Failed Israeli-Palestinian Peace Talks May Sink Obama’s Middle East Strategy

President Obama’s failure to restart Israeli-Palestinian peace talks has severely diminished his administration’s hopes of achieving a Two-State Solution. Persuading Israel and the Palestinians to reach an accord lay at the center of President Obama’s strategy to renew American power in the Middle East. By removing the Israel-Palestinian conflict as the destabilizing accelerant fueling anti-American sentiment, radical sympathies with salafi causes and potential wars between Israel, Lebanon and Syria, President Obama sought to usher in a political re-alignment in the region. Obama’s “New Middle East” envisaged in his Cairo speech embodied the majority of Sunni Arab governments accepting a Two-State Solution, recognizing Israel’s right to exist and working in partnership with the U.S. to curb Iranian influence.

President Obama’s plan hinged on securing two critical concessions; first Israel would be convinced to freeze settlements in the “occupied territories;” then Saudi King Abdullah would be persuaded to support the talks and win approval from the Arab world to bring the Palestinian Authority to the negotiating table. But President Obama miscalculated badly. When Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu refused to freeze settlement activity King Abdullah was forced to reject Obama’s request to support the talks and “normalize” relations with Israel. Left out in the cold, Mahmoud Abbas announced his resignation as Palestinian Authority President. A mere ten months after taking office, President Obama’s Middle East initiative had crashed and burned.    

Since early November the Obama administration has scrambled to revive the peace process with little success. Secretary of State Clinton announced that talks between Israel and the Palestinians could resume as soon as possible without preconditions. But the Palestinian Authority’s immediate rejection of Secretary Clinton’s offer underscores how wide the chasm has grown in the search for peace. Israeli support for Prime Minister Netanyahu’s position to expand settlements in the West Bank has increased. Israeli jets continue to bomb targets in Gaza suspected of being transit points for weapons smuggling and his center-right coalition with Avigdor Lieberman has grown stronger.

On the other side of the divide, the Palestinian Authority is in disarray. Having demanded a total ban on Israel settlements as a condition to resume talks, Mahmoud Abbas is in no position to offer more concessions. Many speculate that Abbas’s threat to resign as Palestinian Authority President is a bluff to force the U.S. to adopt a firmer position with Israel on the settlement issue. But Secretary Clinton’s November endorsement of Netanyahu’s offer to restrict settlement activities with exemptions for Jerusalem and the 3,000 settlement projects already under construction could hardly be considered getting tough with Israel.       

Increasingly, Mahmoud Abbas is viewed throughout the Palestinian Diaspora as a spent force. Abbas and the Fatah’s corruption, inability to deliver vital social services to its constituents and the failure to win anything meaningful after five years of negotiations with Israel and the U.S. has led to the P. A.’s disintegration on the West Bank. Notwithstanding his threats to resign, Mahmoud Abbas will likely cancel the January elections and remain the PA President by default. Calls by Egyptian President Mubarak, Jordan’s King Hussien II, Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak, and President Shimon Peres for Abbas to remain as President reflect growing concerns that the absence of a credible “moderate” PA President will result in the West Bank falling under HAMAS’s control. Nor can the prospects of another destructive civil war between Fatah and HAMAS be ruled out.  

Irrespective of whatever short-term maneuvers Mahmoud Abbas makes, momentum in the West Bank is passing over to HAMAS and more radical Palestinian forces. Similarly, Iran’s influence in the West Bank is likely to grow, even if Abbas maintains some semblance of power with the Palestinian Authority. With Israel moving further to the right and tension mounting in Gaza and the West Bank the prospects for renewed violence may be greater than the prospects of restarting peace talks.

Many will question why President Obama demanded that Israel halt settlement activities as a condition to open talks with the Palestinian Authority when it wasn’t necessary. That the President made such a demand without thoroughly discussing the issue with the Israelis first is even more baffling, as was his expectation that Saudi King Abdullah would support renewed peace talks with no commitment from Israel to stop settlement construction.  Whether President Obama was misled by Tel Aviv, underestimated the Israelis and the Saudis or overestimated his ability to transfer his substantial popularity into a foreign policy breakthrough remains unclear.  What we do know is that President Obama’s Israeli-Palestinian gambit failed miserably, and failure has consequences. President Obama is not the first, nor is he likely to be the last American president to be seduced by the dream of forging an Israeli-Palestinian peace. In the end, peace can only be made when the warring parties are ready for peace. Unfortunately, that day is still a long way off.

Al Maliki’s Defeat in 2010 Parliamentary Elections Will Be a Setback for President Obama in Iraq

Al Maliki’s Defeat in 2010 Parliamentary Elections Will Be a Setback for President Obama in Iraq

BFPR ANALYSIS

 

By Webster Brooks      

Washington, D.C. — The Iraqi legislature’s November 8 approval of a new election law and agreement to hold parliamentary elections before January 31, 2010 are bringing all the major problems in Baghdad to a head. Although President Obama praised Iraq’s parliament saying its action will keep U.S. troop withdrawals on track for completion by August 2011, the outcome of the election is fraught with danger for his administration. Iraq’s Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s re-election bid is in deep trouble. Renewed sectarian violence hangs over Iraq as two deadly al Queda bombings on October 25 of government ministry buildings in Baghdad has unsettled the country. Pro-Iranian Shiia forces have re-organized their election campaigns and are gaining momentum. Tension between Kurdish, Sunni Arab and Turkmen forces over the status of oil-rich Kirkuk are also intensifying as the Parliament’s new election law backed Kurdish demands that voter eligibility in Kirkuk (Tamim Province) will be based on the 2009 voting list. With the stakes and the political temperature rising, U.S. armed forces in Iraq are prepared to redeploy to Kirkuk as Iraq braces for outbreaks of violence in the run up to the election.

 

At the center of the electoral firestorm is Iraqi Prime Minister al-Maliki. In August al-Maliki announced his Dawa Party’s break with the major Shiia groups (Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) and Sadrist forces led by Muqtada al Sadr) to form a secular “State of the Law List” with his “Sunni allies.” After directing the Iraqi Army’s offensive to smash the Sadrists in Basrah in 2008, al-Maliki distanced himself from the ruling Shiia coalition in Iraq’s January 2009 provincial elections. Al-Maliki’s list won a plurality of 31% of the vote carrying most of the Shiia majority provinces by campaigning on a platform of nationalism, political secularism, restoring law and order, building a strong central government and supporting a Status of Forces Agreement to expel U.S. troops by 2011. After his strong 2009 campaign al-Maliki negotiated with Shiia groups for months, demanding 50% of the parliamentary seats for the DAWA Party to join the new Shiia-led “United Iraqi Alliance List.” Fearful that al-Maliki is attempting to consolidate power for himself and DAWA, the Shiia groups balked at his demand but left the door open for al-Maliki’s possible return. On November 4, Iranian Parliamentary leader Ali Larijani arrived in Baghdad for talks with Iraq’s Shiia parties, urging them to settle their differences and bring al-Maliki into the fold to maximize Shiia control over Iraq’s government in the upcoming elections. But rapprochement between al-Maliki and the new United Iraqi Alliance is not likely. Over the past year al-Maliki’s missteps have alienated key forces and developments have conspired to further undermine his power base.

 

In August, former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari led a press conference announcing the creation of a new Shiia majority electoral list; the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA). After losing the 2009 provincial elections, the Sadrists, the Fadhila Party and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) patched up their differences and formed the UIA. Shiia forces hold 128 of the 275 seats in parliament, but in the 2009 provincial elections the ISCI won only 12% of the vote, the Sadrist 9% and former Prime Minister Ibrahim Jaffari won 5%. Forced to adjust its platform, the dominant ISCI dropped its call to create a Shiia controlled autonomous region (Shiiastan) in southern Iraq to appease Muqtada al Sadr’s forces in Baghdad and central Iraq who opposed Shiia regional autonomy. To appeal to more mainstream voters and secularists, the Sadrist and ISCI jettisoned their rhetoric to establish Iraq as a theocratic (read Shiia) Islamic state, choosing instead to run as a secular list. To broaden their base, the UIA invited Sunni groups, independents and influential Shiia secularist politicians like Ahmed al Chalabi and former DAWA Prime Minister al-Jaafari to join their list. When powerful Shiia cleric Ayatollah Sistani endorsed an open ballot process allowing Iraqis to vote for individuals, parties or lists, instead of just coalitions, UIA backers supported the measure in parliament although it will narrow their advantage at the ballot box.

 

While the UIA is expanding its base, al-Maliki’s “State of Law List” efforts to widen its influence beyond its DAWA base have met with little success. Prominent Sunni and secularist leaders publicly courted by al-Maliki are refusing to support his bloc. Former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, Sunni leader Saleh Mutlak and Vice-President Tarik al Hashemi formed the anti-Iranian “Iraqi National Movement List,” advocating re-integration of former Baathist leaders. Sheikh Ahmad Abu Risha, a force in Anbar and Interior Minister Jawad Bolani of the Constitution Party decided to create their own “Unity Alliance.” Similarly, al-Maliki’s efforts to recruit Ninewa Province’s ruling al-Hadbaa Party and Sunni tribal leaders from Anbar, Tamim and Salahaddin met with failure.

 

The Sunni lack of support for al-Maliki is not surprising. Al-Maliki promised to pay salaries for former Sunni Awakening forces and integrate them into Iraq’s national army, but half of the Awakening soldiers were never paid. Recently, al-Maliki announced the armed forces payroll would be cut as government salaries and expenditures were absorbing 74% of the nation’s $58 billion budget, thus the Iraqi National Army will likely remain a predominantly Shiia military. Moreover, reconciliation efforts to reintegrate Baathist forces into the wellsprings of Iraq’s government still has not occurred and no agreement has been reached on distribution of oil revenues. Despite his break with the Sadrists and the Iraqi Supreme Islamic Council, the Sunni still view al-Maliki as an agent of Iranian ambition. Sunni dissatisfaction with al-Maliki was underscored by the twin al Queda bombings in October of government complexes in the middle of Baghdad. The blasts that killed hundreds seriously undermined al-Maliki’s claim that he has restored security to Iraq. As the attacks were directed against major government buildings it appears the bombings were a direct warning to al-Maliki that the Sunni can visit chaos on Iraq if their demands are not addressed.

 

With the passage of the new 2010 election law allowing the 2009 voter list to be used in Kirkuk’s elections the Kurds are poised to gain control of oil-rich Tamim Province and exercise virtual independence from Iraq. Sunni Arab and Turkmen groups argued for using the 2004 voting list to eliminate voter eligibility for thousands of Kurds that returned to Kirkuk after Saddam Hussein was toppled in 2003. How the new election law would be applied to Kirkuk was the most contentious issue delaying the passage of the new bill and it remains the most volatile flashpoint that could lead to mass sectarian violence between the Kurds, the Sunni and Turkmen. The Kurds are now positioned to increase its 53 seat voting bloc in Iraq’s Parliament and strike a deal with the Shiia UAI List to incorporate oil rich Kirkuk into Kurdistan’s autonomous region. The two major Kurdish groups (PUK and KDP) will not enter into an alliance with Nouri al-Maliki, who opposed Kurdish enlargement and dispatched Iraqi Army forces to attack the Kurdish peshmerga in 2008. Instead, the Kurds will support UIA control of parliament and have a major voice in naming a new Prime Minister to replace al-Maliki if the “State of Law List falters.”

 

While Prime Minister al-Maliki’s chances of being re-elected are growing dimmer, shifting alliances and unforeseen events could tip the scales back in his direction the next sixty days. Iraq is a very unpredictable place. Prime Minister al-Maliki’s emphasis on secularism, law and order and building a unitary Iraq rather than ceding more autonomy to the Kurds and Shiia has been viewed with great favor by the Obama administration. And while his outreach to the Sunni may fall short of winning allies for the election, it has altered the political dynamic in Iraq. For the moment, the revamped Shiia led United Iraq Alliance has the momentum to win a working Parliamentary majority and name a new Prime Minister.  Among al-Maliki’s potential successors are Adel Abdul Mehdi, the Vice-President and a senior leader of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, and Ibrahim al-Jaafari, Iraq’s first elected prime minister. A pro-Iran leaning UIA victory will mean Tehran will strengthen its position in Iraq as the United States prepares to accelerate troop withdrawals at the end of March. The referendum on the Status of Forces Agreement scheduled for approval during the 2010 parliamentary has been withdrawn and will proceed on schedule for all U.S. forces to be withdrawn by August 31, 2011. If American forces can avoid being drawn into the maelstrom of Iraqi politics and sectarian violence President Obama may have the good fortune to exit U.S. troops without significant losses and augment his forces in Afghanistan. While an orderly U.S. withdrawal from Iraq will be viewed by many in the United States as a victory, in the larger strategic sense Iran’s ability to gain the upper hand in Iraq and solidify its control over the Persian Gulf would mark a major strategic setback for the U.S. Iraq’s 2010 elections and the fate of Prime Minister al-Maliki will significantly impact the future of American power in Gulf region as democratic elections continue to cast a large footprint across the Middle East.              

 

Obama Can Win Afghanistan With Soft Partition & the “Reverse McCrystal Strategy”

Obama Can Win Afghanistan With Soft Partition & the “Reverse McCrystal Strategy”

by Webster Brooks

Today, the Center for New Politics and Policy (CNPP) released its recommendations to abate the Taliban insurgency and stabilize Afghanistan with a new strategy paper called “Obama Can Win Afghanistan with Soft Partition & the Reverse McCrystal Strategy” (RMS). The RMS report highlights recommendations to halt the Taliban’s momentum, reconfigure US/NATO force structure on the ground with 20,000 additional troops, stabilize Afghanistan’s post-election government and maximize vital reconstruction efforts to unleash Afghanistan’s state building efforts. The Reverse McCrystal Strategy provides a framework for President Obama’s efforts over the next 18 months to achieve his central goal of preventing a Taliban takeover and denying al Queda a platform in Afghanistan to launch attacks against the United States. The report was drafted by Senior Fellow Webster Brooks, Director of Brooks Foreign Policy Review; the international affairs arm of the Center for New Politics and Policy. The following summary of the Reverse McCrystal Strategy was released on October 19, 2009 in Washington, D.C.

 Summary           

The critical moment for President Obama to announce a decision on America’s strategy to win the war in Afghanistan is fast approaching. In the ongoing series of White House war councils, debate continues on General Stanley McCrystal’s August report that stated “Failure to gain the initiative and reverse insurgent momentum in the near-term (next 12-18 months)….risks an outcome where defeating the insurgency is no longer possible.”  Over the next 18 months President Obama faces four critical questions: 1) Developing a response to stem the Taliban’s growing influence and putting the insurgency on the defensive, 2) Redeploying U.S./NATO/ANA forces to tilt the battlefield in their favor, 3) Brokering an agreement to form a power-sharing post-election government and 4) Reorganizing state building and reconstruction efforts to create the foundation needed to sustain Afghanistan. The Reverse McCrystal Strategy (RMS) represents the best and most realistic strategy to achieve these objectives in the next 18 months and prepare for the gradual withdrawal of U.S. troops over the long run (3-4 years). 

The centerpiece of the Reverse McCrystal Strategy calls for redeploying U.S./NATO military and economic power to consolidate Northern, Central and Western Afghanistan into a “maximum safety zone.” Securing these three regions now where 65% of all Afghans live, and linking them to vital reconstruction efforts is the most effective way to diminish the Taliban’s momentum and solidify critical mass around the central government. Supported by 20,000 additional American troops, U.S./NATO operations would shift from conducting “clear, hold and build missions” inside the Taliban dominated Pashtun belt to providing maximum security to Kabul and the 23 identified “median and low-risk” provinces where the Taliban’s presence is minimal but spreading (see map). Recent Taliban advances outside the Pashtun belt suggest that U.S. forces engaging their adversaries from Kunduz in Northeastern Afghanistan to the southern province of Helmand are overstretched and under resourced. General McCrystal’s request for 40,000 to 80,000 troops to pursue the elusive Taliban plays directly into the Taliban’s hit and run strategy. Meanwhile, the Taliban continues to maneuver and expand the battlefield, launching surprise offensives in new areas. What is most important now for President Obama and the faltering Afghan government is reversing the Taliban’s momentum by consolidating order, safety and stability over a significant section of Afghanistan. Demonstrating real progress and a model of a viable state is of the utmost urgency. Securing Northern, Central and Western Afghanistan would not only demonstrate tangible success, it would decisively impact the balance of power on the ground.         

The Reverse McCrystal Strategy also calls on U.S./NATO forces to scale back forward operations for one year in the Pashtun belt where the Taliban enjoys real support, superior battlefield knowledge and strategic depth with supporting rear-guard bases in Pakistan. The tactical pullback in the Pashtun belt would be done in conjunction with the mass redeployment to Northern, Central and Western Afghanistan. A “demilitarized zone” and safe transit corridors to-and-from the Pushtun-belt provinces would be established for commercial purposes and safe passage. In addition, US/NATO forces would continue the “limited use” of Drone attacks and Special Forces operations on the Pakistan/Afghanistan border to interdict arms shipments and infiltrating al Queda elements. Redoubled efforts in cooperation with Pakistan’s government to destroy critical Taliban support networks in Baluchistan and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas is of critical importance. Concurrent with these changes, Afghanistan’s government would open discussions with Pashtun tribal leaders, parliamentary officials and “willing” Taliban elements over a potential framework for regional autonomy and other national reforms.

While the RMS embraces General McCrystal’s call for a shift from defeating the Taliban by force of arms to creating safe havens, it reverses the battlefield deployment and political focus by winning the hearts and minds of two-thirds of Afghanistan’s provinces first. It optimizes opportunities to contain and undermine the Taliban by negating the most compelling factor powering its surge; the prevailing state of chaos across Afghanistan led by an incompetent and corrupt Karzai government and criminal warlords.

By increasing troop levels, resetting US/NATO/ forces and tactically pulling back in the Pashtun Belt, President Obama will gain valuable breathing room to bring America’s allies on side, settle the post-election political governmental crisis and train additional Afghan National Army troops. Whether there is a run-off election or not between Hamid Karzai and Abdullah Abdullah, it is critical that both men participate in a new coalition government. The effort to stabilize Northern, Central and Western Afghanistan will require significant compromise between Uzbeks, Tajiks, Hazaras and Turkmen who were the core of the Northern Alliance that helped topple the Taliban in 2001. Many of these forces also supported Abdullah Abdullah in the first round of the presidential elections. For better or worse, as a Pashtun, Hamid Karzai can still be a valuable asset in talks with provincial leaders on instituting various forms of autonomy in Pashtun communities. While the character of the Taliban’s insurgency is Islamic-based, the Taliban has remained a predominately ethnic-Pashtun movement. Increased autonomy may create new vehicles and greater choice to incorporate Pashtun cultural, religious and traditional practices into provincial governance structures, thereby dispelling notions that only the Taliban can fulfill these aspirations. The essential point of autonomy in the Pashtun belt is that increased empowerment at the provincial level will afford Pashtun more choices and resources to exert independence from the Taliban. 

Critics of the Reverse McCrystal Strategy will undoubtedly claim that any pullback-temporary or otherwise- from taking the fight to the Taliban is tantamount to capitulation or surrender. But there is no purely military solution to end the war in Afghanistan. The consensus view is that sufficient damage must be inflicted on extremists Taliban elements to create conditions that will compel moderate and wavering Taliban elements to align themselves with the central government. By creating a safe and viable Afghanistan state in Northern, Central and Western Afghanistan supported by a majority of the Afghan people, the Taliban’s rationale that they are the only force that can restore order will be severely undermined. Containing the Taliban’s advances by a soft partition of the Pashtun belt will halt their expansion and reverse their momentum. Increased efforts with Pakistan to neutralize their rear-guard support bases will bottle the Taliban up in a confined space. Offers of greater autonomy and redefining their relationship to the Afghan government will stimulate more debate among the Pashtun people about where their future interests lie and further undercut support for the Taliban. The Reverse McCrystal Strategy in its initial phase will significantly weaken the Taliban militarily and drain its political support among the Pashtun people. Moreover, RMS can accomplish all these achievements with the lowest possible U.S./NATO casualty rates. With public opinion weakening in America and Europe for the war, tangible success in stabilizing 65% of Afghanistan today combined with minimum casualties is the formula to sustain support for the cause in Afghanistan. If and when US/NATO forces have to move decisively to fully re-engage militarily in the Pashtun belt they would confront a far less formidable adversary.

Prosecuting unpopular wars against insurgencies that cannot be won militarily is sometimes the burden of policing empire. There are no easy options for President Obama in Afghanistan. What is required now is an imaginative approach that breaks with conventional thinking. The Reverse McCrystal Strategy offers both. ******

Kurdistan’s 2009 Elections Special Report:Brooks Foreign Policy Review

Brooks Foreign Policy Review Special Report:

Kurdistan’s 2009 Elections:

Available now at: www.foreignpolicyreview.org 

Election Results Raise New Questions About Kurdistan’s Relationship With Baghdad

• Presidential and Provincial Election Results
• Commentary on Elections: by Musings on Iraq Blogspot
• Analysis: Kurdistan’s Strained Relations with Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki

Go To: http://www.foreignpolicyreview.org/foreignpolicyreviewkurdistanelections.html

Brooks Foreign Policy Review: Iran’s Presidential Election Special Report: Ahmadinejad’s Landslide Victory Challenged in Iran’s Streets

Saturday, June 13

BROOKS FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW SPECIAL REPORT ON IRAN’S 2009 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS  REPORT AT OUR WEBSITE AT: www.foreignpolicyreview.org

• Election Results
• Blog Updates from Iran and Diasphora
• Election Analysis
• Election Video Coverage
• Commentary and Reactions

Special Elections Link:  http://www.foreignpolicyreview.org/brooksreviewiran.html

Taiwan: Identity Politics and Economic Free Fall in the Other China

by Collin Spears, BFPR Chief Foreign Policy Correspondent

The Other China, The Republic of China (Taiwan) does not have the myriad ethnic diversity of the People’s Republic of China (China). The latter has 56 ethnicities, minorities making up 8% of its 1.3 billion citizens. Taiwan has 23 million people, ethnic Han Chinese making up 98% of the population. The remaining 2% is composed of various aboriginal tribes. Unlike China, Taiwan is a young democracy and its politics have historically been affected by group affiliation, but these ethnic factions are all within the Han majority. Taiwan’s identity politics has and will continue to affect, not only its internal politics during the current economic crisis, but also Cross-Straits relations.

The Taiwanese Han population is divided into Mainlanders (waisheng ren) and “Native Taiwanese” (bensheng ren). The Mainlanders are primarily Chinese National Party (Guomindong, KMT) loyalists who retreated from China with the military at the conclusion of the Chinese Civil War in 1949. This group, from various provinces, used Mandarin as a lingua franca. Although, currently 13% of the population, they have historically held disproportionate political power until the early 1990’s. The Native Taiwanese can be further divided into Fujianese (Fujian ren), the vast majority of Taiwan’s population, and Hakka (Kejia ren). Although linguistically distinct groups, both have resided on the island for at least 4 centuries; combined they are roughly 85% of Taiwan’s population. The Natives were culturally and politically oppressed by the military dictatorship that ruled Taiwan during a period of marshal law known as the “White Terror”, which lasted from 1949 to 1987. During this period, for many Natives, the Mainlanders were seen as oppressors and the KMT was viewed as their instrument. The reality is more complicated, as neither group has been completely endogenous.

ISRAEL’S GAZA INVASION AND OBAMA’S ONE AND ONE-HALF STATE SOLUTION

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 Israel’s invasion of the Gaza Strip and its drive to inflict defeat on HAMAS came as no surprise to the incoming Obama administration. After extensive preparation the offensive launched during George Bush’s final days is calculated to give Israel a one month window to decapitate HAMAS and destroy enough of its military infrastructure to change the political facts on the ground. What comes next is a new interim strategy; the One and One-Half State Solution.

Once Israel has visited as much destruction as possible in Gaza over the next two weeks, Israel’s next prime minister, Palestinian Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas and soon-to-be President Obama will proceed to craft incremental agreements. Substantial resources will be committed to rebuild the West Bank, while the war torn Gaza Strip is left economically and politically isolated. In other words, the failed Two-State Solution will devolve into a de-facto One and One-Half State Solution until such time as Gaza is subdued and purged of its extremist efforts.

If this new strategic turn sounds highly unlikely, its far more feasible than the prospects of Abbas and Al Fatah reconciling their differences with HAMAS. HAMAS’s shocking electoral victory over Al Fatah in 2005, and smashing Al Fatah in the Gaza Civil War in 2007 has left more bad blood on the floor than can be overcome in the short run. Nor is reconciliation on Abbas’s agenda. Israel’s strike to neutralize  HAMAS’s leadership and degrade its growing military capability was designed to elevate Al Fatah to the only legitimate internationally recognized representative of the Palestinian people. Thus the stage is set to engineer new talks favorable to Israel and Abbas that will rise to the top of Obama’s crowded foreign policy agenda when he takes office.

In the short run calls from the European Union, the United Nations and the broader international community for a cease fire will fall on deaf ears. Israel’s air and ground war will likely continue up to Obama’s inauguration, or until international pressure for a cease fire outweighs the military value of completing the mission. Tel Aviv’s phantom goal of eliminating HAMAS’s capacity to launch rockets into Israel is a thinly veiled justification for an open-ended invasion and occupation of Gaza.
Predictably the invasion was backed by U.S. Secretary of State Rice with a familiar refrain that the U.S. wants a cease fire, but cannot support a return to the “status quo ante.” Under the slogan of searching for a “durable peace” the U.S. will stand by Israel until the job is done.

In a repeat performance of Israel’s 2006 invasion of Lebanon, the Sunni-led Arab regimes in Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the smaller Gulf States are all supporting Israel’s actions in the hope that HAMAS will be severely crippled or defeated. HAMAS’s downsizing will relieve the Arab kings and sultans of the burden of hypocritically supporting HAMAS’s anti-Israel and anti-U.S. leadership backed by Shiia-led Iran and enjoying support on the Arab street.

It is not insignificant that today the three most popular leaders in the Sunni majority Middle East are Shiia Muslims (Nasrallah-Lebanon’s Hezbollah leader, Syrian President Bashir Assad and Iranian President Ahmadinejad). More importantly, the Sunni Arab monarchs want to see Iran’s support and strength diminished by the defeat of HAMAS which secures funds, arms and political support from Tehran. Iran and Shiia Islam’s influence that is metastasizing across the Middle East is a direct threat to the Sunni monarch’s authoritarian rule. Another important component of the invasion strategy to reduce Iran’s profile is to demonstrate to Syria that its best interests would be served by jettisoning Iran and joining Israel, the Palestinian Authority and the Quartet’s new peace born-of-war solution. For Egypt and Saudi Arabia who have invested a great deal in promoting their own Israeli-Palestinian peace plans and cease fire agreements, HAMAS’s defeat is critical to stopping Iran’s momentum.

Iran and the Lebanese Hezbollah have resisted attempts to be drawn into the conflict. While condemning the invasion Hezbollah will not unleash its own rocket attacks against northern Israel unless HAMAS is in jeopardy of being totally wiped out. Hezbollah’s priority is consolidating its political gains from the 2006 victory against Israel and preparing to win the parliamentary majority in Lebanon’s upcoming elections.

Despite the military setbacks HAMAS will suffer, it will survive and rebuild its strength in Gaza. Iran and HAMAS are looking to the long run and are confident that its Al Fatah rivals will lose support over time for its complicity with Israel and the U.S. in supporting the invasion. Iran will bide its time and settle for being the beneficiary of heightened anti-U.S. sentiments that continue to deepen across the Middle East. In the West Bank, al Fatah is attempting to suppress mass demonstrations by Palestinians supporting HAMAS and Abbas has even blamed HAMAS for starting the conflict, as if who shot first is the essential question at hand.

In the final analysis there is not going to be a comprehensive Israeli-Palestinian peace until there are peacemakers and peacekeepers on both sides of the conflict. Between the Israelis, Al Fatah and HAMAS, the invasion places the prospects for peace even further in the distant future. That is precisely why the quest for reconciliation between HAMAS and Al Fatah has been abandoned by the U.S., Israel and the Palestinian Authority.

So what will the new Obama administration do?  The conflict has forced Obama’s hand. He cannot retreat or put the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on the back burner. Nor is it guaranteed that a cease fire will occur. Wars have uncertain outcomes, and the West Bank could erupt even if Hezbollah keeps its powder dry in Lebanon. Moreover, Obama has two wars to prosecute in Afghanistan and Iraq that are far more strategic to the U.S. and its allies. The Persian Gulf is still the critical ground zero of the Middle East, and its oil is the lubricant powering a tottering world economy that cannot withstand another short-term energy jolt.

With no prospects of a comprehensive peace in the Levant, Obama will have to go slow and embrace the concept of extracting whatever short term concessions he can out of the situation. The de-facto One and One-Half State Solution will likely be his best option. Obama and the Europeans could pursue a soft strategy of building agreements short of changing any of the base terms of the Roadmap. Massive injections of capital and economic development projects in the West Bank will be critical to pacifying West Bank Palestinians and doing what hasn’t been done; improving their daily lives. They are tired of empty talk, promises, and peace plans that yield more violence and suffering.

Israel would have to agree to stop construction of its settlements in the West Bank and roll back some of its roadblocks and checkpoints. Abbas and the new incoming Israeli Prime Minister (most likely Netanyahu) would agree to a cease fire in the West Bank. Egypt, Jordan and the Saudis would need to invest in the West Bank development initiative with substantial support from international NGO’s to monitor the Palestinian Authority administration of finances and development projects. A small international peace keeping force may also be inserted in the West Bank. In short, the goal would be to economically and politically isolate Gaza and HAMAS, but not militarily attack HAMAS. Presumably, Israel’s invasion would reduce HAMAS’s capacity and appetite for conflict. Palestinians would therefore have two distinct paths to choose from; a potentially prosperous and peaceful West Bank or a struggling and chaotic Gaza.

The One and One-Half State solution is a roll of the dice, but it is a chance to try something new to  produce tangible progress in the West Bank instead of more non-productive peace talks. It is a dangerous initiative that would require patience to endure the blow back that will come from turning Gaza into an island of desolation for an undetermined time. If Obama is lucky, HAMAS’s may actually be forced  concentrate on rebuilding GAZA and defer on launching rockets into southern Israel.  The struggle in the Levant is moving to another level. Condoleezza Rice was correct when she said there can be no return to the “status quo ante.” Going backwards is not an option or possibility. The question is whether developments move in the direction of peace and stability or towards a deepening of the crisis. The hour for all sides to cast off unrealistic dreams committed to paper in far away places like Oslo is at hand.