Failed Israeli-Palestinian Peace Talks May Sink Obama’s Middle East Strategy

President Obama’s failure to restart Israeli-Palestinian peace talks has severely diminished his administration’s hopes of achieving a Two-State Solution. Persuading Israel and the Palestinians to reach an accord lay at the center of President Obama’s strategy to renew American power in the Middle East. By removing the Israel-Palestinian conflict as the destabilizing accelerant fueling anti-American sentiment, radical sympathies with salafi causes and potential wars between Israel, Lebanon and Syria, President Obama sought to usher in a political re-alignment in the region. Obama’s “New Middle East” envisaged in his Cairo speech embodied the majority of Sunni Arab governments accepting a Two-State Solution, recognizing Israel’s right to exist and working in partnership with the U.S. to curb Iranian influence.

President Obama’s plan hinged on securing two critical concessions; first Israel would be convinced to freeze settlements in the “occupied territories;” then Saudi King Abdullah would be persuaded to support the talks and win approval from the Arab world to bring the Palestinian Authority to the negotiating table. But President Obama miscalculated badly. When Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu refused to freeze settlement activity King Abdullah was forced to reject Obama’s request to support the talks and “normalize” relations with Israel. Left out in the cold, Mahmoud Abbas announced his resignation as Palestinian Authority President. A mere ten months after taking office, President Obama’s Middle East initiative had crashed and burned.    

Since early November the Obama administration has scrambled to revive the peace process with little success. Secretary of State Clinton announced that talks between Israel and the Palestinians could resume as soon as possible without preconditions. But the Palestinian Authority’s immediate rejection of Secretary Clinton’s offer underscores how wide the chasm has grown in the search for peace. Israeli support for Prime Minister Netanyahu’s position to expand settlements in the West Bank has increased. Israeli jets continue to bomb targets in Gaza suspected of being transit points for weapons smuggling and his center-right coalition with Avigdor Lieberman has grown stronger.

On the other side of the divide, the Palestinian Authority is in disarray. Having demanded a total ban on Israel settlements as a condition to resume talks, Mahmoud Abbas is in no position to offer more concessions. Many speculate that Abbas’s threat to resign as Palestinian Authority President is a bluff to force the U.S. to adopt a firmer position with Israel on the settlement issue. But Secretary Clinton’s November endorsement of Netanyahu’s offer to restrict settlement activities with exemptions for Jerusalem and the 3,000 settlement projects already under construction could hardly be considered getting tough with Israel.       

Increasingly, Mahmoud Abbas is viewed throughout the Palestinian Diaspora as a spent force. Abbas and the Fatah’s corruption, inability to deliver vital social services to its constituents and the failure to win anything meaningful after five years of negotiations with Israel and the U.S. has led to the P. A.’s disintegration on the West Bank. Notwithstanding his threats to resign, Mahmoud Abbas will likely cancel the January elections and remain the PA President by default. Calls by Egyptian President Mubarak, Jordan’s King Hussien II, Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak, and President Shimon Peres for Abbas to remain as President reflect growing concerns that the absence of a credible “moderate” PA President will result in the West Bank falling under HAMAS’s control. Nor can the prospects of another destructive civil war between Fatah and HAMAS be ruled out.  

Irrespective of whatever short-term maneuvers Mahmoud Abbas makes, momentum in the West Bank is passing over to HAMAS and more radical Palestinian forces. Similarly, Iran’s influence in the West Bank is likely to grow, even if Abbas maintains some semblance of power with the Palestinian Authority. With Israel moving further to the right and tension mounting in Gaza and the West Bank the prospects for renewed violence may be greater than the prospects of restarting peace talks.

Many will question why President Obama demanded that Israel halt settlement activities as a condition to open talks with the Palestinian Authority when it wasn’t necessary. That the President made such a demand without thoroughly discussing the issue with the Israelis first is even more baffling, as was his expectation that Saudi King Abdullah would support renewed peace talks with no commitment from Israel to stop settlement construction.  Whether President Obama was misled by Tel Aviv, underestimated the Israelis and the Saudis or overestimated his ability to transfer his substantial popularity into a foreign policy breakthrough remains unclear.  What we do know is that President Obama’s Israeli-Palestinian gambit failed miserably, and failure has consequences. President Obama is not the first, nor is he likely to be the last American president to be seduced by the dream of forging an Israeli-Palestinian peace. In the end, peace can only be made when the warring parties are ready for peace. Unfortunately, that day is still a long way off.

Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Policy Gamble and the Iranian Nuclear Problem

Saudi Arabia's King Abdullah in Germany

September 22, 2009

BROOKS FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW: ANALYSIS

By Webster Brooks

While there are many unanswered questions about Saudi Arabia’s evolving foreign policy, Riyadh’s response to Iranian enlargement in the Middle East already suggests that great change is at hand. The Saudi’s are engaged in active diplomacy with Iran while simultaneously fighting proxy wars against them, pursuing a massive military buildup, inviting the Soviets into the Persian Gulf and debating nuclear deterrence to push back the “Persian threat.”

 

Containing Iran’s drive for dominance in the Middle East has risen to the top of Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy agenda. Tehran’s enlarged footprint in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Afghanistan, the Palestinian territories and Gulf States has diminished Saudi Arabia’s political power across the Middle East. The threat to Riyadh’s national security interests are being felt with immediacy. Iranian backed Shiite militias control southern Iraq and threaten Saudi Arabia’s northern border. In Yemen, Iran is supporting the al Houthi Shiia insurgency against President Saleh’s government on the Kingdom’s southern border. With the specter of Iran’s nuclear program looming over the House of Saud, Riyadh is recalibrating its foreign policy to counter the possibility of a new existential threat. To combat Iran’s imperial reach King Abdullah has transformed Saudi Arabia’s once secretive cloak and dagger diplomacy into a fully engaged foreign policy agenda aimed at establishing Saudi Arabia as maximum leader of the Arab World. But King Abdulla’s multifaceted efforts to staunch the Iranian juggernaut have met with limited success. Thus, Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy continues to undergo profound change that will require more accommodations to Tehran, greater independence from the United States, closer ties to Russia and an unprecedented military buildup that could include a Saudi nuclear program.    For decades, maintaining stability in the Persian Gulf and insuring the safe passage of oil through its critical shipping lanes defined Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy universe; a policy based on Riyadh’s reliance on American military power. The nexus of U.S.-Saudi relations was containment of Iran and Iraq whose highly militarized states constituted a direct threat to Riyadh. But the 1979 Iranian revolution that bought a radical Shiite theocracy to power, and President Bush’s ill-advised Iraq invasion that led to an Iranian backed Shiia government in Baghdad has changed the balance of power in the Persian Gulf.    With Saddam Hussein’s buffer state deposed and nothing standing between Saudi Arabia and Iran’s hegemonic designs, King Abdulla initiated a decisive shift in the Kingdom’s policies toward Tehran. Riyadh no longer treats Iran as a permanent adversary but a strategic competitor. Rather than leading a Sunni Arab united front to isolate Tehran, King Abdulla opened a permanent dialogue with Iran on a full range of diplomatic issues. Since Iranian President Ahmadinijad’s surprise invitation to address the religious pilgrimage in Mecca in 2007, Saudi and Iranian leaders have negotiated understandings over Lebanon, Iraq and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Both countries have sought to “manage” conflict between their competing religious and political factions to minimize sectarian bloodshed. In each instance Iranian backed Hezbollah forces in Lebanon, the Mahdi and Badr Forces in Iraq and HAMAS in Palestine have held the upper hand militarily. Thus, the Saudi’s have funneled arms and money to defend their Sunni allies, while negotiating compromises with Iran to preserve political options for their Sunni compatriots. Although King Abdullah slowed Iran’s momentum in Lebanon where the Cedar forces won the spring elections and HAMAS and al Fatah are at an impasse, Iran is clearly emerging as the Gulf’s dominant force. Indeed, the Iraqi Shiia ascendency to power under Nouri al Maliki constituted an enormous strategic setback for Riyadh. Expanded Iranian access to Iraqi oil, its waterways and its strategic energy platform in Basra has greatly strengthened Iran’s economic, military and political position across the Middle East.    With a weak national army, vulnerable borders and having dismissed American forces from its soil in 2003, King Abdullah has embarked on a military buildup that consumes 11% of the nation’s GDP. To counter Iran’s growing threat he turned to an unlikely ally; Russia. In 2007, following discussions with President Vladimir Putin, King Abdullah agreed to a $4 billion deal to purchase 150 Russian T-9 tanks, 100 MI-17 and MI-35 tanks, hundreds of BMP Armored Infantry Combat Vehicles and 20 BVIC air defense systems. Putin also offered the Saudi’s nuclear reactors and cooperation on a space program to invest in launching Saudi satellites.  Speculation that the Saudi arms deal with Moscow included a proviso that Russia would oppose Iran’s nuclear arms program has not materialized. Abdullah’s shift to allow the Russians arms sales shocked the United States and Western Europe. As a major arms and nuclear materials supplier to Iran, Russian arms sales to Saudi Arabia afford Moscow powerful leverage in the Persian Gulf at a time when American and Western European influence is declining.

Notwithstanding the Russian arms deal Saudi Arabia will remain in the U.S. sponsored Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) defense pact. The Saudi’s will install an $8 billion border security system, procure coast guard vessels, surveillance aircraft, helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicles and a telecommunications network as part of the GCC agreement. But the Moscow agreement was a serious warning that Riyadh is no longer marching in lockstep with the U.S., especially when its national security interests are at state.  Similarly, the debate within the House of Saud about President Obama’s response to the Iranian nuclear threat has raised the issue of Riyadh pursuing a nuclear path.

The Saudi’s are skeptical about President Obama’s imprimatur to convene talks with Iran over its nuclear program. Irrespective of the fact that no proof exist that Iran has a nuclear weapons program, the Saudi’s are convinced Iran won’t suspend its enrichment activities or permit more intrusive inspections. Should the U.S. or Israel attack Iran’s nuclear facilities Tehran would likely respond with attacks on Saudi oil tankers, close Gulf shipping lanes, sabotage Saudi oil facilities and foment Shiia unrest within the Kingdom. While the Saudi’s are split on the issue of an attack against Iran, at the end of the day the decision is not theirs to make. It is this sense of frustration at the lack of a credible conventional and nuclear deterrent that has prompted the Saudi’s to consider a nuclear program.      

The prospects of Saudi Arabia attempting to develop a nuclear weapons program are remote. The Kingdom has no nuclear power facilities. Its scientists have no experience in enriching uranium for reactor fuel or operating nuclear reactors. Further, no evidence exists that Riyadh has tried to procure nuclear weapons from foreign suppliers. Saudi Arabia has joined the Gulf Cooperation Council initiative to develop a joint nuclear energy program. In May 2008, they also signed a memorandum of understanding with the U.S. on nuclear energy cooperation. Were the Saudi’s to move in the direction of a nuclear weapons program, they would undoubtedly face heavy international criticism, risk isolation and stiff economic sanctions. Nevertheless, the possibility of Riyadh going nuclear cannot be ruled out. If Iran brings a nuclear weapons program on-line, or Saudi confidence in America’s ability to protect the Kingdom collapses, or a new leader succeeds King Abdullah with a pro-nuclear weapons agenda, Riyadh could reverse course.   

While there are many unanswered questions about Saudi Arabia’s evolving foreign policy, Riyadh’s response to Iranian enlargement in the Middle East already suggests that great change is at hand. The Saudi’s are engaged in active diplomacy with Iran while simultaneously fighting proxy wars against them, pursuing a massive military buildup, inviting the Soviets into the Persian Gulf and debating nuclear deterrence to push back the “Persian threat.”

 Beyond Riyadh’s preoccupation with Iran, the broader currents of change sweeping over the Middle East are challenging the Saudi foreign policies as well. The Saudi’s are already softening their position towards Shiia Muslim communities in Arab countries in response to the “Shiia awakening.” The clamor for democracy that is bringing new forces to power through elections is forcing the Saudi’s to enter new alliances with a more diverse set of players. The growing role of non-state actors, militias and ethnic breakaway movements has exposed the limitations of Riyadh’s reliance on petro-dollars to simply buy off whole governments. The Saudi’s attempt to pay the Kurds $1 billion dollars to postpone the referendum on Kirkuk for ten years is a classic if not embarrassing case in point. Even the Saudi’s role as the grand mediator’s of Sunni Arab conflicts is being challenged by tiny Qutar that recently brokered peace arrangements in Lebanon and Yemen.    There is a “New Middle East” coming into being. How Saudi Arabia adjust its foreign policy to meet the Iranian challenge and embrace the winds of change engulfing the region will determine if Riyadh is prepared to meet the test of leadership in a new age.  ******

 

Defusing Yemen’s Ticking Time Bomb & the Iran-Saudi Proxy War

Yemen's Embattled President Ali Abdullah Saleh

 

Defusing Yemen’s Ticking Time Bomb & the Iran-Saudi Proxy War

www.foreignpolicyreview.org  

Brooks Foreign Policy Review

 

September 7, 2009

by Webster Brooks

 

Yemen is a ticking time bomb with a dangerously short fuse. President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s government is under siege; battling an al Houthi insurgency, attacks by Sunn extremists rebranded as “al Queda of the Peninsula” (AQP) and fending off a growing secessionist struggle led by the Southern Movement.” Absent urgent American intervention, Yemen is on a course leading to the collapse of President Saleh’s government or the partitioning of Yemen into autonomous zones run by non-state actors. Concerns in the United States and Saudi Arabia are mounting as Iran has entered the fray backing the al Houthi Shiia (Zaida sect) insurgency. Like Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq, Yemen is emerging as a battlefield in a proxy war between Iran and the Saudi/American axis. Tehran is threatening to secure a beachhead in the strategic Southwest Arabian Peninsula, where Yemen’s oil, proximity to Saudi oilfields and control over critical Red Sea shipping lanes are up for grabs.

As the poorest Gulf oil state Yemen is the regional nerve center for trafficking arms, narcotics and harvested body parts, transiting jihadists and sponsoring Somali pirating operations. With President Saleh’s 30 year rule faltering, Saudi Arabia has intervened to contain the threat Yemen’s instability poses to its national security and to short circuit Iran’s growing influence.  Saudi Arabia is actively supporting President Saleh’s war to eliminate the Zaida Shiite sect (called al Houthi’s) in the mountains of northwestern Yemen along the Saudi border. The al Houthi are fighting to restore Shiite rule over Northern Yemen they lost to the Sunni in 1962. Shiite Muslims make up 40 percent of Yemen’s population. Saudi Arabia’s Sunni royalists are mortified at the prospects of the al Houthi Shiia revolt spreading across its border with Yemen to inflame the passions of its own repressed Shiia minority concentrated around its Eastern oilfields. Reports are also surfacing that Egypt is providing arms and ammunition to President Saleh’s government with American approval.

While admitting they are “consulting” with Saleh’s regime, Saudi leaders have disavowed claims by the al Houthi that Saudi planes have bombed rebel positions in Sa’adah province where the heaviest fighting is occurring. President Saleh has promised to crush the al Houthi resistance, or force them to accept a six-point peace plan that includes surrendering their weapons and control over key highways on the Saudi border. Pressing the offensive against the al Houthi with his most elite units, tanks and artillery divisions, Saleh has been forced to recruit local tribes to fight the insurgency.  Hundreds have been injured or killed and thousands displaced as the both sides battle with resolve.

 

The tenacity of the al Houthi insurgency has taken the Yemeni government by surprise. President Saleh has accused Iran of arming the northern rebels, and claims his government has uncovered caches of Iranian made short-range missiles and machine guns. Like the Saudi’s, Iran has denied the claims, which means the likelihood that both countries are arming proxy forces is true. In the spring Iranian Parliamentary Speaker Ali Larijani visited Yemen and affirmed Iran’s support for a unified Yemen. Yemen has entered into discussions with Tehran over Iranian investments in its energy platform, roads, dams and housing industry. Yemen reciprocated by announcing its support for Iran’s development of a civil nuclear program, much to the chagrin of the U.S. and Saudi Arabia.

Iran’s capacity to leverage Yemen’s huge Shiite community, the al Houthi insurgency and President Saleh’s weak position is substantial and can be projected over time. Indeed, Iran’s genius in cultivating ties with Hezbollah and Hamas are the result of decades of support. In addition to Iran’s support for the al Houthi insurgency, Tehran could also begin supporting the socialist-led Southern Movement coalition. Notwithstanding its Shiia roots, Iran could also funnel backdoor support to the resurgent elements of “Al Queda of the Peninsula,” (AQP) if the Sunni extremist target President Saleh’s regime or more importantly use Yemen as a base to continue their battle against neighboring Saudi Arabia’s royal family.    

Al Queda resurfaced in Yemen last year after its forces were routed by the House of Saud in the 2004-2007 jihadist war. Given Saudi concerns about AQP reigniting its insurgency inside the kingdom from neighboring Yemen, the Obama Administration’s plans to transfer 110 Yemeni detainees from Guantanamo Bay when the base closes has surfaced as a complicated issue. The Yemeni government wants to accept the detainees, insisting they will prosecute those who have committed acts of terrorism and rehabilitate the rest. However, after the mysterious prison break of 2006 when 23 al Queda members escaped from Yemen’s jails, the U.S. is reluctant to hand over the detainees to President Saleh. The Obama administration prefers to return the detainees to Saudi Arabia, who they believe has a better record of rehabilitating extremists. The Saudi’s don’t share the U.S.’s enthusiasm on the detainee issue. Ironically, last week in Jeddah, royal family member and Saudi counter terrorist head Prince Mohammed Bin Nayef narrowly escaped death after a Yemeni jihadist turning himself in for rehabilitation set off a suicide bomb in his presence.    

With Yemen on the brink of a renewed civil war between Saleh’s regime and the secessionist “Southern Movement” in South Yemen, the Obama administration has stepped up its call for a negotiated settlement.  After two years of peaceful protests led by civil service workers and soldiers whose pensions were never paid, the situation is escalating to violence.  In the last few months three opposition leaders have been murdered by northern security forces and seven newspapers have been shut down. The movement has been joined by socialist forces and sympathizers of the former South Yemen government who are fed up with the Saleh government’s rampant corruption and mismanagement of the economy. Ali Salem al-Bidh, the former Marxist leader who negotiated the first reunification agreement between North and South Yemen in 1990, has been named the new leader of the Southern Movement. Because the Southern Movement has no faith in negotiating with Saleh, they have called for the United Nations to lead reconciliation talks or allow the Gulf Cooperation Council to form a new caretaker government in lieu of new negotiations.

Once again, the United States finds itself caught in a diplomatic tangle. The Obama administration wants negotiations to unify Yemen. The Southern Movement and the al Houthi Shiia have no intention of entering direct negotiations with a corrupt regime that has criminalized the machinery of national governance and used authoritarian measures to suppress their just struggles.

In the final analysis, the al Houthi Shiia sect and the Southern Movement insurgencies can be resolved through negotiations and diplomacy, but not as long as President Saleh remains in office. The U.S. must insist on his replacement, a new negotiations process and the willingness to make compromises with the insurgents to preserve Yemen’s unity. If not, Yemen’s descent in chaos will continue, marked by sectarian violence, balkanization, and foreign proxy wars. It is time for the Obama administration to defuse the powder keg in Yemen before it explodes.  ***