WHY OBAMA WILL ADOPT “McCRYSTAL LIGHT” STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN

 

BROOKS FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW

www.foreignpolicyreview.org

Analysis:  November 3, 2009    

by Webster Brooks 

 

 

With Hamid Karzai’s re-election as President of Afghanistan guaranteed by Abdullah Abdullah’s withdrawal from the race, President Obama is  moving U.S. policy towards the end-game of America’s occupation in Afghanistan. To reverse the Taliban’s momentum, protect Afghanistan’s major population centers and allow more time for President Karzai’s embattled government to be stabilized, President Obama will deploy up to 20,000 additional U.S. troops. By steering a “middle course” with a scaled down version of General McCrystal’s counterinsurgency plan, the President hopes to tilt the battlefield in favor of U.S./NATO forces without launching a forward-based offensive in the Pashtun Belt that will result in heavy U.S. troop losses.  The “McCrystal Light” strategy will place more emphasis on containing the Taliban, rather than the U.S. taking aggressive actions to significantly degrade Taliban forces. President Obama’s overarching strategic consideration will be re-setting the battlefield to give Afghanistan’s indigenous anti-Taliban oppostion forces the leverage to militarily engage and nuetralize the Taliban over time as the U.S. starts drawing down forces in 2011.   

President Obama’s decision to surge more U.S. troops to Afghanistan was never in question for several reasons. The Taliban’s growing momentum and influence cannot be allowed to expand without a challenge. Troop increases will also forestall a revolt by the U.S. military establishment and the Republican Party that have solidly backing the McCrystal plan. At the same time, a more robust presence of U.S. troops on the ground will send a message to America’s allies (NATO, India and Pakistan) and regional adversaries (Russia, Iran and China) that Afghanistan will not be abandoned. 

President Obama’s adoption of the “McCrystal Light” counterinsurgency plan is clearly a gamble to play for more time–more time for fresh U.S. forces to get postioned during the winter lull in fighting; more time to coordinate a new strategic orientation with NATO, and more time for new power sharing arrangements to be forged between Karzai, Abdullah Abdullah and the warlord powers. Afghanistan’s fraudulent elections have further undermined President Karzai’s despised government, increased ethnic tension and could still lead to violence between competing warlords if a post-election power sharing arrangement is not reached. 

By maintaining control of Afghanistan’s major population centers and key highways between Kandahar, Jalalabad, Mazar e Sharif, Herat and Kabul, U.S. /NATO forces may be able to bludgeon the Taliban’s advance while containing its presence in Eastern and Southeastern Afghanistan. To disrupt the Taliban and al Queda operations, the U.S. will certainly continue its Drone attacks and Special Forces missions along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.

In the meanwhile, the Obama administration will be forced to rapidly buildup the criminal warlord forces and their militias along with Afghanistan’s National Army as a bulwark against a Taliban takeover. As the warlord forces outside the Pashtun Belt represent Afghanistan’s Tajik, Uzbek, Hazara and Turkmen ethnic groups (60% of the total population), it’s possible that America’s eventual withdrawal could lead to a civil war between Afghanistan’s ethnic groups and the Pashtun dominated Taliban. These non-Pashtun communities that  coalesced under the banner of the Northern Alliance to help topple the Taliban in 2001 have no desire to live under Taliban rule again. Thus, to the extent that these forces could re-unite to form an effective anti-Taliban united front, preventing a Taliban takeover of all Afghanistan can be averted even if the Taliban is not completely dislodged from its Pashtun Belt strongholds.

President Obama is also gambling that as U.S. forces begin to draw down troop levels, Iran, Russia and India–three countries that supported the Northern Alliance and have a significant stake in preventing the Taliban’s return to power –may increase support for their various proxy forces within Afghanistan. Thus far Russia and Iran have benefitted strategically from America being pre-occupied and weakened by the conflict in Afghanistan. However, a Taliban takeover would spell trouble for Moscow and Tehran. Indeed, there are realistic scenarios in which the United States can withdraw the majority of its armed forces from Afghanistan and still prevent a Taliban takeover while denying al Queda a safe haven.

Under any of these scenarios, the real tragedy will be the horrible violence and deprevation the majority of Afghan people will continue to endure. The hardship they have suffered since the Taliban was deposed in 2001 has not significantly changed under the corrupt Karzai government. Moreover, the criminal warlords who have privatized the nation’s resources, stolen its mineral wealth, established their own tax collections system, profited from Afghanistan’s booming narcotics industry and crushed the Afghan peoples’ democratic rights have rivaled the Taliban in the art of brutal repression. The much discussed need for a counterinsurgency strategy and increasing U.S. troops to defeat the Taliban while doing nothing to curb the warlords power will leave millions of Afghans defenseless against these henchmen, many of which hold top level positions in the Karzai government today.

President Obama has come under heavy criticism for being indecisive and taking too much time to respond to General McCrystal’s assessment and recommendations on Afghanistan. What may be closer to the truth is that President Obama did not particularly like the options he was presented with. Vice-President Biden’s counterterrorism stategy emphasizing Drone attacks and Special Forces operations to subdue the Taliban was nothing more than a quick and dirty withdrawal strategy by another name. Obama will conclude that the situation on the ground does not yet warrant committing 40,000 additional troops. Given the current strain on U.S. armed forces Obama is also clearly concerned about getting bogged down in a long war in Afghanistan when America has other challenges it must prepare for. The situation in Iraq where 130,000 U.S. troops are still deployed remains a fluid and dangerous thearte of war. In steering the “middle course” President Obama will seek to balance all the competing internal forces on the ground in Afghanistan to achieve an outcome that prevents the Taliban from returning to power. This strategy calls for reshaping alliances and weakening forces in some cases, while strengthening forces and even provoking rivalries in others instances. With public support in America waning for the war in Afghanistan, President Obama’s “McCrystal Light” strategy to achieve the same objective of pushing back the Taliban and al Queda with minimal U.S. troop fatalities may also strike an acceptable balance.

Subduing insurgencies in foreign countries is sometimes the burden policing  empire. These unpopular conflicts can be lost by the lack of polictical support at home, just as easily as by being defeated by adversaries on the battlefield abroad. President Obama didn’t create American empire or start the war in Afghanistan, but he is now fully immersed in the search for an elegant solution to a very thorny crises in the Central Asian Great Game.

Obama Can Win Afghanistan With Soft Partition & the “Reverse McCrystal Strategy”

Obama Can Win Afghanistan With Soft Partition & the “Reverse McCrystal Strategy”

by Webster Brooks

Today, the Center for New Politics and Policy (CNPP) released its recommendations to abate the Taliban insurgency and stabilize Afghanistan with a new strategy paper called “Obama Can Win Afghanistan with Soft Partition & the Reverse McCrystal Strategy” (RMS). The RMS report highlights recommendations to halt the Taliban’s momentum, reconfigure US/NATO force structure on the ground with 20,000 additional troops, stabilize Afghanistan’s post-election government and maximize vital reconstruction efforts to unleash Afghanistan’s state building efforts. The Reverse McCrystal Strategy provides a framework for President Obama’s efforts over the next 18 months to achieve his central goal of preventing a Taliban takeover and denying al Queda a platform in Afghanistan to launch attacks against the United States. The report was drafted by Senior Fellow Webster Brooks, Director of Brooks Foreign Policy Review; the international affairs arm of the Center for New Politics and Policy. The following summary of the Reverse McCrystal Strategy was released on October 19, 2009 in Washington, D.C.

 Summary           

The critical moment for President Obama to announce a decision on America’s strategy to win the war in Afghanistan is fast approaching. In the ongoing series of White House war councils, debate continues on General Stanley McCrystal’s August report that stated “Failure to gain the initiative and reverse insurgent momentum in the near-term (next 12-18 months)….risks an outcome where defeating the insurgency is no longer possible.”  Over the next 18 months President Obama faces four critical questions: 1) Developing a response to stem the Taliban’s growing influence and putting the insurgency on the defensive, 2) Redeploying U.S./NATO/ANA forces to tilt the battlefield in their favor, 3) Brokering an agreement to form a power-sharing post-election government and 4) Reorganizing state building and reconstruction efforts to create the foundation needed to sustain Afghanistan. The Reverse McCrystal Strategy (RMS) represents the best and most realistic strategy to achieve these objectives in the next 18 months and prepare for the gradual withdrawal of U.S. troops over the long run (3-4 years). 

The centerpiece of the Reverse McCrystal Strategy calls for redeploying U.S./NATO military and economic power to consolidate Northern, Central and Western Afghanistan into a “maximum safety zone.” Securing these three regions now where 65% of all Afghans live, and linking them to vital reconstruction efforts is the most effective way to diminish the Taliban’s momentum and solidify critical mass around the central government. Supported by 20,000 additional American troops, U.S./NATO operations would shift from conducting “clear, hold and build missions” inside the Taliban dominated Pashtun belt to providing maximum security to Kabul and the 23 identified “median and low-risk” provinces where the Taliban’s presence is minimal but spreading (see map). Recent Taliban advances outside the Pashtun belt suggest that U.S. forces engaging their adversaries from Kunduz in Northeastern Afghanistan to the southern province of Helmand are overstretched and under resourced. General McCrystal’s request for 40,000 to 80,000 troops to pursue the elusive Taliban plays directly into the Taliban’s hit and run strategy. Meanwhile, the Taliban continues to maneuver and expand the battlefield, launching surprise offensives in new areas. What is most important now for President Obama and the faltering Afghan government is reversing the Taliban’s momentum by consolidating order, safety and stability over a significant section of Afghanistan. Demonstrating real progress and a model of a viable state is of the utmost urgency. Securing Northern, Central and Western Afghanistan would not only demonstrate tangible success, it would decisively impact the balance of power on the ground.         

The Reverse McCrystal Strategy also calls on U.S./NATO forces to scale back forward operations for one year in the Pashtun belt where the Taliban enjoys real support, superior battlefield knowledge and strategic depth with supporting rear-guard bases in Pakistan. The tactical pullback in the Pashtun belt would be done in conjunction with the mass redeployment to Northern, Central and Western Afghanistan. A “demilitarized zone” and safe transit corridors to-and-from the Pushtun-belt provinces would be established for commercial purposes and safe passage. In addition, US/NATO forces would continue the “limited use” of Drone attacks and Special Forces operations on the Pakistan/Afghanistan border to interdict arms shipments and infiltrating al Queda elements. Redoubled efforts in cooperation with Pakistan’s government to destroy critical Taliban support networks in Baluchistan and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas is of critical importance. Concurrent with these changes, Afghanistan’s government would open discussions with Pashtun tribal leaders, parliamentary officials and “willing” Taliban elements over a potential framework for regional autonomy and other national reforms.

While the RMS embraces General McCrystal’s call for a shift from defeating the Taliban by force of arms to creating safe havens, it reverses the battlefield deployment and political focus by winning the hearts and minds of two-thirds of Afghanistan’s provinces first. It optimizes opportunities to contain and undermine the Taliban by negating the most compelling factor powering its surge; the prevailing state of chaos across Afghanistan led by an incompetent and corrupt Karzai government and criminal warlords.

By increasing troop levels, resetting US/NATO/ forces and tactically pulling back in the Pashtun Belt, President Obama will gain valuable breathing room to bring America’s allies on side, settle the post-election political governmental crisis and train additional Afghan National Army troops. Whether there is a run-off election or not between Hamid Karzai and Abdullah Abdullah, it is critical that both men participate in a new coalition government. The effort to stabilize Northern, Central and Western Afghanistan will require significant compromise between Uzbeks, Tajiks, Hazaras and Turkmen who were the core of the Northern Alliance that helped topple the Taliban in 2001. Many of these forces also supported Abdullah Abdullah in the first round of the presidential elections. For better or worse, as a Pashtun, Hamid Karzai can still be a valuable asset in talks with provincial leaders on instituting various forms of autonomy in Pashtun communities. While the character of the Taliban’s insurgency is Islamic-based, the Taliban has remained a predominately ethnic-Pashtun movement. Increased autonomy may create new vehicles and greater choice to incorporate Pashtun cultural, religious and traditional practices into provincial governance structures, thereby dispelling notions that only the Taliban can fulfill these aspirations. The essential point of autonomy in the Pashtun belt is that increased empowerment at the provincial level will afford Pashtun more choices and resources to exert independence from the Taliban. 

Critics of the Reverse McCrystal Strategy will undoubtedly claim that any pullback-temporary or otherwise- from taking the fight to the Taliban is tantamount to capitulation or surrender. But there is no purely military solution to end the war in Afghanistan. The consensus view is that sufficient damage must be inflicted on extremists Taliban elements to create conditions that will compel moderate and wavering Taliban elements to align themselves with the central government. By creating a safe and viable Afghanistan state in Northern, Central and Western Afghanistan supported by a majority of the Afghan people, the Taliban’s rationale that they are the only force that can restore order will be severely undermined. Containing the Taliban’s advances by a soft partition of the Pashtun belt will halt their expansion and reverse their momentum. Increased efforts with Pakistan to neutralize their rear-guard support bases will bottle the Taliban up in a confined space. Offers of greater autonomy and redefining their relationship to the Afghan government will stimulate more debate among the Pashtun people about where their future interests lie and further undercut support for the Taliban. The Reverse McCrystal Strategy in its initial phase will significantly weaken the Taliban militarily and drain its political support among the Pashtun people. Moreover, RMS can accomplish all these achievements with the lowest possible U.S./NATO casualty rates. With public opinion weakening in America and Europe for the war, tangible success in stabilizing 65% of Afghanistan today combined with minimum casualties is the formula to sustain support for the cause in Afghanistan. If and when US/NATO forces have to move decisively to fully re-engage militarily in the Pashtun belt they would confront a far less formidable adversary.

Prosecuting unpopular wars against insurgencies that cannot be won militarily is sometimes the burden of policing empire. There are no easy options for President Obama in Afghanistan. What is required now is an imaginative approach that breaks with conventional thinking. The Reverse McCrystal Strategy offers both. ******

Pakistani Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud Killed in CIA Missile Strike

Brooks Foreign Policy Review

August 7, 2009

Today Pakistani officials announced that Pakistani Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud was killed by a U.S. drone missile attack. Mehsud was the most feared leader of Pakistan’s resurgent Tehrik-i-Taliban. He has been accused of masterminding terrorists attacks from Spain to complicity in the murder of former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in 2007. Mehsud always denied he had any involvement in Bhutto’s assassination. He was also accused of working directly with al Queda in Pakistan, supplying them with support to establish operating and training bases in the Federally Administered Tribal Territories.

While definitive proof of Mehsud’s death has yet to be established it is believed he was killed in Drone attack on his father-in-laws home on Friday morning, where he was visiting his second wife. Reports have also indicated that local Taliban leaders in South Waziristan have already convened a shura (council) to determine who will succeed Mehsud as leader. Robert Gibbs, Obama adminstration spokesman said they are aware of the reports but cannot confirm their accuracy. Meanwhile the Pakistani government announced they will be dispatching a team to the site of the attack to confirm Baitallah Mehsud’s death.

Obama’s Unfolding Strategy for Victory in Afghanistan

August 4, 2009

by Webster Brooks ,

Editor Brooks Foreign Policy Review 

With July marking the deadliest month of combat for U.S. and NATO forces since the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, America’s fortitude and patience with an intensifying military conflict will be severely tested in 2009. So too will President Obama’s leadership as a wartime president. England and Canada’s flagging support for the war, rising casualty rates and abducted American soldiers pleading for their lives on cable news channels are already generating concern at the White House and the Pentagon. Because wars can be lost just as easily by the lack of domestic support, more so than military defeats on foreign battlefields, President Obama must continue to forcefully articulate what vital American interests are at stake in Afghanistan. He should answer his critics who question his rationale for escalating a war most experts agree cannot be won militarily against an enemy that poses no existential threat to America. Afghanistan is now Barak Obama’s war. His credibility as Commander-in-Chief and his presidency may well depend on it. 

President Obama came to office with a clear and well conceived strategy to prosecute the “Forgotten War” in Afghanistan; one he has relentlessly pursued in his first six months in office. Having inherited George Bush’s war, he immediately redefined the goal in Afghanistan as defeating al Queda and its extremists Taliban allies, and denying them a sanctuary to launch attacks against America. Obama’s critical first step called for a larger American military footprint on the ground. Not surprisingly, his attempts to persuade our NATO allies to make a similar commitment were not very successful. Although some of his detractors questioned his decision to expand America’s commitment in Afghanistan out of fear that the U.S. would get bogged down in a military quagmire, President Obama had no choice. When he assumed office in January, the Taliban had advanced to the outskirts of Kabul, and were gaining control of more provinces within the country. Not to act quickly and decisively to increase America’s presence on the ground risked the downfall of President Hamid Kharzai’s weak and unpopular government. The possibility of Afghanistan collapsing into a failed state would have dramatically destabilized the region and vastly complicated an already dangerous situation in neighboring Pakistan and Iran.  Since the arrival of additional troops in Afghanistan and Obama’s installation of General Stanley McChrystal to lead the war effort, the Taliban’s offensive has been blunted and President Kharzai’s government has been shored up. The troop surge has also been critical to restoring order across the country in the lead up to the September presidential elections.  

In July, Obama’s troop surge unfolded as the locus of his long-term strategy of unleashing a military offensive to break the back of extremist Taliban forces entrenched in Eastern Afghanistan. President Obama’s goal is not to totally destroy extremist Taliban elements, but to significantly reduce their military capability and influence; thereby creating new conditions to draw “moderate” Taliban elements into Kharzai’s ruling coalition government. July’s ground offensive targeted the Taliban’s most significant stronghold in southeastern Afghanistan’s Helmund Province.  Helmund Province is not only one of the Taliban’s military and cultural centers of gravity, but the most profitable poppy growing region in the nation that finances much of the Taliban’s operations. The Taliban cannot be defeated until its economic lifeline to narcotics trafficking is degraded and U.S./Afghan National Army forces can exert more control over the areas along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border to stem the flow of jihadists, arms and drugs to-and-from Pakistan.  

The costs of taking the fight to the Taliban thus far have been heavy. The spike in U.S. and NATO casualties will undoubtedly continue throughout 2009 as the missions to subdue the Taliban in Eastern Afghanistan continue. In July, NATO and American forces suffered 75 fatalities; 42 two U.S. troops were killed and six more died the first two days in August. Despite the uptick in combat deaths, the U.S. and NATO must continue to press forward on the battlefield. Their failure to do so would send a negative message to the Afghan people who already question America’s commitment and resolve to the future wellbeing of Afghanistan.

Similar to Iraq, the U.S. military is attempting to drive the Taliban out of its areas of refuge and support, and then remain in the “liberated” areas to secure the safety of local inhabitants. This close combat and exposure to enemy fire associated with the “capture, hold and build” strategy is more challenging in Afghanistan which is not only larger but more ethnically and tribally diverse than Iraq. The Afghan Taliban forces are extremely capable and well trained, particularly in using suicide and roadside bombs to kill American soldiers. Thus higher casualty rates must be expected.

By pressing its ground and air offensive early and hard against Taliban strongholds in Helmund Province, President Obama is hoping to score a decisive victory that will create the momentum to confront the Taliban in Afghanistan’s other eastern provinces like Kandahar, while at the same time demoralizing wavering Taliban elements. Key to the success of the Obama’s strategy of winning moderate and wavering Taliban elements over to the Kharzai government is convincing them that the Taliban hardliners cannot win the war or offer its citizens a better life.

As an integral part of this strategy the U.S. is moving to implement a similar tactic that it used with success in Iraq in the Anbar Awakening; putting Taliban insurgents on its payroll to stop fighting the Kharzai government. In Iraq the U.S. coughed up $30 million a month to pay 100,000 Sunni insurgents $300 each. In Afghanistan it has been estimated that its 250,000 insurgents could be paid $120 a month, or the national average of the salary of the lowest ranking members of the Afghan army. In the weeks ahead the Obama administration can be expected to roll out this program after the presidential elections that Kharzai is expected to win.  

A second strategy the Obama administration is reviewing to bring more moderate Taliban elements into Kharzai’s coalition government is “flipping” various Taliban leaders and groups. In Afghanistan’s past twenty years of internal warfare, various warlords, tribal and clan leaders have often “switch sides” in the middle of a conflict based on who they think will win. Warlords and tribal leaders joining the same forces they once fought against has been a constant and peculiar feature of Afghanistan devastating patchwork of civil wars. In short, many Taliban leaders have placed insuring the survival of their own tribes and klans above their loyalty to national Taliban leaders like Mullah Omar or major figures from other provinces. The Obama administration has made it clear to Hamid Kharzai, that if he wins the presidential election, he will have to reach out to various Taliban forces that have opposed him and even fought against him in the past. He will also have to end the rampant corruption that has marked his presidency. Kharzai has already begun making his peace with some of these Taliban leaders by offering them offices in his government in exchange for their support for his candidacy. While “flipping” certain Taliban leaders is an intricate and complex process intrinsic to Afghan culture, the prospects of its success will be dramatically improved the more U.S. and NATO forces are able to rock extremists Taliban elements back on the heels militarily.

Beyond the military component of the Afghanistan War, financial support, NGO involvement, reconstruction teams, education, infrastructure and economic development assistance are needed to stand up a viable functioning state. If the U.S. is going to eradicate poppy fields and production that constitutes 60 percent of Afghanistan’s economy they must also have replacement crops and programs available to poor Afghan farmers to maintain their support. Coordinating and bringing these resources to bear on Afghanistan is far beyond the means of the United States alone. It will require the cooperation and assistance of NATO countries and others like India, Iran and Russia that already have substantial investments and national security interest in a stable Afghanistan. But these massive investments and improvements in the daily lives of the Afghan people can only become tangible in an environment where there is a reasonable hope of long-term security and stability in government. Right now the Afghan people have neither.

President Obama is well aware of the dangers of getting bogged down in a long-drawn out war in Afghanistan; one the United States cannot afford militarily or financially. Afghanistan storied history as being the graveyard of empires from Genghis Khan to the Soviet Union’s disastrous occupation has informed his military strategy. President Obama’s troop surge and military offensive to “capture, hold and build” territory while changing facts on the ground in the short run is the only realistic strategy that can create the conditions for a negotiated settlement with moderate and wavering Taliban forces. It is a realistic approach for getting American troops out of Afghanistan sooner rather than later. Whether the American people will demonstrate the resolve to support America’s difficult and painful mission in Afghanistan remains to be seen. As for the Obama Administration, there can be no turning back now.  ******

Guantanamo and the Uighurs: The Story of China’s Other Minority – Part II

by Collin Spears – Visiting Fellow, Center for New Politics and Policy

The first installment of this two part series explored the situation of Uighur detainees in Guantanamo Bay and China’s response to the U.S. decision to release the Uighurs to third-countries as political refugees.  This installment will look at the current situation in Xinjiang.  Then, the history of the Han Chinese – Uighur relationship will be surveyed to deduce what motivated the Guantanamo Uighurs to journey to Afghanistan and Pakistan as political and economic refugees, some of whom trained in the hope of returning to Xinjiang to commit terrorist acts against the Chinese government.  Further, the implications to U.S. foreign policy, as it relate to the situation in Xinjiang, will be examined.

Brooks Sunday Global Review – Shujah Nawaz Interview: Toward an Obama Reponse to Pakistan’s Long March

Shuja Nawaz

BROOKS SUNDAY GLOBAL REVIEW – TALK
Shuja Nawaz, Director of The Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center
Discusses: “A Comprehensive U.S. Policy Toward Pakistan” Report
and the Kerry-Lugar Senate Bill on Pakistan with Webster Brooks.

Pakistan Moving Toward Revolution or Military Takeover Unless Zardari Resigns

Chief Justice Chaudhry to be Restored to Pakistan's Supreme Court

President Asif Zardari must tender his resignation now or consign Pakistan’s fate to a military takeover or another chaotic attempt by the democratic opposition to remove him from office. Those in search of a middle course to resolve the post-Long March crisis will find no safe harbor. Prime Minister Galini’s March 15 pre-dawn announcement restoring Iftikhar Chaudry as chief justice of Pakistan’s Supreme Court prevented bloodletting in Islamabad’s streets between democratic opposition forces and government troops. But it did not represent a principled compromise nor was the order to ’stand down’ troops a sign that Pakistan’s democracy has been strengthened. Quite the opposite, the lawyer’s movement and Sharif forces imposed their will on the government and the army. Thus, the events surrounding the Long March have widened Pakistan’s political chasm and expanded the power vacuum in an already fractured society. The question is what comes next?

The issue before the Pakistani people, the region and the west is whose in charge? Zardari? Galani? Kayani’s Army or the ISI? The answer is obvious; there is no maximum leader or governing institution guiding Pakistan’s wayward ship of state. Zardari’s actions to keep Chaudhry under house arrest, pack the judiciary with his own judges, arrest opposition leaders and dismiss Punjab’s provincial government revealed that he is a petty dictator. The lawyer’s movement was and remains the last line of defense against the dictatorships of Musharraf and Zardari. The Army is the only instrument of national power that can prevent a total collapse of order in Pakistan, but at the expense of imposing marshal law and at the risk of provoking a fresh uprising of the democratic opposition.

Zardari is now a spent force with no moral or political authority. Galani lacks the political base, muscle and stature to lead Pakistan out of its crisis. Army Chief Kayani and Pakistan’s western backers want to avoid at all costs another military takeover. Not only would a military dictatorship bring the opposition into the streets, it would paralyze the Army’s already difficult task of containing the al Queda/Pakistani Taliban offensive in the Northwest Territory and FATA.

For all these reasons, former Prime Minister and PML-N leader Nawaz Sharif is surfacing as a force the U.S and Britain must contend with. As leader of the second largest political bloc in parliament and the dominant figure in Pakistan’s most populous and wealthy province of Punjab, Sharif is a power player. With historically close ties to Pakistan’s Muslim political parties, the U.S. has always been uncomfortable with Sharif. Initially raised to power as Prime Minister in 1990 by the stridently Islamists Generals Hamid Gul and Mirza Aslam Beg, Sharif eventually opposed the Generals and their plans to export nuclear technology to Iraq and Iran. However, many believe America’s and Britain’s concern about Sharif’s Islamic ties are overblown. Sharif has moderated his views over the years and his close connection to Saudi Arabia where he was exiled has enhanced his standing.

Upon returning to Pakistan in late 2008, Sharif entered a coalition with his long-time rival Benazir Bhutto to oppose Musharraf’s dictatorship prior to her assassination. To Sharif’s credit he has consistently fought to re-seat Chaudhry and the judges that were illegally removed by Musharraf. He correctly insisted that Zardari give up the extra-constitutional presidential powers he inherited from Musharraf’s corrupt dictatorship. Thus, when Sharif supported the lawyer’s movement call for the Long March on Islamabad, his action cannot be considered as political opportunism. Whether Nawaz Sharif and his brother Shahbaz’s disqualification from holding office will be rescinded by the courts is not clear. But one thing is certain; Pakistan’s political crisis will not be resolved without Sharif playing a critical role.

With each passing day, Pakistan is spiraling deeper into the abyss that can only end in a catastrophic collapse. Beyond its unsustainable leadership void, the stress fracture of ethnic separatism is propelling Pakistan toward a dangerous breakup of the state. The Pakistani Taliban and al Queda forces are expanding in the Northwest Territory and SWAT Valley. Kashmir is a contested hot zone of conflict with India and the source of contentious debate among Pakistan’s political factions and especially within the army. A confederation of radical Pashtun tribal leaders, Tajik, Uzbek, Afghan, Chechen and Middle Eastern jihadists control large sections of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Balochistan has long been a rear-guard base area for Mullah Omar’s Taliban forces and Baloch nationalists’ forces opposed the central government’s writ. Indeed, taken as a whole the Northwest Territory, FATA and Balochistan constitutes a virtual Pashtunistan state that operates beyond the government’s writ.

Moreover, the battle lines between Nawaz and Zardari camps have been drawn after Zardari’s draconian dismissal of the Punjab’s provincial government and the controversial nomination of Salmaan Taseer as the new Punjab governor. The takedown of Punjab’s elected government has also exacerbated tension between the Punjab and Singh provinces.

As the central government weakens the influence and power of the separatist movements and radical Islamists is growing. The antagonisms spurned by these separatist movements are splintering the ranks of Pakistan’s military as well. For the neighboring governments of India, Iran, Afghanistan and China the instability in nuclear armed Pakistan increases their need to back various proxy forces and run covert operations inside the country to protect their interests.

The clock is ticking and time is running out on Islamabad. Pakistan’s political insolvency, spiraling economic crisis and the growing pressures of regional/ethnic separatism are leading inexorably toward a violent collision at the center. Last week Nawaz Sharif said the Long March was “a prelude to revolution.” We beg to differ. The revolution started in 2008 when the lawyer’s movement challenged Musharraf’s dictatorial rule. It has proceeded through twist and turns, regained momentum and surged ahead again. The Pakistani people must now sweep Asif Zardari aside, restore Iftikhar Chaudhry and the dismissed judges to their rightful place and reconstitute the Punjab provincial government; all without asking the permission of Washington, D.C and London.

Obama’s Central Asia Crisis: The Wars to Come in Afghanistan, Pashtunistan and Pakistan

 

 Eliminating al Queda’s stronghold in Pakistan and defeating the Taliban in Afghanistan has moved to the top of President-elect Barak Obama’s foreign policy agenda. Circumstances on the ground in Central Asia have grown increasingly grave as a resurgent al Queda has pivoted toward a new strategy in Central Asia; destabilizing the nuclear armed government of Pakistan. In Afghanistan the Taliban’s offensive has rendered key provinces ungovernable and pushed President Hamid Karzai’s government to the abyss of collapse. Al Queda and the Taliban are stretching the global battlefield and redefining Central Asia’s geo-political map. For Barak Obama, the stakes are enormous. Developments in Central Asia will test the full measure of American hard and soft power and Europe’s resolve to forge a durable global security arrangement.      

 

The emerging Central Asian crisis poses daunting challenges for the incoming Obama administration. President Karzai of Afghanistan and President Zardari of Pakistan are weak leaders of faltering governments that cannot be sustained without unpopular U.S. intervention. Since al Queda and the Taliban launched their ground offensive in May 2006 they now occupy military space in four Southeastern Afghanistan provinces, Baluchistan Province in Pakistan, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (F.A.T.A.) and growing swaths of the North West Frontier Provinces (NWFP). A virtual failed state of Pashtunistan now exists in the majority Pashtun ethnic seam on both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. While Obama promises to insert 10,000 additional troops in Afghanistan, most NATO countries in-theater refuse to allow their troops to engage the Taliban-leaving the brunt of the fighting to U.S. armed forces. Finally, Iran, Russia, India, China and Pakistan all have strategic designs on Afghanistan backed by armed proxies on the ground; few of which comport with U.S. interests.

 

The Obama administration’s national security goals in Central Asia have yet to be articulated, but preventing Afghanistan or Pakistan from becoming failed states is foremost on the agenda. The collapse of either government will unleash Al Queda, the Taliban and other extremists to expand their influence across Central Asia, particularly in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Should Pakistan slide into chaos the prospects of loose nuclear technology floating on the black market has ominous implications. The global nerve center of terrorism has relocated to Pashtunistan where terrorist attacks on London, Madrid and Bali were all hatched, and where al Queda makes it new home. Therefore Obama must unite his European allies around a central strategy to bring Pakistan on side, dislodge Al Queda and the Taliban from Pashtunistan (FATA and the NWFP) and reach consensus on a long range plan to rebuild Afghanistan.   

 

Al Queda’s long-term strategy is to draw the U.S. military into the Middle East, spread its forces thin and bleed the U.S. until it withdraws from the region. Weakened regimes  left behind would have to fend for themselves against a radicalized Muslim street and potent non-state actors, as is feared in Iraq today. Thus, a sustained al Queda offensive in Pakistan could warrent U.S. intervention in its third Muslim country the past seven years. The alternative would be to risk Pakistan lapsing into a failed state. Aided by the Bush administration’s ill conceived and mismanaged war of choice in Iraq, Al Queda and anti-U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf and Central Asia have seized the  initiative. They are selecting the time and place of battle and determining the choice of weapons. Given the magnitude and complexity of the challenges surfacing in Central Asia, how will President Barak Obama’s respond? 

 

While stabilizing Afghanistan will require patience, perseverance and a renewed commitment by NATO, the situation in Pakistan has imparted a great sense of urgency and volatility to the Central Asian equation. The surprising strength of Al Queda’s resurgence in Pakistan and its alliance with the new Pakistani Taliban (Tehrik-e-Taliban) poses an immediate threat to Pakistan. Pakistan’s economy is in a tailspin, which could fuel more discord among the Pakistani body-politic. Going forward Obama’s biggest problem may not be al Queda as much as the Pakistani Army and the Inter Services Intelligence Agency (ISA) whose loyalties remain divided between the Zardari government on the one hand and extremist Taliban and Kashmiri elements on the other. The Army and the ISI sponsored A.Q. Khan’s acquisition of nuclear technology to build Pakistan’s “Islamic” bomb, and provided cover for Khan’s black market sales bazaar of nuclear technology to Iran, North Korea and Libya. All this was done as a matter of state policy. Along with hosting and financing global terrorists since the beginning of Afghanistan’s resistance to the Soviets in 1979, the Army and ISI has done more to advance the cause of global terrorism than any other nation or non-state actor.            

 

Having enjoyed sanctuary in Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier Territories since 2003, al Queda continues to receive aid and comfort from key sectors of the Army and the Inter Services Intelligence Agency (ISI). Now al Queda has turned on the Pakistani government with a vengeance. Their sponsorship of Muslim extremists that provoked the Red Mosque massacres in Islamabad in 2007 marked a crucial turning point in Pakistan that re-energized the extremist Muslim movement. After the mosque massacre angry volunteers and madrassa students streamed into FATA and the NWFP. In November 2007, al Queda launched its biggest operation ever in Pakistan’s Swat Valley where thousands of Taliban, Chechens, Uzbeks and Arab jihadists joined AQ to blowup police stations, drive out local administrators, burned down girls schools, forced thousands to flee the  fighting and shut down the Valley’s tourist economy. The Swat Valley offensive was followed by a wave of suicide bombings and assassination attempts against the military and leading Pakistani officials from Karachi to Rawalpindi to the assassination of Benazir Bhutto. The scale of the offensive and the damage done to Pakistan’s tottering economy has unsettled Pakistan’s government and illuminated the red lights in the Pentagon’s Situation Room.

 

Fully aware of the implications of Al Queda’s offensive, in October Obama said “We have to make the case that the biggest threat to Pakistan is not India which has been the historical enemy. It is actually militants within their borders. If we get them to refocus on that, that’s going to be critical for our success, not just in stabilizing Pakistan but also in finishing the job in Afghanistan.” Obama’s message to Pakistani Prime Minister Galani and President Zardari was clear; the days of diverting billions in U.S. aid to fund Pakistan’s military operations against India and supporting Kashmir extremists are over. If Pakistan wants the proposed new $15 billion aid package, it must start rooting out Taliban and al Queda forces within its borders and scale back support for Kashmiri terrorists. To undermine al Queda and the army’s support for Kashmiri adventurism, Obama is thinking seriously about appointing a special envoy to finally broker a border settlement between Pakistan and India over Kashmir.    

 

Despite his critics in the U.S. and Pakistan, Obama has refused to backtrack on his statement that if Pakistan doesn’t move on “actionable intelligence” to strike al Queda inside its borders, the United States will. In truth, Drone missile and U.S. helicopter gunship attacks on al Queda positions are increasing as the Bush presidency draws to a close. Should Pakistan’s Army and ISI continue to drag their feet on going after AQ and the Pakistani Taliban, Obama may be confronted with a game changing decision; whether to commit U.S. special forces in Pakistan. Even if bin Ladin is killed, al Queda is not going away. Committing ground forces with coordinated lethal air power may be the only option available to strike a decisive blow to al Queda and the Taliban. It could also ignite a wave of anti-U.S. outrage that threatens the political legitimacy of the Zardari-Galani government. While there are few good options in Pakistan, Al Queda’s operation in Pashtunistan must be shut down. 

 

On the other side of the border Obama’s first move will be carrying through on his campaign pledge to redeploy two U.S. brigades from Iraq to Afghanistan. His objective will be expelling Mullah Omar’s Taliban forces from Kandahar and the poppy rich Helmund Province in Southern Afghanistan that provides millions in narco-trafficking revenue to the insurgency. Obama and his new CENTCOM Commander General David Petraeus are both leaning toward a military “surge first” policy that creates conditions for negotiations to bring “moderate Taliban” elements into the government. In October, Obama said “I think that after talking to our commanders on the ground and based on sound intelligence, if we can peel off some support from the hardcore militants that are aligned with Al Qaeda that will be beneficial.”

 

To make this strategy work, the U.S. must hit the Taliban hard enough militarily to separate the Taliban and Pashtun tribes that truly want to enter a coalition government with Karzai, from diehard Taliban forces determined to undermine the government. The Taliban’s strategy is not to militarily topple the Karzai regime, but to undermine it while extending their influence. By destroying infrastructure, burning down schools, attacking NGO’s and targeting Aghan police officers they seek to make it impossible for Karzai to govern.

 

Increasing U.S. troop strength to 43,000 soldiers on the ground along with 30,000 NATO forces will allow the U.S/NATO corps to replicate the Iraq strategy of clearing territory; holding ground and building stable protected areas with the support of Afghan people. Implementing the “clear, hold and build” strategy will be far more difficult than it was in Iraq. Afghanistan’s land mass is considerably more vast and the Taliban much stronger and better organized than Iraq’s fractured political forces. Karzai’s government only controls one-third of the country, with warlords, Northern Alliance forces, and Iran wielding tremendous influence in Herat and Western Afghanistan. 

 

The deployment of more U.S. troops and the “surge first” strategy will also send a strong message to Pakistan and others that the U.S. is making a long-term commitment to Afghanistan’s beleaguered government; a commitment the U.S. never made since its 2002 invasion. Karzai needs time and space to reign in the provincial warlords he’s allowed to run roughshod over the country. New estimates for rebuilding a credible the Afghan National Army and the Afghan Police Force has jumped from 65,000 to 200,000. And there are still the challenges of restoring basic services starting with water, electricity, schools and medical services.

 

Karzai has been widely discredited among Afghans as ineffective against tyrannical warlords, and an enabler of Afghanistan’s massive corruption. Karzai’s own brother has been linked to drug trafficking. Obama could have Karzai on a short leash. Presidential elections are coming in 2009 and Karzai may not survive if an attractive Pashtun leader emerges to challenge for office. 

 

The road forward in Afghanistan will be a long and difficult one that likely spans President Obama’s presidential term, even if re-elected. Afghanistan is one of the poorest countries in the world, divided by many ethnic groups, warlords and foreign powers. The economic commitment necessary to overcome the effects of three decades of civil war is so large that U.S. and European leaders have yet to live up to their pledges made in of 2002. In the midst of the current global economic crisis, European largesse seems even less likely. The failure to defeat or co-opt the Taliban in Afghanistan will be a devastating blow to the effectiveness of NATO and the European Union, and would have serious repercussions for the future of global security.

 

General Petreaus, who is conducting a top-down review of CENTCOM operations in Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan, said last month that “The effort in Afghanistan is going to be the longest campaign of the long war.” Obama will do well to remember that. After all, he seeks to accomplish what Alexander the Great, Genghis Khan, the British Raj and the Soviets could not; subdue Afghanistan’s insurgency with foreign troops and impose a proxy government on Kabul.