troops out of Afghanistan sooner rather than later. Whether the American people will demonstrate the resolve to support America’s difficult and painful mission in Afghanistan remains to be seen. As for the Obama Administration, there can be no turning back now. ******
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